From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Sun Jul 13 2003 - 18:11:34 MDT
Robin Hanson wrote:
> On 7/11/2003, Dan Fabulich wrote:
> > > >... most people, asked to make a deliberate choice between
> > > >status/power and the good of the tribe, would either choose the good of
> > > >the tribe, or feel guilty about not doing so ...
> > >
> > > I don't disagree that many would feel guilty, but I'm not sure your
> > > implication follows.
> >
> >I think you misunderstood this point: the claim seems to be that people
> >who chose to betray the tribe would feel guilty *instead* of feeling happy
> >about their decision; this suggests that your two metrics are at odds on
> >this central fundamental case.
>
> A happiness metric does not require that people be informed about the
> consequences of their choice.
Of course not. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your argument, but I thought
the claim was: "We can think of two ways of identifying what you'd
'really' want. First, we can see if you'd be happier if you got it.
Second, we can see if you'd choose to get it when they are briefly and
privately informed. In the case of betraying the tribe, the person would
do this if briefly and privately informed. Therefore, this is what they
really want."
I'm claiming, against this: "But it wouldn't, in fact, make them happy.
That shows that it's not 'really' what they want... not REALLY." Or, at
the very least, that in this fundamental case, the metrics seem to point
in opposite directions: one seems to claim that this IS what we'd really
want, because we'd pick it, but another argues that it ISN'T, because,
whether or not we knew it beforehand, we wouldn't be happy with it after
the fact.
> >As I have argued before, these "dark pictures" of human society for
> >which Eliezer has consistently taken you to task constitute exactly the
> >sort of conceptual scheme that any plausible normative component of
> >your theory would argue that we shouldn't endorse to other people, and
> >which, as we discussed at length in an earlier thread, we shouldn't
> >believe. Your philosophy does not warrant its own assertion; it is not
> >rational to claim to have it, and it could never be so if it were true.
> >... economic data in the world can and should be cast aside as a merely
> >"useful" model, as it runs afoul with our strongest held ethical
> >principles: principles about the ethics of belief and group
> >association. I argue that, whatever the economic data may show, we'll
> >always be free to adopt a metaphysical stance about "real" cognitive
> >beliefs that I might call "morally uplifting" and which you might call
> >"self-flattering". ;) The data doesn't show what we should do or say;
> >only our moral convictions can show that. And, in this case, it seems
> >obvious that anti-realism about the economic data is exactly what's in
> >order here. I morally exhort you to take an anti-realistic stance to
> >the "data" you've been observing and to adopt more conventional
> >metaphysical stance in a hurry.
>
> You say "I argue that ... anti-realism ... is ... in order here" but I
> don't see that you've made an argument here (or even made clear what
> your position consists of). If the argument is elsewhere, you'll have
> to give me a more specific cite than "an earlier thread."
The "earlier thread" in question is the "Should we believe the truth"
thread. But I'll clarify my argument here to make it explicit.
Your argument is that we're self-decieved: we are "really"
untrustworthy, in the sense that we "really" want things that no one would
trust us if they knew we wanted them (and that we would act to get them).
You follow that up with the claim that if individuals become honest to and
with themselves, they'll suffer serious consequences.
Any plausible normative corollary to this claim would require that either:
1 we should cast off our "self-deception" and be honest to ourselves, come
what may, accepting that we all really want terrible things and that no
one should be trusted in the ways that they've been pressured to claim, or
2 we shouldn't believe the truth, as you argued in an earlier thread.
As you may recall, I argued that 2 was self-contradictory in the "Should
we believe the truth" thread: the short version of that argument was that
it was contrary to 2's own normative principles to believe that it was
true. So, if it were true, we shouldn't believe it: it would be its own
first casualty. I claimed further that 2 was in violation of normative
logic: that, rather, the truth is what we should believe. (This is
because I shouldn't believe that "there is some X such that X is true but
I shouldn't believe X.") I can rehearse this argument at greater length,
if you like.
I admit that I was overlooking the possibility that you might be claiming
1 when I charged you with contradiction... Of course, I was probably
overlooking it because I already knew that you thought 2 had a lot of
merit, and that you were presenting this argument to get us to conclude
that 2 was, in fact, right. Turning now to 1, we immediately see that the
normative argument against accepting 1 is obvious: many bad consequences
would result, at least in the short term, to any individual who took it
seriously and ran with it. Indeed, 1 seems so difficult that it would
certainly require a very strong argument to convince anyone to act on it;
I claim that this argument is not at hand.
Instead of accepting 1 or 2, which are both entailed by your first claim,
I argue that we should reject that claim entirely, which keeps us from
having to choose between a dreadful situation and a contradiction.
I argue that we are free to do this because the claim is philosophical,
and we are therefore allowed to pick our own metaphysics to suit us. In
particular, being anti-realistic about the set of desires D, those which
the economist seems to find that we have, allows us to act correctly on
the economic data without believing anything that would lead us to have to
accept 1 or 2. We can say, without contradiction, that the economist has
found a set of things that might be called desires but aren't "really"
what we desire at all.
> >This is exactly right... which is why I argue that the argument is a
> >philosophical one, and not (per se) an economic one. I know you'll
> >object to that notion, but what the economists are trying to figure out
> >is something entirely different from what the philosophers are trying
> >to figure out.
>
> I think the idea of a sharp demarcation between these disciplines
> doesn't work here, because this is a topic that both have make
> contributions to.
Here, you may rightly try to turn my argument on its head: just as we
shouldn't let economists get the last say, perhaps we shouldn't let the
philosophers get the last say either. Perhaps, but I think I can safely
argue that the economist's input ends when he tells us which theory is the
best economic theory; the philosopher's job begins precisely when we are
deciding whether the best economic theory is "real" or just "useful".
You say we can't demarcate these tasks so cleanly, but I think the
division of labor here is clear and natural. The economist made his
contribution by restricting our choices to economically acceptable
theories: now we put on our philosopher hats to choose whether that theory
will get the attitude of "realism" or "anti-realism." The economist, on
this point, has no *further* contribution to make.
As anti-realists, we can reject 1 AND 2: we can claim that we are NOT
self-decieved, avoiding 1, without believing a falsehood, avoiding 2. 1
and 2 both look bad. Why, I ask you, would you want either of those when
a good and reasonable alternative was available that didn't have these
dark consequences?
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Jul 13 2003 - 18:22:03 MDT