From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Sat Jul 12 2003 - 01:53:07 MDT
On 7/11/2003, Dan Fabulich wrote:
> > >... most people, asked to make a deliberate choice between
> > >status/power and the good of the tribe, would either choose the good of
> > >the tribe, or feel guilty about not doing so ...
> >
> > I don't disagree that many would feel guilty, but I'm not sure your
> > implication follows.
>
>I think you misunderstood this point: the claim seems to be that people
>who chose to betray the tribe would feel guilty *instead* of feeling happy
>about their decision; this suggests that your two metrics are at odds on
>this central fundamental case.
A happiness metric does not require that people be informed about the
consequences of their choice.
> > This is the heart of our dispute. As in discussions of whether the
> > upload, or its copy, would "really be you", there is an element of
> > definition or choice in looking into a complex contradictory person and
> > saying what their "real" preferences are. If you aren't going to appeal
> > to any criteria about why this is a good choice, but just declare it by
> > definition, then there isn't much more to talk about.
>
>This is exactly right... which is why I argue that the argument is a
>philosophical one, and not (per se) an economic one. I know you'll object
>to that notion, but what the economists are trying to figure out is
>something entirely different from what the philosophers are trying to
>figure out.
I think the idea of a sharp demarcation between these disciplines doesn't
work here, because this is a topic that both have make contributions to.
>Certainly the economists should have some input into this question, but
>they certainly shouldn't get the last word, even if all of the data points
>them squarely at a certain model in particular. ...
Sure, agreed.
>As I have argued before, these "dark pictures" of human society for which
>Eliezer has consistently taken you to task constitute exactly the sort of
>conceptual scheme that any plausible normative component of your theory
>would argue that we shouldn't endorse to other people, and which, as we
>discussed at length in an earlier thread, we shouldn't believe.
>Your philosophy does not warrant its own assertion; it is not rational to
>claim to have it, and it could never be so if it were true. ...
>economic data in the world can and should be cast aside as a merely
>"useful" model, as it runs afoul with our strongest held ethical
>principles: principles about the ethics of belief and group association.
>I argue that, whatever the economic data may show, we'll always be free to
>adopt a metaphysical stance about "real" cognitive beliefs that I might
>call "morally uplifting" and which you might call "self-flattering". ;)
>The data doesn't show what we should do or say; only our moral convictions
>can show that. And, in this case, it seems obvious that anti-realism
>about the economic data is exactly what's in order here.
>I morally exhort you to take an anti-realistic stance to the "data" you've
>been observing and to adopt more conventional metaphysical stance in a
>hurry.
You say "I argue that ... anti-realism ... is ... in order here" but I don't
see that you've made an argument here (or even made clear what your position
consists of). If the argument is elsewhere, you'll have to give me a more
specific cite than "an earlier thread."
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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