From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Thu Jun 26 2003 - 11:14:29 MDT
Brett Paatsch wrote:
> Lee Corbin writes:
>
>> The psychological problem that most people have
>> against uploading, of course, is that of "being
>> inside a computer", or of knowing that one is really
>> just on a silicon chip.
>
> Perhaps its because I haven't read enough about it, but,
> the reservation, I have against uploading, and also
> cryonics is that I just not convinced that, appearances
> not withstanding, the me that goes in, will be the me
> that comes out.
With cryonics, most people are concerned about the uncertainty of the
technology being able to adequately repair the damage, both pre-existing age
and disease-related, and the damage caused by the cryonic processes itself.
But it appears your concern is of more of a philosophical nature related to
the nature of personal identity.
>
> Perhaps it is a bit different between uploading and
> cryonics because uploading changes the matter substrate
> on which one perceives one exists more radically.
I would have *much* more confidence in uploading to a more robust and high
performance substrate compared to risking the damage of freezing and
restoring my biological substrate.
>
> Let's stipulate that the means to do a complete atomic
> level recreation of all parts of a cryonically preserved
> person, including the sense of self, and a consistent set
> of memories from one's early childhood up until the
> moment one voluntarily consented to undergo a cryonic
> procedure. Like consenting to a life saving general
> anaesthetic. Let's assume the nanotech is good enough
> to rebuild the exact atomic replica of person X.
So you've duplicated the complete physical body, at some moment in time, to
the atomic level. To me, that appears to be sufficient, but I realize many
persons *feel* and suspect we are more than physical machines and they
search for that something special in terms of quantum theory, mysticism, or
non-materialistic philosophy.
>
> My current sense is that, to everyone else person X
> *will* appear to be the *same* person both before
> and after. Person X prime, (Xprime), will perceive himself
> to be person X, but it seems to me that neither Xprime's
> opinion, nor the opinions of other people are fully
> satisfactory when one puts oneself in the place of person
> X considering undergoing cryonics or uploading. It seems
> that person X's predisposition to cryonics or uploading is
> something of a leap of faith or perhaps the sense of having
> nothing little to lose.
If X, and all his friends observe that he is the same in all measurable
ways, then what could be missing?
>
> How can X know that Xprime is any more than a very
> complete copy? The same process that reproduced one
> Xprime from the information in X could also produced
> multiple copies.
Yes, the idea of multiple copies is outside our experience and threatening
to our evolved sense of self, and raises some interesting questions of how
society would deal with their presence, but I don't see anything paradoxical
about the concept.
>
> Let me try and use what seems to be an appropriate
> analogy. A candle flame, 'energy' can be transferred or
> spread from one candle (a matter substrate) to another
> without being extinguished. The flame might also be
> extinguished on the original substrate and relit. Or with
> nanotechnology we may rebuilt a candle that, atom by
> atom, is the same as the original candle and relight it,
> but the *particular* flame, the *particular* energy flow
> on the substrate will still have been interrupted. Indeed
> it will have been snuffed out.
>
> It seems to me that "death" may be analogous to the
> candle flame (i.e. a continuous flow of energy dancing
> on a matter substrate). Because we eat and exchange
> atoms throughout our lives the analogy could be
> extended to say wax is added to the candle whilst the
> flame continues to burn. But, extinguish the flame, stop
> the continuous energy flow, and perhaps you extinguish
> the continuing phenomena, the 'super-consciousness',
> (to coin a term covering conscious and unconscious
> processes) that are the subjective experience of life. I
> guess what I'm positing is that, one's life, one's self,
> may depends on continuity. Perhaps something
> important to the identity of a person is lost if the energy
> flow or 'super-conscious' is interrupted. Actually the
> consciousness is interrupted sometimes in life but not
> along with the unconscious so far as I know.
People have been completely "brain dead" for significant periods of time and
then revived with no loss of personal identity. (However it is open to
debate whether their soul got bored and departed.)
I'm not aware of anything physical that is truly continuous as you describe
it. If you look closely you see that pieces of the universe appear to be
moving around in interesting patterns. To me, the patterns carry all the
information, and are all that's really of interest. A subset of those
patterns is organized in such a way that it thinks it is separate, and
perceives a "self".
>
> Following a successful cryonics procedure everyone,
> including the reconstructed X, Xprime, thinks X has
> been preserved, this I freely concede. But X the
> original, is no longer around or in a position to confirm
> that X the original, X's super-consciousness, X's self,
> rather than an excellent replication has actually emerged
> from the process.
>
> So, does it finally come down to a "leap of faith" on behalf
> of the potential cryonaut or the potential upload that
> *they*, X, will *actually* survive?
But why does it matter? There's no need for a leap of faith if everything
works as before. Your X-prime would know this intuitively. He would be the
same as before, and much more the same person than he was a week ago, or a
year ago, or 20 years ago.
>
> Or, and this I would like to be convinced of, are there in
> fact deeper levels of understanding still available to an
> inquiring mind, *this* side of the cryonics or upload
> procedure, perhaps in physics, or perhaps around
> (or avoiding) the fuzzy phenomenon I've termed the
> super-conscious, that would allow one to more rationally
> avoid the sense that the prospective cryonaut or upload
> are undertaking a one way journey that is in many ways
> every bit as much a "leap of faith" for them as the "leaps
> of faith" taken by people of religious viewpoints since
> time immemorial?
I remember going through similar thoughts in my past, and feeling like I was
abandoning the cultural framework I had acquired as a child, and traveling
into the void. Coming out the other side, with no visible means of support,
I felt more liberated, more confident, and free of much excessive baggage.
>
> - Brett Paatsch
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