From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@optusnet.com.au)
Date: Thu Jun 26 2003 - 15:35:52 MDT
Jef Allbright writes:
> Brett Paatsch wrote:
> > Lee Corbin writes:
> >
> >> The psychological problem that most people have
> >> against uploading, of course, is that of "being
> >> inside a computer", or of knowing that one is really
> >> just on a silicon chip.
> >
> > Perhaps its because I haven't read enough about it, but,
> > the reservation, I have against uploading, and also
> > cryonics is that I just not convinced that, appearances
> > not withstanding, the me that goes in, will be the me
> > that comes out.
>
> With cryonics, most people are concerned about the
> uncertainty of the technology being able to adequately
> repair the damage, both pre-existing age and disease-
> related, and the damage caused by the cryonic
> processes itself.
It has seemed that way to me. And these are valid
practical considerations.
>
> But it appears your concern is of more of a philosophical
> nature related to the nature of personal identity.
Yes. But if there is not a convincing case able to be made
to someone like me (who is genuinely open minded but
sceptical) that personal identity will be retained, cryonics
doesn't just have a philosophical problem it has a major
selling problem. If one can only approach cryonics with
a leap of faith mentality it is competing with religions.
> >
> > Perhaps it is a bit different between uploading and
> > cryonics because uploading changes the matter substrate
> > on which one perceives one exists more radically.
>
> I would have *much* more confidence in uploading to
> a more robust and high performance substrate compared
> to risking the damage of freezing and restoring my
> biological substrate.
So would I but cryonics is possibly available as a solution
now but is not exactly thriving in the market, uploading is
not available now.
> >
> > Let's stipulate that the means to do a complete atomic
> > level recreation of all parts of a cryonically preserved
> > person, including the sense of self, and a consistent set
> > of memories from one's early childhood up until the
> > moment one voluntarily consented to undergo a cryonic
> > procedure. Like consenting to a life saving general
> > anaesthetic. Let's assume the nanotech is good enough
> > to rebuild the exact atomic replica of person X.
>
> So you've duplicated the complete physical body, at some
> moment in time, to the atomic level. To me, that appears
> to be sufficient, but I realize many persons *feel* and
> suspect we are more than physical machines and they
> search for that something special in terms of quantum
> theory, mysticism, or non-materialistic philosophy.
The machine analogy doesn't really help when we are
trying to retain consciousness as part of personhood and
no machine is conscious, at least so far as I know.
> >
> > My current sense is that, to everyone else person X
> > *will* appear to be the *same* person both before
> > and after. Person X prime, (Xprime), will perceive himself
> > to be person X, but it seems to me that neither Xprime's
> > opinion, nor the opinions of other people are fully
> > satisfactory when one puts oneself in the place of person
> > X considering undergoing cryonics or uploading. It seems
> > that person X's predisposition to cryonics or uploading is
> > something of a leap of faith or perhaps the sense of having
> > nothing little to lose.
>
> If X, and all his friends observe that he is the same in all
> measurable ways, then what could be missing?
Say you were X and were replicated whilst alive and your
replicant though he was you and you did too. Then you
were informed that you the orignial X were now redundant
and would be elimated. Would you not feel a sense of
impending loss? A desire to continue? Some disastisfaction
that you could not know that your replicant was you but
you would know that you'd be dead. Would you not
have preferred to have moved more steadily towards
longevity perhaps by adding modules to your still working
brain and replacing your body. The leaps of faith are
less. You don't have to jump and hope. You can try
before you buy.
To answer you question whats missing may well be
you except that you are not there to complain or note
the fact. Your as gone as a blown out candle flame.
> >
> > Let me try and use what seems to be an appropriate
> > analogy. A candle flame, 'energy' can be transferred or
> > spread from one candle (a matter substrate) to another
> > without being extinguished. The flame might also be
> > extinguished on the original substrate and relit. Or with
> > nanotechnology we may rebuilt a candle that, atom by
> > atom, is the same as the original candle and relight it,
> > but the *particular* flame, the *particular* energy flow
> > on the substrate will still have been interrupted. Indeed
> > it will have been snuffed out.
> >
> > It seems to me that "death" may be analogous to the
> > candle flame (i.e. a continuous flow of energy dancing
> > on a matter substrate). Because we eat and exchange
> > atoms throughout our lives the analogy could be
> > extended to say wax is added to the candle whilst the
> > flame continues to burn. But, extinguish the flame, stop
> > the continuous energy flow, and perhaps you extinguish
> > the continuing phenomena, the 'super-consciousness',
> > (to coin a term covering conscious and unconscious
> > processes) that are the subjective experience of life. I
> > guess what I'm positing is that, one's life, one's self,
> > may depends on continuity. Perhaps something
> > important to the identity of a person is lost if the energy
> > flow or 'super-conscious' is interrupted. Actually the
> > consciousness is interrupted sometimes in life but not
> > along with the unconscious so far as I know.
>
>
> People have been completely "brain dead" for significant
> periods of time and then revived with no loss of personal
> identity.
Really? Do you have any evidence of this?
> I'm not aware of anything physical that is truly continuous
> as you describe it.
I thought brain activity was continuous. If a person flatlines
and what is flatlining is alledgedly brain activity, I think I'd
suspect instrument sensitivity issues.
I do recall reading in the book What is Life (actually it
was not the orignianl but an anthology 50 years after
Schroedinger (I think) wrote the orignal and posited life
was an aperiodic crystal) about a spore that could survive
extraordiary low temperatures and come back to life simply
with the addition of heat.
There were nematode worms that were frozen and survived
the columbia space shuttle crash. ie. When thawed out they
got moving etc. But neither these spores or the nematodes
have much of a consciousness that I am aware of.
> If you look closely you see that pieces
> of the universe appear to be moving around in interesting
> patterns. To me, the patterns carry all the information,
> and are all that's really of interest. A subset of those
> patterns is organized in such a way that it thinks it is
> separate, and perceives a "self".
I thought patterns existed in the mind of the perceiver.
This makes me thing patterns and information alone
are insufficient to explain conscious life. Again I am
not positing anything supernatural or mystical I am simply
saying I think something is missing, something is not
understood. By me at least and perhaps by others
as well.
>
> >
> > Following a successful cryonics procedure everyone,
> > including the reconstructed X, Xprime, thinks X has
> > been preserved, this I freely concede. But X the
> > original, is no longer around or in a position to confirm
> > that X the original, X's super-consciousness, X's self,
> > rather than an excellent replication has actually emerged
> > from the process.
> >
> > So, does it finally come down to a "leap of faith" on behalf
> > of the potential cryonaut or the potential upload that
> > *they*, X, will *actually* survive?
>
> But why does it matter?
Same answer as above. It matters because cryonics may not
be a solution even in principle, or it might, but its worth knowing
and to my mind we don't know well enough yet to convince
even sceptics like me.
> There's no need for a leap of faith if everything works as before.
> Your X-prime would know this intuitively.
The X-prime could be genuinely and deeply mistaken. But he's
fine. It X the original that is not there.
Regards,
Brett Paatsch
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