From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@optusnet.com.au)
Date: Wed Jun 18 2003 - 04:57:20 MDT
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> Brett Paatsch wrote:
>
> > > > Dan Fabulich writes:
> > > >
> > > > > In particular, I consider it a fact of ethical logic that,
> > > > > for any X, we shouldn't believe the claim *:
> > > > >
> > > > > (*) Although X is false, we should believe X anyway.
> > > >
> > > > What about where X = "This drug will relieve your illness"
> > >
> > > Yes, even then. Because, what I think you're arguing here
> > > is that, in this case, we should believe X, and hence, we
> > > shouldn't believe (1), which just says ~X.
Note *if* your argument reduces to the assertion that
mutually contradictory beliefs should not (logically) be held
by one person. I agree.
But you also have the word "ethical" in there, making things
more interesting. So I'm still probing your initial proposition.
> > There may be a problem with the use of the word "we". In
> > your example "we" could be the same person, in mine a doctor
> > makes statement X. And note he says "will" not "might" to
> > maximise the patients confidence and give the placebo the best
> > chance. Yet it is the patient (another person) who believes X
> > and in 40% of cases actually benefits from that belief (but not
> > for the reasons he thinks) but in 60% of cases he does not
> > benefit.
>
> Well, first off, I think it's important to note that my argument
> isn't a proof that _lying_ is wrong.
Yep. Noted.
>
> But to clarify the point about "we", you can replace "we"
> in * with any particular individual in this scenario; which
> ever individual you choose, THAT individual shouldn't
> believe their version of *. Let's call the doctor Alice and
> the patient Bob. What I'll try to show is that Alice shouldn't
> believe * for Alice, which says that "~X & Alice should
> believe X", and Bob shouldn't believe * for Bob, which
> says that "~X & Bob should believe X."
>
> Starting with Dr. Alice, clearly, she shouldn't believe X,
Agreed.
> (even if, perhaps, she should tell Bob X,) and she
> shouldn't believe that she *should* believe X.
Alice is a doctor. Ethically she should be competent
enough to know she is dealing out a placebo, or, even in
a double blind test, (which I did not stipulate) she should
she still know that she *might* be administering a placebo
and that that placebo *might* not work in this case. She
should not want to believe anything that makes her a less
competent doctor.
I did consider that a doctor who understand the rationale
for double blind procedures, (ie. That the doctors belief
that they are administering the real drug rather than the
placebo, can, of itself convey something of a placebo
effect, (or cause the doctor to interpret ambiguous signs
from the patient as improvements), might factor this
understanding into her consideration. But even if she
wished she might believe the placebo was effective (for
the sake of conveying the most positive cues to her
patient) wishing to believe is not believing. Its not should
belief or ought believe. Alice might call in Dr Brian
perhaps even lie to him, (temporarily), to maximize the
chance of the placebo effect for patient Bob, but
Alice cannot believe.
- I agree.
> If she shouldn't believe "Alice should believe X",
> then she shouldn't believe "~X & Alice should believe X",
> which is * for Alice. So Alice shouldn't believe *.
Agreed.
> Next, let's consider Bob. Let's suppose, for the sake of
> argument, that you're right that Bob should believe X.
> ... if Bob should believe X, then he shouldn't believe that ~X.
Agreed, when X and ~X are mutually exclusive opposites.
> If he shouldn't believe that ~X, he shouldn't believe that "~X &
> Bob should believe X", which is * for Bob.
Agreed
> So Bob shouldn't believe * either.
True.
>
> Of course, if I don't let you suppose that Bob should believe
> X, if I demand that Bob SHOULDN'T believe X for some
> reason, then my argument that Bob shouldn't believe * looks
> just like the argument that Alice shouldn't believe *.
I think your argument *does* reduce to the assertion that mutually
exlusive beliefs should not be held by the same person.
> So it doesn't matter what you think Bob should think about X,
> he DEFINITELY shouldn't believe *.
True.
>
> > There are potential benefits in believing white lies told to us
> > by others and that being the case they may be being ethical
> > to do so.
>
> If so, then all I need to prove is that you (the individual)
> shouldn't believe that they are lies: you should believe that they
> are *not* lies. And you shouldn't believe that you should
> believe that they're lies.
Yes. But this does not amount (nor have you said it does) to
a proof that there are no cases in which one should not lie,
as the more ethical option, provided that one does so
convincingly.
>
> Of course, that means that there's no proposition P which
> you should believe to be a lie, but you should also believe.
Yep
> That means that if you think you should believe in something,
> then you should believe it; you shouldn't believe it's a lie at all.
> So you shouldn't believe that there are any lies that you should
> believe.
>
> The argument is slippery, but, I think, it is correct.
Me too. Well argued.
-Brett Paatsch
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