From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Wed Jun 18 2003 - 01:40:04 MDT
Brett Paatsch wrote:
> > > Dan Fabulich writes:
> > >
> > > > In particular, I consider it a fact of ethical logic that,
> > > > for any X, we shouldn't believe the claim *:
> > > >
> > > > (*) Although X is false, we should believe X anyway.
> > >
> > > What about where X = "This drug will relieve your illness"
> >
> > Yes, even then. Because, what I think you're arguing here is that, in
> > this case, we should believe X, and hence, we shouldn't believe (1), which
> > just says ~X.
>
> There may be a problem with the use of the word "we". In your
> example "we" could be the same person, in mine the people it is a
> doctor that makes statement X. And note he says "will" not "might"
> to maximise the patients confidence and give the placebo the best
> chance. Yet it is the patient (another person) who believes X
> and in 40% of cases actually benefits from that belief (but not for
> the reasons he thinks) but in 60% of cases he does not benefit.
Well, first off, I think it's important to note that my argument isn't a
proof that _lying_ is wrong. If you say that the doctor should lie in
this case, well, we can discuss that, but it has no bearing on my argument
that "we" shouldn't believe *.
But to clarify the point about "we", you can replace "we" in * with any
particular individual in this scenario; which ever individual you choose,
THAT individual shouldn't believe their version of *. Let's call the
doctor Alice and the patient Bob. What I'll try to show is that Alice
shouldn't believe * for Alice, which says that "~X & Alice should believe
X", and Bob shouldn't believe * for Bob, which says that "~X & Bob should
believe X."
Starting with Dr. Alice, clearly, she shouldn't believe X, (even if,
perhaps, she should tell Bob X,) and she shouldn't believe that she
*should* believe X. If she shouldn't believe "Alice should believe X",
then she shouldn't believe "~X & Alice should believe X", which is * for
Alice. So Alice shouldn't believe *.
Next, let's consider Bob. Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that
you're right that Bob should believe X. (Perhaps if only because Dr.
Alice told him so.) Well, this is the case I discussed earlier: if Bob
should believe X, then he shouldn't believe that ~X. If he shouldn't
believe that ~X, he shouldn't believe that "~X & Bob should believe X",
which is * for Bob. So Bob shouldn't believe * either.
Of course, if I don't let you suppose that Bob should believe X, if I
demand that Bob SHOULDN'T believe X for some reason, then my argument that
Bob shouldn't believe * looks just like the argument that Alice shouldn't
believe *. So it doesn't matter what you think Bob should think about X,
he DEFINITELY shouldn't believe *.
> There are potential benefits in believing white lies told to us by
> others and that being the case they may be being ethical to do so.
If so, then all I need to prove is that you (the individual) shouldn't
believe that they are lies: you should believe that they are *not* lies.
And you shouldn't believe that you should believe that they're lies.
Of course, that means that there's no proposition P which you should
believe to be a lie, but you should also believe. That means that if you
think you should believe in something, then you should believe it; you
shouldn't believe it's a lie at all. So you shouldn't believe that there
are any lies that you should believe.
The argument is slippery, but, I think, it is correct.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Jun 18 2003 - 01:49:53 MDT