From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Tue Jun 17 2003 - 07:25:39 MDT
At 02:06 AM 6/17/2003 -0700, you wrote:
> > > Hence, with the use of approximating models, we can get 99% of the value
> > > of believing a falsehood without actually doing so. ...
> > I think you vastly over-estimate the ability of most people to pretend
> > to believe things that they do not actually believe. ...
>
>I think you, in turn, vastly underestimate our capacity to become immersed
>in models. (Er, not the living kind.) As we all know, it's easy to get
>into the "zone" and forget about crucial details for a while, or, if not
>forget about them, then just let them sink back into our unconscious.
>Ask an average man with an average girlfriend whether he really believes
>his girlfriend is the beautifulest, (in private, of course, and under
>conditions of trust, etc.) and I think he'll concede that, when he
>considers it carefully, she's not the most beautiful girl *in the world*,
>but, you know, she's _close enough_. Since it's easy enough not to let
>that be a constant factor in your consciousness, it's easy enough to let
>that slide into the background as you engage in close relations.
Perhaps I didn't understand you before. It sounds now like you are saying
that while it might look like you are saying untruths, you are actually
not because you are using an "approximating model", with the fact that
your approximation is way off here having conveniently slipped your mind.
I would call this self-deception and biased reasoning.
>You, on the other hand, seem to be pursuing a distinctly irrational
>strategy at the moment. I think if you believe what you say, you should
>stop doing so immediately, on its own terms. All these dismal truths are
>precisely the sort of thing you argue we're supposed to disbelieve for our
>own good, isn't it?
I said that I place a large primary value of believing the truth. The
topic here was whether there are any other strong reasons one can offer
for believing the truth.
>I might add that your claim that most people seem to be mostly
>self-deceived about most of what's around them, especially in particular
>areas of discourse, seem vulnerable to (Donald) Davidsonian arguments: I'd
>say that we could not say of a society that we understand what they are
>saying and that they are radically mistaken about most of what they're
>saying. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/
I've heard that argument against the possibility of detecting self-deception
and reject it. If you read the literature on self-deception it becomes
clear that it is a real phenomena that we can in fact reliably detect in
many circumstances.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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