From: avatar (avatar@renegadeclothing.com.au)
Date: Thu Feb 13 2003 - 18:03:44 MST
I am going to have to get back to you on this one. I need to get another copy of Tipler's book and reread it.
From my memory he wasn't claiming to upload an internal-perspective only simulation of you onto an energy-based computronium grid.
From my memory he said, use the photon trails to gain the information, carry this inside the computronium-energy grid (which indeed contains upgrades or uploads) which has evolved just before the Big Crunch through ealier nanoengineering of the universe, then move into the Big Crunch and use the infinite energy to create subsections which are as big as the current universe in terms of numbers of particles, are interconnected, and in which quantum duplicates/splits of persons can be constructed. The issue then is whether the sub-sections (universes) though equal in particle size to our current universe are different in the particle construction of the "resurrected" body. From my memory Tipler makes no claims to resurrecting persons through "best-guessing" brain structure through superintelligence (as many believers in simulation-resurrection have it) or uploading through scanning and internal-perception-simulation reconstruction [i.e. where the brain is actually different in structure, floating in a computronium matrix, but perceives itself to be the same as when it was in its older organic form]. From my memory Tipler claims that resurrection occurs through actual precise duplication of the particle structure of the person at the moment of death [or the beginning of brain death] [presumably followed by quickly fixing the problem medically].
Towards Ascension
Avatar Polymorph
34 After Armstrong
----- Original Message -----
From: "Lee Corbin" <lcorbin@tsoft.com>
To: <extropians@extropy.org>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2003 7:25 PM
Subject: RE: Where the I is
> Avatar Polymorph writes
>
> > Lee Corbin notes I diverge from the "I" discussion to uploading.
> > True... still, consciousness and uploading are interlinked discussions,
> > both interlink with the idea of consent.
>
> Yes; I was just noting it; no criticism meant.
>
> > I believe that Tipler in the particular scenario of the Omega Point
> > theory of his book envisages us upgrading ourselves (or perhaps
> > uploading) into energy states (as all the matter in the universe is
> > transmogrified cosmologically in any case) and these are integrated
> > into the universal (truly) Turing machine/computer matrix,
>
> Yes, that's one way to describe. But to those of us who
> consider all Turing machine equivalents to equally instantiate
> an uploaded person, the exact means is not important.
>
> > which then one presumes uses the photon signatures etc. to
> > reconstruct the bodies of the earlier dead just as they are
> > about to die (prior to brain death)
>
> This is only how the data is collected. And as for
> "reconstructing the bodies", why, no---not at all.
> When you upload you no longer require a physical
> body. It's as I said before: for all I know, my
> brain could be in a jar in Moscow.
>
> >From your remarks I wonder if I read "The Physics of
> Immortality" too rapidly, or you didn't get what
> Tipler was driving at.
>
> > in virtualities which are made to allow for such
> > (correct particle configurations, etc.) and then
> > presumably these beings get to go through their
> > options.
>
> I have no idea why you keep mixing the possible moral
> questions with the descriptions of what *could* happen.
> What is wrong with the simple picture here:
>
> Whether it's (a) I get resuscitated after a cryonic
> sleep (b) I get uploaded by an SAI (c) I get uploaded
> at the Omega point, in one sense it's all the same to
> me subjectively. I don't die. It's as simple as that.
>
> > But this process which occurs through quantum splitting
> > is not strictly speaking uploading but splitting.
>
> What the devil do you mean by this? You are using the
> terminology usually associated with MWI or quantum
> mechanics. If you mean having a duplicate created,
> with the original preserved, you can always use Eugen
> Leitl's term "forking". I guess that that's what you
> mean.
>
> And, as you know, if I'm suddenly forked and a new
> Lee suddenly comes to in Mongolia, that has nothing
> to do with the one here, who won't be aware that it
> happened at all. Vice-versa, the one in Mongolia
> will only wonder how he got suddenly teleported
> there, and will be unaware that the original still
> exists in California. It's a very clear picture
> from over here, Avatar.
>
> > There will have to be some mechanism for the
> > Omega Point matrix to reconfigure the dying person
> > (split B) to stop the process of death
>
> Of course. And if I'm dying of cancer there has
> to be, duh, some treatment for Alcor to use to
> save me from it, or they revived me too soon.
> What could be more natural? If one is resurrected
> at the Omega Point, very simply one's disease will
> not be loaded into the virtual reality one experiences.
> I hope that this is clear. If not, here is an example.
> A person X has just died in a fiery automobile crash.
> At the Omega Point, the state of his experiences just
> as the fireball was killing him is re-created.
>
> "Ouch!", he says. "What was that?" THE VOICE: "You
> died back in 2003 in an auto crash, remember?" The
> resurrectee: "Yes, that's the last thing I remember.
> What year is it now?", etc.
>
> > (or alternatively to then upload the dying person
> > into a body which has no injuries or is a substratum of
> > computronium).
>
> No one will need bodies by the time I'm either defrosted
> or uploaded by the Omega Point! And if uploading through
> nanotech becomes available in 2017, I'll *both* upload
> and remain in this body. Why not? I'd rather be alive
> in two places than one anyway.
>
> > Of course, Tipler may be wrong about the whole
> > procedure. What is exciting about Tipler for me is:
>
> > . quantum splitting
>
> Now I am less sure that you meant before "creating a
> duplicate". Now I worry that this is about QM.
>
> > . the demonstration that nanotech probes can
> > reach all or most of the full universe
>
> Well, Tipler predicates his whole theory on the universe
> curling up just so, so that this is necessary.
>
> > . articulation of the principle of transference
> > of the apparently dead
>
> Google for "cryonics".
>
> > . articulation of the principle of seeking full
> > extropy (infinite growth) [as you know, some
> > writers speculate even heat death can be used
> > for this purpose]..
>
> Yes.
>
> > Lee wants to know why I'm an augmenter rather than uploader.
>
> > I reject uploading because of the principle of continuity
> > being breached [and the duplicate is only a rough approximation
> > not quantum and therefore according to Tipler a "split"].
>
> Yes. And you are only a *much more rough* approximation
> of the Avatar who wrote the post I'm responding to. Did
> he survive? Well, if you've been around, you know that
> we've been through the identity stuff a lot.
>
> > > I want to know why you do not consider your present atomic
> > > configuration to be a near-duplicate of your state yesterday.
>
> > As I hold time travel to be unethical, without gaining
> > the consent of every person affected, the question does
> > not arise for me.
>
> Oh, sorry for not clarifying. This has NOTHING to do with
> time travel. The argument, again, is that you are concerned
> that a non-exact duplicate of you is not you. My counter is,
> you are a non-exact duplicate of the person you were yesterday.
> Yet he survives, because you and he are the same person. It
> was only that old point that I was making. Time travel and
> ethics have absolutely NOTHING to do with it.
>
> Lee
>
>
>
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