From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Thu Feb 13 2003 - 01:25:29 MST
Avatar Polymorph writes
> Lee Corbin notes I diverge from the "I" discussion to uploading.
> True... still, consciousness and uploading are interlinked discussions,
> both interlink with the idea of consent.
Yes; I was just noting it; no criticism meant.
> I believe that Tipler in the particular scenario of the Omega Point
> theory of his book envisages us upgrading ourselves (or perhaps
> uploading) into energy states (as all the matter in the universe is
> transmogrified cosmologically in any case) and these are integrated
> into the universal (truly) Turing machine/computer matrix,
Yes, that's one way to describe. But to those of us who
consider all Turing machine equivalents to equally instantiate
an uploaded person, the exact means is not important.
> which then one presumes uses the photon signatures etc. to
> reconstruct the bodies of the earlier dead just as they are
> about to die (prior to brain death)
This is only how the data is collected. And as for
"reconstructing the bodies", why, no---not at all.
When you upload you no longer require a physical
body. It's as I said before: for all I know, my
brain could be in a jar in Moscow.
From your remarks I wonder if I read "The Physics of
Immortality" too rapidly, or you didn't get what
Tipler was driving at.
> in virtualities which are made to allow for such
> (correct particle configurations, etc.) and then
> presumably these beings get to go through their
> options.
I have no idea why you keep mixing the possible moral
questions with the descriptions of what *could* happen.
What is wrong with the simple picture here:
Whether it's (a) I get resuscitated after a cryonic
sleep (b) I get uploaded by an SAI (c) I get uploaded
at the Omega point, in one sense it's all the same to
me subjectively. I don't die. It's as simple as that.
> But this process which occurs through quantum splitting
> is not strictly speaking uploading but splitting.
What the devil do you mean by this? You are using the
terminology usually associated with MWI or quantum
mechanics. If you mean having a duplicate created,
with the original preserved, you can always use Eugen
Leitl's term "forking". I guess that that's what you
mean.
And, as you know, if I'm suddenly forked and a new
Lee suddenly comes to in Mongolia, that has nothing
to do with the one here, who won't be aware that it
happened at all. Vice-versa, the one in Mongolia
will only wonder how he got suddenly teleported
there, and will be unaware that the original still
exists in California. It's a very clear picture
from over here, Avatar.
> There will have to be some mechanism for the
> Omega Point matrix to reconfigure the dying person
> (split B) to stop the process of death
Of course. And if I'm dying of cancer there has
to be, duh, some treatment for Alcor to use to
save me from it, or they revived me too soon.
What could be more natural? If one is resurrected
at the Omega Point, very simply one's disease will
not be loaded into the virtual reality one experiences.
I hope that this is clear. If not, here is an example.
A person X has just died in a fiery automobile crash.
At the Omega Point, the state of his experiences just
as the fireball was killing him is re-created.
"Ouch!", he says. "What was that?" THE VOICE: "You
died back in 2003 in an auto crash, remember?" The
resurrectee: "Yes, that's the last thing I remember.
What year is it now?", etc.
> (or alternatively to then upload the dying person
> into a body which has no injuries or is a substratum of
> computronium).
No one will need bodies by the time I'm either defrosted
or uploaded by the Omega Point! And if uploading through
nanotech becomes available in 2017, I'll *both* upload
and remain in this body. Why not? I'd rather be alive
in two places than one anyway.
> Of course, Tipler may be wrong about the whole
> procedure. What is exciting about Tipler for me is:
> . quantum splitting
Now I am less sure that you meant before "creating a
duplicate". Now I worry that this is about QM.
> . the demonstration that nanotech probes can
> reach all or most of the full universe
Well, Tipler predicates his whole theory on the universe
curling up just so, so that this is necessary.
> . articulation of the principle of transference
> of the apparently dead
Google for "cryonics".
> . articulation of the principle of seeking full
> extropy (infinite growth) [as you know, some
> writers speculate even heat death can be used
> for this purpose]..
Yes.
> Lee wants to know why I'm an augmenter rather than uploader.
> I reject uploading because of the principle of continuity
> being breached [and the duplicate is only a rough approximation
> not quantum and therefore according to Tipler a "split"].
Yes. And you are only a *much more rough* approximation
of the Avatar who wrote the post I'm responding to. Did
he survive? Well, if you've been around, you know that
we've been through the identity stuff a lot.
> > I want to know why you do not consider your present atomic
> > configuration to be a near-duplicate of your state yesterday.
> As I hold time travel to be unethical, without gaining
> the consent of every person affected, the question does
> not arise for me.
Oh, sorry for not clarifying. This has NOTHING to do with
time travel. The argument, again, is that you are concerned
that a non-exact duplicate of you is not you. My counter is,
you are a non-exact duplicate of the person you were yesterday.
Yet he survives, because you and he are the same person. It
was only that old point that I was making. Time travel and
ethics have absolutely NOTHING to do with it.
Lee
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