Samantha Atkins responds to Eliezer Yudkowsky:
> > Essentially, Robin's paper gives a rigorous mathematical proof that for
> > two people to (a) disagree and (b) maintain their disagreement after
> > interaction, one or both of the parties must believe that they are more
> > likely to be rational than the other person. ...
>
>This seems a bit strained to me. That A has a strong argument for X
>that I cannot defeat logically does not compell me to accept X at that
>time. I may believe the argument leaves out something crucial than I
>have as yet been unable to identify. ... It is quite
>unlikely that only our conscious evaluations and adhering only to them
>at all points will generally bring us closer to truth in all
>circumstances.
I think you've missed the point. My argument is not about responding to
arguments at all - it is about responding to opinions, and hence about
responding to all those unconscious processes you celebrate. You have
unconscious processes and so do they. To prefer the output of your
processes to theirs you have to assume that you are more meta-rational.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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