Robin Hanson wrote:
> Samantha Atkins responds to Eliezer Yudkowsky:
> > > Essentially, Robin's paper gives a rigorous mathematical proof that for
> > > two people to (a) disagree and (b) maintain their disagreement after
> > > interaction, one or both of the parties must believe that they are more
> > > likely to be rational than the other person. ...
> >This seems a bit strained to me. That A has a strong argument for X
> >that I cannot defeat logically does not compell me to accept X at that
> >time. I may believe the argument leaves out something crucial than I
> >have as yet been unable to identify. ... It is quite
> >unlikely that only our conscious evaluations and adhering only to them
> >at all points will generally bring us closer to truth in all
> I think you've missed the point. My argument is not about responding to
> arguments at all - it is about responding to opinions, and hence about
> responding to all those unconscious processes you celebrate. You have
> unconscious processes and so do they. To prefer the output of your
> processes to theirs you have to assume that you are more meta-rational.
I have not "celebrated" anything, merely pointed out something I
believe has bearing. I have no clear means to determine who is
and is not more "meta-rational". I have a more or less
informaed opinion about who I believe is more likely to be
correct in a given situation and on a given subject.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon May 28 2001 - 10:00:03 MDT