From: Greg Burch (gregburch@gregburch.net)
Date: Tue Sep 02 2003 - 19:10:34 MDT
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robbie Lindauer
> Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 4:35 PM
>
> Greg:
>
> Thanks for taking the time.
... a few more stolen moments give me a chance for another round.
> I can see that our sole point of difference comes down to whether
> or not "In
> the Long Run" we had to act now.
>
> This strikes me as an epistemological question
In a sense, it very much is. How much can we know about the future? But
it's an epistemological question with a primarily moral dimension: In a
world of uncertainty, how much must we know before we can act?
> - given two possible
> long-term future outcomes, couldn't several short-term options
> lead to them
> given that we don't know what's going to happen as a result of
> our immediate
> action.
I'm not sure I know what the first part of this means -- I've read it
several times -- but I agree we can never know for certain what's going to
happen as the result of our actions in a system as complex as the world of
human events.
[snip scenarios, all plausible]
> Before we act, we don't really know which one is going to happen.
> (Although
> we might have strong inclinations in one way or the other, we don't KNOW).
> What we KNOW is that we have a CHOICE.
>
> If we have a choice, we are not being forced. If we were not
> Forced in this
> sense, then we didn't have to bomb them, so we did it without
> necessity, and
> we both agreed, it was wrong to do so.
I think where we're differing is in the meaning of "forced." I can be
"forced" to do something by my convictions, my moral princples. Say I have
a friend, who is also my client. I know he is going to commit a violent act
based on confidences he has placed in me as his attorney, and that the only
realistic way I have of stopping him is to reveal those confidences. Am I
"forced" to do so? In a physical sense of the word "forced," no. But in a
legal and moral sense, I am "forced" to do so, even though I may have very
mixed feelings about the matter.
> I think the only way out of this would be something like a certaintity
> judgement for:
>
> We knew, before the fact, that the outcome would be better than all the
> possible outcomes.
Phrased this way, in the world of politics and international affairs, you
will always decide to not act, because the level of certainty isn't
achievable. You've placed the burden of proof too high, in my opinion. I
think this is precisely the same kind of rhetorical move that Luddites have
sought to do with the so-called "Precationary Principle;" they've stacked
the deck against action.
Let me say that an advocate of action in an uncertain world takes a risk --
a risk of being wrong and, even more morally challenging, a risk of never
being able to know if she was *really* right at all. I'm all for visitng
the consequences of the risk-taking on the actor. You can't have your cake
and eat it too in the world of moral action: Ultimately you'll be judged by
history. Yes, the moral actor can seem self-righteous: "How *certain* you
seem!" they say to the one who steps out ahead of the crowd. And if the
consequences of the action ultimately end up being bad on balance, then that
judgment of bull-headed self-righteousness will have been correct. But
remember the judgment of Churchill in the 1930s -- most people saw him as a
grumbling crank.
> I just don't see any evidence of any kind for that kind of proposition. I
> doubt that it can ever be produced unless you really are being forced and
> someone is genuinely amassing tanks at your borders.
In this, you're being consistent: With the standard of moral certainty
you've set, one could not act until the tanks actually cross the border, I
would think. After all, they may just be having a parade!
Let me end by saying that I came to support the war in Iraq late and only
with great reluctance. Nevertheless, I expect to be judged harshly by both
friend and foe if things go disasterously wrong. Heck, I'll probably be
judged harshly no matter what!
GB, THHotA
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