From: Robert J. Bradbury (bradbury@aeiveos.com)
Date: Mon Jul 28 2003 - 17:41:31 MDT
On Sat, 26 Jul 2003, Jeff Davis wrote:
> --- "Robert J. Bradbury" <bradbury@aeiveos.com> wrote:
>
> > I believe that I subscribe to an "extropic" moral
> > code ...
>
> Robert, I consider you a person of good faith, so I'm
> ready to accept that this exi-code is probably a good
> thing.
It is perhaps something I'm trying to figure out.
Reference my recent posts to Barbara with respect
to the various different "codes" (and some useful
comments on them from several people).
I have a core belief that "more complexity" is better
than "less complexity". This may be modified by
"more complexity sooner" is better than "less complexity
sooner". That is because the Universe as we know it
and as currently structured might end and if one doesn't
get sufficient complexity to potentially intervene in
that process (sooner) then all bets are off. (Viewed as
another way I'm concerned that we not only have to create an
extropic reality now, but we have to create an even
more extropic reality in the future, and we potentially
have to warp reality such that increasing extropicness
is feasible and can survive the current reality.
This is driven in large part by Dyson's "Time without
end" perspective [1]. Alternate "realities" such as
Tipler's hold little attraction for me. The entire
state of our comprehension of our universe *is* in
a significant state of flux at this time (due to
work in everything from dark energy to dark matter
to string theory) -- so exactly *how* the physics
of reality impacts on maximization of extropic
perspectives I do not now know. But I *do* think
we should be thinking about it.
> My problem is that 10^8 x 1 = 10^8, but 10^14 x (the
> number of seconds remaining in the life of the
> universe) x ***ZERO*** = ZERO.
Point accepted.
> To me, a potential life, a never-would-have-been-born-otherwise
> life gets a coefficient of actuality--and corresponding
> coefficient of value--of zero.
Here is where we may part in our opinions. I view a
potential future human life as a "it might save my lazy old
ass probability". [This is well documented in terms of
the productivity of scientists younger than 30, not yet
married, etc.] So one should not discount the value
of future human lives to zero (irrespective of the
discount rate one is otherwise using). [For as I've
discussed if one loses humanity totally (leaving aside
oneself as an individual) then the discount rate one
selects doesn't really friggin matter -- so one had best
factor in some way to figure out how current vs. future
human lives may relate to ones long term survival.]
> Once you're born and living, you *count*.
No argument. But from an extropic perspective I have
to raise the question "How much do you count"? Can
you climb out of bed on a day to day basis and answer
the question "Yesterday, did I increase or decrease
the entropic trend in the universe?".
Most members of humanity do not really have the opportunity to
ask that question unfortunately. Most members of this list
and certain people in power positions do.
I *still* have not seen a clear and concise argument that
"the needs of the many living" outweigh "the needs of the
many more future living". I've seen arguments that those
living have a right of "being". Sorry, Nature doesn't
care about said "right" -- be it an earthquake, a volcano
or an asteroid they do not discriminate and they are
ruthless. So the question becomes *what* one is doing
to reduce those risks (for either humanity or oneself)
or whether one has adopted a perspective of "Live for now --
for it may all be over soon" (which of course isn't a very
extropic perspective).
> Woulda-coulda-shoulda been alive is nothing, zero, a fantasy.
Not in my book -- those people may save my ass.
> This in turn means that you're proposing killing ten million
> for (what seems to others to be) nothing.
Point taken. If I accept that future lives are worth nothing
your argument holds. But I do not -- particularly if the
elimination of humanity significantly devalues all current
human lives (what was the point of existing if nobody cares,
nobody remembers it, all of your history is erased, etc.).
> Consequently, it's up to you to show that it isn't
> nothing, and that it rises to a level justifying the
> shocking violence you ask us to consider.
I have tried above (and in some previous messages).
In reflecting on it I realize that my suggestion of using
nuclear weapons was probably not justifiable due to the
fact they would likely cause an excessive amount of pain.
We probably have the technological means to eliminate
large numbers of individuals painlessly (one could think
of large scale administration of phenobarbital or something
similar). [So the "horror" of nuclear weapons is removed
and one is just dealing mostly with the question of
"Is the long term future of humanity better off with
these people alive or not alive?" -- not too different
from the question that jurors in homicide cases deal
with though I'll admit the numbers are quite different.]
And before everyone jumps off the cliff on me I do
realize the suggestion is horrible -- but I'm trying
to force one into the position of possible choices
between "morality" or "humanity".
I believe that it may be fundamental to extropic perspectives.
Robert
1. "Time without End: Physics and Biology in an Open Universe", Freeman J. Dyson,
Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 51(3):447-460 (July 1979); Originally
presented as four lectures, the "James Arthur Lectures on Time and its Mysteries"
at New York University, Autumn 1978.
One URL: http://www.aeiveos.com/~bradbury/ETI/Authors/Dyson-FJ/TWE.html
Others can be located via google.
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