From: JDP (jacques@dtext.com)
Date: Fri Jul 25 2003 - 07:55:32 MDT
Robert J. Bradbury a écrit (24.7.2003/13:32) :
> With respect to writing -- I think a key point to stress might be
> that the medical definition of "death" has evolved over the decades
> or centuries (e.g. heart death, brain death, disassembly death).
> Should the courts condemn individuals to one type of death when
> they may not meet the criteria of another type?
>
> In addition can the courts assert that the individuals are *really*
> dead? We revive people with hearts that do not beat every day.
> There was a recent case in the U.S. of an individual recovering
> from a coma (a form of brain death) after something like 30 years.
> Given something as simple as stem cell research -- how can a court
> assert that the people are indeed dead? (assuming then that it has
> jurisdiction over dead people).
One could probably make a defense entirely based on this.
But I don't think it would work.
At the end of it, the judge is left to his "intimate conviction", and
that conviction will most probably be pathetical delusion and certain
death, not a reasonable doubt about the death. That's the common
wisdom about it, and judges (by design) reflect the common wisdom when
they are left to appreciate.
At least it seems risky to try only this. But I think you can do
composite defenses, mixing various lines. So that's certainly one good
point to include.
Thanks for your suggestions, on-line and off-line, Robert. They are
much appreciated.
Jacques
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