From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Fri Jul 11 2003 - 20:01:44 MDT
Robin Hanson wrote:
> >>There are two classic ways to determine what people "really" want. One
> >>is based on "happiness," the other on informed choice. ... The informed
> >>choice metric asks whether people would choose status/power or good for
> >>the tribe if they were briefly and privately informed, via enough
> >>evidence to typically be persuasive to a neutral observer, ...
> >
> >Why do you think the informed choice metric runs this way? I would guess
> >the opposite - that most people, asked to make a deliberate choice between
> >status/power and the good of the tribe, would either choose the good of
> >the tribe, or feel guilty about not doing so (implying that their
> >renormalized volition would move in the direction of choosing the good of
> >the tribe).
>
> I don't disagree that many would feel guilty, but I'm not sure your
> implication follows.
I think you misunderstood this point: the claim seems to be that people
who chose to betray the tribe would feel guilty *instead* of feeling happy
about their decision; this suggests that your two metrics are at odds on
this central fundamental case.
Indeed, it seems to me that, to the extent that they reasoned about it
clearly, betrayers might say: "Argh! I should never have acted on my
first-order desires for power... I knew then that I wished I didn't have
those first-order desires, but I acted on them anyway, and now I'm
miserable. I *truly* desired not to do that, but I did it anyway, woe is
I."
> >What is the justification for taking such a dark view of things? Why
> >make this claim?
>
> This is my reading of what the data tell us.
Fascinating, but utterly lacking in content. ;)
> >The folk picture of people struggling between their high moral
> >aspirations and their inner demons is, as far as I can tell, pretty
> >much correct.
>
> The folk picture that most people are much more concerned about
> appearing moral than being moral is also pretty much correct.
So you keep saying.
> >My own claim is that if you asked people what they cared about, what
> >mattered most to them, what kind of person they wanted to be, they
> >would say that the altruism is the most important part of them. Since
> >that is what they tell me, why should I - or any friend of theirs -
> >contradict them? The deliberative system may sometimes be weak, but it
> >is ultimately in charge - or at least is the center I look to, to
> >determine how to find the "person" I want to "help".
>
> This is the heart of our dispute. As in discussions of whether the
> upload, or its copy, would "really be you", there is an element of
> definition or choice in looking into a complex contradictory person and
> saying what their "real" preferences are. If you aren't going to appeal
> to any criteria about why this is a good choice, but just declare it by
> definition, then there isn't much more to talk about.
This is exactly right... which is why I argue that the argument is a
philosophical one, and not (per se) an economic one. I know you'll object
to that notion, but what the economists are trying to figure out is
something entirely different from what the philosophers are trying to
figure out.
The economists are trying to decide on a model to predict human behavior;
instead of looking at the complicated mess of desires we actually have,
they select some set of simplified idealized desires, and use those to
predict our behavior. Doing this research is a good idea, but when the
economist actually takes that leap and calls those desires our "real"
desires, (which, I'll admit, must be irresistable after working long
enough in the field,) he steps entirely out of the area on which we HAVE
any data.
The economist who claims that his useful predictors are the "real" desires
is engaging in metaphysics, par excellence: they are deciding on what we
should call "real" and what we should call the "mere appearances".
Certainly the economists should have some input into this question, but
they certainly shouldn't get the last word, even if all of the data points
them squarely at a certain model in particular. At the end of the day,
all the economist can claim to have identified is the best possible model
of our economic desires, or our desires as economic actors. That's just
one factor that we take into consideration when we engage in philosophy.
On the point of philosophy, especially moral philosophy, I take it that
the cynicalism which you so consistently espouse has serious problems.
As I have argued before, these "dark pictures" of human society for which
Eliezer has consistently taken you to task constitute exactly the sort of
conceptual scheme that any plausible normative component of your theory
would argue that we shouldn't endorse to other people, and which, as we
discussed at length in an earlier thread, we shouldn't believe.
Your philosophy does not warrant its own assertion; it is not rational to
claim to have it, and it could never be so if it were true.
Our choice of metaphysics, our selection of which sorts of words we claim
will "really" describe us, as opposed to merely "useful" models, directly
tie back into the way we should behave. Should we trust ourselves and our
fellows? Should we coordinate in families, co-ops, unions, businesses and
nations to promote our common good? If so, what should we say about
ourselves and these cooperative ventures? On this account, all of the
economic data in the world can and should be cast aside as a merely
"useful" model, as it runs afoul with our strongest held ethical
principles: principles about the ethics of belief and group association.
I argue that, whatever the economic data may show, we'll always be free to
adopt a metaphysical stance about "real" cognitive beliefs that I might
call "morally uplifting" and which you might call "self-flattering". ;)
The data doesn't show what we should do or say; only our moral convictions
can show that. And, in this case, it seems obvious that anti-realism
about the economic data is exactly what's in order here.
I morally exhort you to take an anti-realistic stance to the "data" you've
been observing and to adopt more conventional metaphysical stance in a
hurry.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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