From: Steve Nichols (steve@multisell.com)
Date: Fri Jun 06 2003 - 16:29:40 MDT
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2003 00:23:50 +1000
> From: "Brett Paatsch" <paatschb@optusnet.com.au>
> Subject: Atheism as a spandrel? (was Re: Deep River/Deep Sleep etc)
>
> I'm an atheist, but the psychology of believing is easier for me to
> explain than the psychology of disbelieving. I can see how believing
> and hoping for some sort of personal survival and continuance
> however irrationally, could be an evolutionary advantage enabling
> one to pass on one's genes, yet disbelieving in all forms of personal
> continuation seems to be self defeating mechanism more likely to
> instil depression and hopelessness.
>
> Historically if there has been a personal upside to atheism for the
> atheist I can't see it. It seems to me that not believing in things
> without evidence would normally be a benefit to the individual.
> But not believing in that which gives one's contemporaries hope
> would be a detriment.
>
MAYBE JUST THE TRUTH IS SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF?
> Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2003 15:16:03 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
> From: Dan Fabulich <dfabulich@warpmail.net>
> Subject: Re: Alltheism was RE: The Simulation Argument again
>
> Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
> > ### I wonder how I should call myself - as a modal realist I do believe
in
> > the actual existence of everything, including God (Jehovah, Allah, and
> > absolutely every deity ever invented or not invented), but I think they
are
> > all pretty far away from here, ever farther away than my nearest
> > atom-perfect copy in this level I Tegmark universe. So for all practical
> > purposes I am an atheist, because gods, AFAIK, are too far away to
matter.
> > But in theory I am a theist, a polytheist, or even a maxitheist.
> >
> > So maybe I am an alltheist.
>
> You are a theist about this world, as well as all the others. Alvin
> Plantinga is famous for this somewhat surprising enhancement to Anselm's
> ontological argument. The argument is as follows: presume that you are a
> "modal realist:" a believer in the idea that there are entities called
> possible worlds, within at least one of which all possibilities are
> actual(ized).
>
> Well, we can define "God" to be an entity with maximal "greatness", which
> is plausibly defined as a being which is morally perfect and "necessary":
> existing in all possible worlds. Or none at all. (Other candidates for
> "necessary" entities might be the empty set, the number 1, and the
> geometric point.) Well, in that case, "God" exists in all possible worlds,
> or none at all. [Do not omit the scare quotes in this argument; its
> unusual definition is the whole key to getting it off the ground.]
>
> Since you say that "God" exists in some possible world, you are therefore
> forced to conclude that "God" exists in all possible words, including, of
> course, this one!
>
> Of course, if you think that there is ANY possible world in which "God"
> doesn't exist, you are similarly forced to accept that "God" exists in no
> possible worlds at all!
>
> While not even Plantinga thinks that the argument is a good proof, or
> even very convincing, it does serve to galvanize the debate: either "God"
> exists necessarily, in all possible words, or "God" necessarily *doesn't*
> exist in ANY possible worlds.
AS FAR AS I GOD IS AN UNINTELLIGIBLE CONCEPT (UNKNOWABLE
BY DEFINITION) ......... AND UNLESS IT CAN BE SUMMONED TO VISIBLE
APPEARANCE LIKE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT BURNING BUSH OR WHATEVER,
SURELY "IT" CAN'T EXIST IF EVEN DEFINITION CAN'T BE AGREED?
Steve Nichols
Posthuman Organisation
http://members.ebay.co.uk/aboutme/multisel
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