From: Hal Finney (hal@finney.org)
Date: Mon Jun 02 2003 - 22:39:30 MDT
Harvey writes:
> The Simulation Argument is silly. It is circular logic. First, you must
> assume that there are more simulations than realities. Then, you conclude
> that since there are more simulations than realities, it is statistically
> likely that we are in one of them.
I don't believe that the SA is circular. A circular argument is
one where you assume your conclusion.
Now let me clarify one thing: in a certain sense, every valid argument
has an element of circularity, because its conclusion is implicit in
its premises. That's the definition of a valid argument! But I would
reserve the term "circular" for arguments which use the conclusion,
or something very similar, as one of the premises.
In the case of the SA, we don't just assume there are more simulations
than realities. Even if we did, we'd have to combine this with the
premise that this numerical difference does give us grounds to believe
that we are experiencing the more numerous category. So there is at
least one extra premise that makes the argument work.
But more importantly, the claim that there are many simulations is
itself a conclusion, based on other premises. We are a civilization
of a type which uses simulations extensively, both in our heads and in
our computers. Once we gain technological advancement we will be able to
produce even more realistic simulations. If our nature remains the same,
chances are that we will run simulations as real as the world is today.
And if other civilizations out there have a similar nature to our own,
they are probably doing so as well.
It is from all of these premises that we derive the conclusion that
we are probably living in a simulation. It is perfectly legitimate to
criticize these premises for lack of realism or plausibility. But that
is a far cry from saying that the argument is circular. Assuming that
we like to run simulations and that we'll soon have more computing power
is not the same as assuming that we live in a simulation.
> But what if we don't conclude that there are more simulations? What if
> simulations are rare? What if perfect simulations of reality are just as
> boring as reality and nobody makes them? What if perfect simulations are so
> wonderful that only people from reality universes migrate into them and very
> few simulated people get created? What if simulations are almost always
> programmed to prevent discovery of the simulations, such that
> discovery-possible simulations are extremely rare? By assuming that
> simulations are rare, then our circular logic would have to conclude that
> statistically speaking we are likely not to be in a simulation.
I agree that if these premises turn out to be true, it would undercut
the argument that we live in a simulation. However, again, that doesn't
make it a circular argument. Rather, as for any valid argument, if you
invalidate its premises, the argument loses force.
In the case of the simulation argument, while any of the possibilities
you list might occur, it is IMO more plausible to assume that people will
continue to use simulations much as we do today, as tools to model systems
under study. And I think that past history, or even alternative past
histories, will be among the systems which are studied in that way.
> Both of these conclusions are circular and lead people to believe what they
> want to believe. There is no data either way to lead anybody into either
> conclusion. Whatever people already believe, that is where their circular
> logic will lead them. There is no statistical support in either direction.
I don't see why you think the simulation argument makes people believe
what they want to believe. Are you opposing the argument for this kind
of emotional reason, and then projecting such motivations onto others?
I hope not.
> Furthermore, I believe their are other counter-examples to the simulation
> universe:
>
> - Occam's Razor suggests that simpler, more direct explanations are more
> likely to be correct. In the absence of data, there is no reason to
> postulate unfalsifiable, hidden, mystical worlds that cannot be detected or
> tested. Why stop there? Why not postulate that every religion is true?
> That all fictional stories are real? That imaginary creatures are
> everywhere when we're not looking? Etc.?
Again, no one is postulating that we live in a simulation. That is
a conclusion, which should not be confused with a premise. The SA
postulates that civilizations like ours will run simulations of people
like us. That is much less of a reach than to postulate that every
religion is true, or that imaginary creatures are everywhere. There is
no comparison between these, and I can't imagine how you could think
there is.
> - Theories are supposed to predict observed phenomenon. This theory is
> untestable. It predicts nothing, explains nothing, and provides no further
> information about how the universe works. Unless some theorized difference
> between a real universe and a simulated universe can be predicted, this
> theory will never be testable.
The SA is not a theory. As its name suggests, it is an argument.
It takes premises and works to a conclusion. To the degree that we
accept the premises, logic will "take us by the throat" and force us to
accept the conclusion, no matter how disagreeable.
> - The very calculation of "more likely to be in a simulation" seems suspect
> to me. To do such a simple calculation we would need real measurements, and
> more importantly, some sort of mechanism for counting universes and
> simulations. If many-worlds interpretation says there are an infinite
> number of real universes, how can there be more simulations than infinity?
> If every possible universe exists, wouldn't that include many (or most)
> universes without simulations?
This gets into some pretty slippery philosophical stuff which I won't
try to deal with at this time.
> - As an absurd argument, why not count dreams? They are simulations of the
> universe that seem real to us at the time. There are many more dreams than
> universes (either simulated or natural). Wouldn't this imply that we are in
> a dream instead of a simulation or reality?
There may be a lot of dreams, but they don't last very long, and they're
not really that convincing, I don't think. They only seem so because
our minds are dulled. The total measure of observer-moments in reality
is probably quite a bit greater than in dreams.
Hal
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