From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Tue Jun 17 2003 - 12:57:48 MDT
Brett Paatsch wrote:
> Dan Fabulich writes:
>
> > In particular, I consider it a fact of ethical logic that,
> > for any X, we shouldn't believe the claim *:
> >
> > (*) Although X is false, we should believe X anyway.
>
> What about where X = "This drug will relieve your illness"
>
> When
>
> (1) The drug is a placebo and no real medication is available.
>
> (2) 40% of patients with the particular illness have improved
> as a result of the placebo effect in the past.
Yes, even then. Because, what I think you're arguing here is that, in
this case, we should believe X, and hence, we shouldn't believe (1), which
just says ~X.
Hence, we shouldn't believe that ~X, so we shouldn't believe "~X & we
should believe X", which is *.
Eliezer suggests that I weaken my position. I actually think my position
is already and automatically weakened by making it a "logical" argument as
such: it's only a fact about our definitions, not really about the world.
So it's already weak enough, and hence defensible enough.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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