Re: Rightness and Utility of Patriotism

From: Eliezer S. Yudkowsky (sentience@pobox.com)
Date: Tue Jun 17 2003 - 03:25:56 MDT

  • Next message: Amara Graps: "Re: META: Dishonest debate (was "cluster bombs")"

    Lee Corbin wrote:
    >
    > Do you agree that two ideal perfect Bayesians might nonetheless
    > firmly disagree about to whom a piece of real estate belongs?
    > Or do ideal Bayesians have no values?

    This is a much more complex question than it looks. The standard Bayesian
    formalism uses a static utility function or an environmental reward
    channel, which from my perspective makes the standard formalism an
    oversimplified special case. Before you can even get started on talking
    about moral computations, you need to replace the usual simplification
    with (a) a bounded Bayesian wannabe instead of a logically omniscient
    entity; and (b) make the Bayesian reflective and capable of at least some
    kinds of self-modification, rather than dividing it off from the universe
    by a sharp Cartesian boundary. Then, once you've done that, you need to
    replace the static utility function by a complex unfinished computation,
    perhaps with external dependencies that need to be reasoned about via
    Bayesian sensory evidence, or containing complex internal questions, such
    that, although the answers are computationally deterministic, only
    probabilistic approximations are cheap enough to compute - i.e., primes
    versus pseudoprimes.

    If you do this, you can talk about two entities which evolved so as to
    inherit similar, but not exact, complex unfinished computations as their
    utility functions, and natures which include specific procedures for how
    to argue with other such entities. Such entities, when they disagree
    about desirable actions, may not know whether their disagreement is about
    unknown external facts, different approximations to deterministic internal
    computational results, or genuinely different utility computations.

    Ideal perfect Bayesians, if they disagree about to whom a piece of real
    estate belongs, will know their disagreement is about values. Humans
    cannot "firmly" disagree about values because they do not know firmly what
    their own values are, and furthermore, do not know which components of the
    complex computation are of the cannot-agree-to-disagree class. This is
    why moral argument even exists in the first place.

    -- 
    Eliezer S. Yudkowsky                          http://singinst.org/
    Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
    


    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Tue Jun 17 2003 - 03:37:58 MDT