From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Mon Jun 16 2003 - 21:41:58 MDT
Robin writes
> I have to agree with Eliezer S. Yudkowsky regarding the huge dangers of
> patriotism. Evolution has clearly programmed us to have strong inclinations
> toward group loyalty, and to bias our beliefs on this basis. It was in
> our ancestor's individual interest to be so biased, and may well be in our
> individual interest today to be so biased. But such tendencies cause great
> problems for someone who tries hard to eliminate biases in his or her beliefs.
I don't disagree with anything here. However, this is not
necessarily *directly* about beliefs.
> Of course that raises the question of why believing in the
> truth should have such an overwhelming importance, moral or
> otherwise. Some plausibly argue that it is more moral to
> be loyal to one's group, even if this means that your beliefs
> will be biased, just as they believe it is more moral to give
> charity to members of your group, even if this means that
> worse off outsiders go without.
One, today, is deluding himself if he believes that he is without bias,
as you know. Indeed we must view patriotism, or love, as dangerous
in this regard. However, the phenomenon transcends this in two
ways. The first is that the integrity of the self may indeed
require a bias; others might say the same about a group. (We
have, for example, seen calls for a uniformity of beliefs that
we as extropians present to the world, or even entertain.)
For another, values constitute a large part of patriotism or
love. One treasures that which is loved, or treasures the group
to which one has loyalty. This means willingly sacrificing the
benefit of those who are not of one's group, or not loved. Do
you agree that two ideal perfect Bayesians might nonetheless
firmly disagree about to whom a piece of real estate belongs?
Or do ideal Bayesians have no values?
> I have to admit to while I think that there are few things
> more important than believing the truth, I can offer only
> disappointingly weak moral arguments to justify this.
Quite a few of us fallible human beings strive, I think, for
the truth while admitting our ideological and philosophical
biases. Of course, results will vary: how much do you
dislike or hate oppression? how much do you love your people?
how much sympathy do you really have for animals? and so on.
Indeed, we can be more suspicious of the statements of those
we think visibly biased, and that's as it should be. But in
theory, having enormous loves or hates, need not deflect an
ideal rationalist from the truth. It's just that many things,
even ownership, cannot always be objectively determined.
Lee
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