From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Mon Jun 16 2003 - 14:18:05 MDT
On 6/16/2003, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
>>>>Of course that raises the question of why believing in the truth should
>>>>have such an overwhelming importance, moral or otherwise. ...
>>>
>>>Here are some of my favorite answers: ...
>>> * "Because knowing the truth is the best and only means of
>>> achieving the goals I care about."
>>To judge whether this is true, we need to know more about the goals you
>>care about.
>
>How would a goal get achieved without a Bayesian decisionmaking system to
>implement it? ...
>
>>An instrumental justification of seeking truth seems bound to run into
>>situations where it harms other goals more than it helps. For example,
>>if you want a happy marriage you might do better to not know too much
>>about how unhappy most marriages end up, or how similarly happy you might
>>have been with the other spouses you could have chosen. Probably simpler
>>to just declare truth-seeking as a strong primary goal.
>
>Simpler, sure. And you are safer, in your pursuit of rationality, if your
>love of the truth is strong enough in itself to overcome any temptations
>to depart. But that does not mean that there is not more than one
>argument that locks the truth into place. ...
I edited out more of the discussion above because it all comes down to one
simple point. Yes, truth is instrumentally useful in various ways, but
unless you assign it overwhelming primary importance, it is easy to find
situations where you should be willing to give up the instrumental
advantages of truth to obtain other things. Such as in marriage, promoting
group loyalty, and much else. Can't you imagine any such situations?
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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