Re: Rightness and Utility of Patriotism

From: Mark Walker (mark@permanentend.org)
Date: Mon Jun 16 2003 - 11:40:06 MDT

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    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Robin Hanson" <rhanson@gmu.edu>
    > I have to admit to while I think that there are few things more important
    than
    > believing the truth, I can offer only disappointingly weak moral arguments
    to
    > justify this.
    >
    >
    Surprising isn't it? I think it is pretty hard to think about this one
    without going to first principles. I think part of the problem here is that
    modern moral theories tend to view believing the truth instrumentally, e.g.,
    a utilitarian might say that believing the truth is good so long as it
    increases happiness or pleasure. This invites all sorts of scenarios where
    it is better to believe the "noble lie" than the truth. Perhaps total
    happiness is not increased if everyone in the Matrix finds out the truth of
    their situation. Not all forms of consequentialism need be subject to this
    sort of thought experiment, e.g., some versions of perfectionism (a much
    older theory) take knowledge as a basic good (and knowledge implies
    believing the truth), thus, the total perfection of the world might be
    increased if everyone in the Matrix knows the truth of their situation. The
    other main option would be to put the "right" before the "good" so one might
    say the right action is to believe the truth even though this may mean
    terrible consequences for the good (say increasing pain, or unhappiness, or
    imperfection).

    Mark

    Mark Walker, PhD
    Research Associate, Philosophy, Trinity College
    University of Toronto
    Room 214 Gerald Larkin Building
    15 Devonshire Place
    Toronto
    M5S 1H8
    www.permanentend.org

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