Re: Rationality of Disagreement (Was: Status of Superrationality)

From: Eliezer S. Yudkowsky (sentience@pobox.com)
Date: Sat May 31 2003 - 18:03:12 MDT

  • Next message: Rafal Smigrodzki: "Re: Rationality of Disagreement (Was: Status of Superrationality)"

    Hal Finney wrote:
    >
    > This is not at all what Robin's paper predicts! Instead, for a typical
    > dispute, say one with just two possible positions, each participant has
    > a 50-50 chance of changing his mind on every round. Here is a typical
    > dialog among rational disagreers:
    >
    > AMY BOB
    >
    > I don't think capital punishment I believe capital punishment
    > reduces crime. does reduce crime.
    >
    >
    > Oh, really? Then I now think that You don't say! In that case I
    > capital punishment does reduce now believe that capital punishment
    > crime. does not reduce crime.
    >
    >
    > Well! Therefore I have now gone back Oh? Then I now believe again that
    > to my original position, that capital capital punishment does reduce
    > punishment does not reduce crime. crime.

    I can personally attest that, in practice, this is not how meta-rational
    Bayesian wannabes actually argue.

    On our way back from Extro 5, Nick Bostrom and I shared a taxicab to the
    airport. We each contributed half the fare, but on counting the collected
    money prior to paying, it became clear that there was an extra $20 bill
    which one of us had put in by accident. I didn't think it was me, and
    Nick Bostrom didn't think it was him.

    First, we paid the taxi driver and got out of cab and into the airport.
    Then we turned our minds to the matter of the $20 bill. Both of us, after
    counting the money remaining in our wallets, noticed no obvious
    discrepancy. And both of us found it implausible that the bill could have
    come from his own wallet.

    Now most people would have argued with each other, trying to demonstrate
    superior politeness and altruism, until one person agreed to accept the
    bill, and the other walked off slightly higher in tribal status. Or
    perhaps, after some rounds of the exchange, both would have agreed to
    donate the $20 bill to charity.

    But Nick Bostrom and I each knew the other to be meta-rational, so the
    following exchange took place:

    Eliezer Yudkowsky: "What's your estimated probability that the $20 bill
    is yours?"
    Nick Bostrom: "Fifteen percent."
    Eliezer Yudkowsky: "Mine is twenty percent."
    (Calculator referred to.)
    Eliezer Yudkowsky: "I'll keep the twenty. Here's eight dollars and
    fifty-seven cents."

    And that's how it works.

    -- 
    Eliezer S. Yudkowsky                          http://singinst.org/
    Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
    


    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat May 31 2003 - 18:14:05 MDT