From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Sat May 31 2003 - 03:31:56 MDT
Rafal Smigrodzki responded to Eliezer S. Yudkowsky re my paper:
> >> Certainly a quite complex article. I think that what you quoted
> >> above means that the Bayesian would treat the output of another
> >> Bayesian as data of the same validity as the output of his own
> >> reasoning. ... In effect, his beliefs are as valid an input for
> >> your future reasoning as your own sensory ... subsystem outputs.
> >
> > Bear in mind that one should distinguish between *real*, *genuine*
> > Bayesians like AIXI, and mere Bayesian wannabes like every physically
> > realized being in our Universe.
> >
> > Bear in mind also that the above result holds only if you believe with
> > absolute certainty (itself a very non-Bayesian thing) that the
> > Bayesian's reasoning processes are perfect.
>
>### But why? If I believe with some reasonable certainty that the other
>Bayesian is a perfect as myself, and then some more (to account for my lack
>of absolute certainty that he is what I think he is), then I should still
>assign the same level of trustworthiness to his beliefs as to mine.
Let me echo Rafal; you should find their reasoning as useful as your own
as long as they are as reliable as you. They need not be perfect.
Jef Allbright wrote:
>To me the problem is simple in concept, but limited in practice. We can
>never have absolute agreement between any two entities, due to their
>different knowledge bases (experiences.) However, two rational beings can
>approach agreement as precisely as desired by analyzing and refining their
>differences. ... extrapolate any more limited
>concept of rational behavior to a timeless setting.
The argument is *not* that eventually rational agents must come to agree
if they share enough experience and evidence. It is that they must agree
*immediately*, merely due to knowing each other's opinion, without knowing
their supporting evidence.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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