Re: [POLITICS] Why People Are Irrational about Politics

From: Technotranscendence (neptune@mars.superlink.net)
Date: Wed May 28 2003 - 05:44:20 MDT

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    On Wednesday, May 28, 2003 12:26 AM Lee Corbin lcorbin@tsoft.com wrote:
    >> For the full essay, see
    http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/irrationality.htm
    >
    > One of the problems I have with Michael Huemer's points---although
    > agreeing that this paper is very good and on the whole makes
    > valuable points---is when he writes
    >
    >
    > In one psychological study, subjects were exposed to evidence
    > concerning the deterrent effect of capital punishment. One
    > study had concluded that capital punishment has a deterrent
    > effect; another had concluded that it does not. All experimental
    > subjects were provided with summaries of both studies, and then
    > asked to assess which conclusion the evidence they had just
    > looked at most supported, overall. The result was that those
    > who initially supported capital punishment claimed that the
    > evidence they'd been shown, overall, supported that capital
    > punishment has a deterrent effect. Those who initially opposed
    > capital punishment thought, instead, that this same evidence,
    > overall, supported that capital punishment had no deterrent
    > effect. In each case, partisans came up with reasons (or
    > rationalizations) for why the study whose conclusion they
    > agreed with was methodologically superior to the other study.
    > This points up one reason why people tend to become polarized
    > (sc., to adopt very strong beliefs on a particular side) about
    > political issues: we tend to evaluate mixed evidence as
    > supporting whichever belief we already incline towards---
    > whereupon we increase our degree of belief.
    >
    > I agree that everything he has said here is true; I simply don't
    > think that evolution erred to make us this way. But first of all,
    > a point about PCR (Pat-Critical Rationalism).
    >
    > It must be held in mind that mixed evidence DOES NOT knock down a
    > belief! Mixed evidence does not refute anything, and a conjecture
    > subjected to only "mixed evidence" survives the criticism, perhaps
    > unscathed. So therefore it is in the nature of how our learning
    > take place---through conjecture and refutation---that this tendency
    > within us arises. And so far as we know (considering the absence
    > of other beings who think a lot different from us), this is a good
    > thing.

    Well, several points can't be made here. One, are these people using
    PCR in belief selection? I doubt it very much. In fact, few people use
    PCR. I don't see PCR as the natural process of belief selection for
    most people on either a personal or a social level.

    Two, PCR is self-refuting -- at least in its all encompassing form. If
    there's any diluted form, then that is not really pancritical.:) See my
    "Comments on Pancritical Rationalism" at
    http://uweb.superlink.net/neptune/PCR.html

    Third, Huemer stated:

    "The result was that those who initially supported capital punishment
    claimed that the evidence they'd been shown, overall, supported that
    capital punishment has a deterrent effect. Those who initially opposed
    capital punishment thought, instead, that this same evidence, overall,
    supported that capital punishment had no deterrent effect. In each
    case, partisans came up with reasons (or rationalizations) for why the
    study whose conclusion they agreed with was methodologically superior to
    the other study."

    From this passage, we can see he's not talking about people working from
    "mixed evidence," but people throwing out some of the evidence. Some go
    with the evidence because it supports their prejudices, others disregard
    it because it goes against theirs. The selection method here is not
    PCR, but ideology. In other words, X believes B, so he looks for
    evidence for B and ignores or explains away evidence against B, while Y
    believes non-B and looks for evidence against B and ignores or explains
    away evidence for B.

    Now, you might come back and state that there's a threshold here. The
    staunchest supporter of B will eventually cave when enough evidence is
    presented against it. Likewise, the staunchest opponent of B will
    change her mind when enough eviendence is presented for it. If that
    were the case, then why irrationality at all? Why religious beliefs?
    Why ideologues? (I freely admit to being called one, but in my defense,
    an ideologue is always the other guy -- not me.:)

    Also, again, this proves my point about PCR not being behind these
    people's thinking. If it were, the goal would be to engage in debate
    not to persuade so much as to find the truth. (While I believe PCR is
    self-refuting, I generally agree with the motivations of PCR
    supporters.) Instead, what justifications for political beliefs usually
    look like is just versions of the 10 leaky buckets arguments -- i.e.,
    people use cardstack, use non sequitirs, etc. hoping that all these
    illogical strategies lumped together add up to a logical argument.

    Finally, I think you mean "pancritical rationalism" -- not "Pat-Critical
    Rationalism." If this has something to do with Pat's rationalism, then
    I withdraw my previous comments.:)

    Cheers!

    Dan
    http://uweb.superlink.net/neptune/MyWorksBySubject.html



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