From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sat Apr 05 2003 - 19:00:44 MST
Robert J. Bradbury wrote,
> (Oh Harvey -- you raise a host of complex issues which is why
> I suppose I hang out on this list). Its going to be a toss-up
> today whether you or Anders get the prize for creating the most
> worthwhile stuff to talk about (though he was delivering
> abstracts so its not clearly an original work product).
Wow! I am honored to be compared to the Jupiter brain known as Anders,
although I fear he may be insulted. I only hope that you do not find us so
comparable that you begin to suspect that one can replace the other, given
the current discussions.... :-)
You are also in the running to get the prize for creating the most
worthwhile stuff to talk about! (I forgot to ask what the prize was. I
hope it is a pre-paid teleportation ticket of the kind you are describing.)
Read further to see where you have triggered me to clarify my position
versus destructive copies. Your version of the process may resolve my
objections!
> First,
> > What happens to one copy may not happen to the other copy.
>
> Oh but you can't assume this. If I can make 1000 copies of RJB
> I think I might be quite tempted to produce a collective mind
> (it is essential to beat the hazard function -- repeat after me
> "distributed replicated intelligence"). The logical step beyond
> that is a highly interconnected "distributed replicated intelligence".
>
> Once one can do this all of the information and experiences
> become "shared".
Wow. This is an intermediate copy/transfer scenario. If the two brains
could really work in conjunction to control both bodies with one mind, it
would raise some new possibilities. It might be possible to withdraw all
processing of the single mind into one or the other of the bodies. That is,
the mind would move back and forth between the bodies. This would be an
excellent way to transfer instead of copying a mind form one to the other.
Instead of having two complete independent individuals, where one gets
killed, we could have one neuron at a time transfer function to the other
brain and then shutdown. Although I would need a lot more details on how
this connected brains would work as a single mind, such a thing would
probably eliminate any objection to the original being destroyed.
> > As such, they each have a different point-of-view.
>
> Only limited by the degree to which they are restricting input.
> An "individual" can break itself off from the "collective" but
> as soon as it does that it is dooming itself to mortality.
> No way out of this box (at least that I've seen yet).
I was not considering a connected brain. I was talking about the copies
being identical yet distinct beings. Connecting them as you suggest brings
up a whole new range of possibilities.
> > That point-of-view never is modified to achieve
> immortality. It is only the
> > newly created point-of-view that experiences immortality.
>
> This seems to assume there is never a collective intelligence
> that does not need to be copied/teleported to achieve "immortality".
I was indeed assuming that. I was imagining two distinct copies without a
shared mind. Therefore, my objection can really be seen as objecting to two
minds, where one mind is destroyed. If there is a single mind, I don't care
if there are two bodies and one is destroyed. This is indeed an important
distinction to my position. If we can duplicate bodies, retain a single
mind, and transfer the one mind between the two bodies, I would have no
objection to what happens to any body. As long as the single mind
continues, I would be happy. (Now we need to research and carefully define
how to count minds, and what to count as part of the same single mind....)
> > It may "remember" being mortal in that we have programmed it with a
> > copy of all the memories from the original, but it never actually
> > experienced them.
>
> Oh, now I think you are treading on very thin ice -- attempting to
> differentiate "memories" from "experiences". If the molecular
> reassembly is "identical" how can these be differentiated (other
> than in the mind if one happens to know one is a replicant?).
>
> An experience *is* a memory I don't see one escaping from that easily.
People can "remember" false memories of alien abduction and sexual
molestation that they never really experienced. When we get to the point of
rewriting memories into our brains, I am making the distinction between real
experiences that actually happened and current memory of the events which
may or may not match reality. (Semantics again, I think....)
> > One is mortal and is never saved.
>
> If one does not form a distributed replicated intelligence one is
> mortal. End of discussion.
I agree here! My objection to the destructive copy was the lack of a
distributed intelligence. An exact copy of my intelligence is not the same
as connecting/distributing my intelligence between the bodies.
I think that you have addressed Eliezer's distinction between /copying/ a
mind into a new body and /moving/ a mind into a new body. Your process of
distribution seems to allow for the actual moving of a mind from one place
to another instead of just copying it.
-- Harvey Newstrom, CISSP, IAM, GSEC <www.HarveyNewstrom.com>
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