From: matus (matus@snet.net)
Date: Sat Apr 05 2003 - 12:54:09 MST
> Robert J. Bradbury wrote,
> > Harvey and Lee raise some very interesting points vis-a-vis whether
> > teleportation has to use the same atoms.
> >
> > I think Lee then said:
> > > I was astonished early last year to learn that some highly
> > > intelligent and thoughtful list members will not teleport.
> > > That is, on my "Seven Levels of Identity", they are at level
> > > one or two.
> >
> > My conclusion is that Harvey & Lee know different sets of people.
>
> It could be. I don't think that I have heard anybody on the
> Extropians list
> claim that we need to retain our same atoms to retain identity. I think
> this is a common misunderstanding that one side assumes for the
> other side.
> Does anybody claim this viewpoint for themselves?
>
>
I advocated at length the last time an identity discussion occured that we
need to retain a majority of the same atoms as we had the instant before to
be considered the same person. Some people interpreted this in a way that
suggested I thought those particular atoms were in some intrinsic way
different then every other atom in the universe of the same kind in
existence. While there was no intrinsic difference, there was certainly a
practical one, as those particular atoms are the only ones in the universe
that are part of the atoms dancing the dance that is you.
My position is pragmatic, if you copy me, and retain the copy, the original
and the copy (even if you couldnt tell which is which) both instantly
experience different stimuli (one is on one side of the copying machine, one
is on the other, for instance) Since the copy is not experiencing the same
thing I am, then we are not the same subjective being. Hence a copy is not
'me' even though me and the copy are identical in virtually every manner, it
can not rationally be considered to be a subjective continuation of me,
since it and my subjective experiences are independant. Destroying the
original, as I believe you have pointed out a few times, doesnt elimate the
problem, if the original were not destroyed it and the copy still
subjectively experience different stimuli, and thus *must* be different
subjective beings, although virtually identical.
Michael Dickey
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