From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Sat Apr 05 2003 - 13:53:15 MST
Harvey writes
> Robert J. Bradbury wrote,
>
> > I think one problem with these levels is that they seem to presume
> > the retention of the current concept of an "individual". In a
> > Jupiter Brain or a Matrioshka Brain one's "individuality" may become
> > so interconnected with the "collective" that it becomes relatively
> > difficult or impossible to teleport an individual at all.
>
> This is where semantics comes in. We are facing new situations that have
> never occurred before. Questions about identity, individualism, and the
> like beg the question of what these terms mean when copies, backups,
> distributions, and collectives are possible.
Yes, this is certainly true. I have already found one case where
probably Harvey and I explicitly agree on actions to be taken, and
also agree on the desirability of various outcomes, yet are not
quite using the same terms/words.
> > Lee continues:
> > > I claim that this decision rests with owner of the resources,
> > > perhaps just the owner of the atoms involved. For example, if
> > > someone came to me and wanted to be teleported to New York, and
> > > insisted that he would permit me to gratify his wish only if I
> > > also arranged for the destruction of the original, I would
> > > reluctantly agree.
> > >
> > > But it *is* a dumb waste, isn't it?
> >
> > No, not if its Lee -- one copy is *completely* sufficient.
> > :-)
>
> Sufficient for what?
Robert was, of course, joking---implying that one of me was adequate
to cause a lot of trouble in discussions like this ;-)
> One copy of Lee is sufficient to continue the situation of having
> one Lee. But after you have made two copies of Lee, there are more
> possibilities. Two copies can go in two directions and do more
> things. Two Lees are better than one. Now that we have these
> additional possibilities, destroying one Lee is a loss. Going
> back to one Lee reduces the mobility of Lee, the total brain
> matter of Lee, the number of hands Lee can use, the number of
> places Lee can visit concurrently, etc.
Yes, but this is true in general (you and I would concur) of
any particular person. Yet perhaps counter-examples exist.
Many people would not favor the existence of multiple Bill
Gates. Suppose that it became technologically possible to
create a duplicate of oneself for ten million dollars, and
Bill Gates immediately decides to have a thousand duplicates
of himself created. He's quite candid about the reasons why:
"With a thousand more of me, Microsoft profits will go up by
a huge factor, and then I can afford even more copies of me,
and so on."
Also, many people would object to there being multiple copies
of known serial killers (even in captivity), or known cruel
despots. Surely *one* "Beloved Leader" is enough!
> Saying that the one [person] at the end is equivalent to
> the one [person] at the beginning ignores the additional
> [person] in the meantime. It is like saying I have no
> children now, I can produce children, kill them, and
> everything ends up like it was before. Some would claim
> that nothing is lost, but once these individuals exist,
> it is a loss when they cease to exist.
Yes, I agree exactly with what you have written, but perhaps
not with the values behind it. Suppose that the choice were
strictly between
(A) getting a duplicate, and the two of you working together
for a year, and then one of you having to painlessly
get vaporized
(B) no duplicate
I would choose A, because the more run time for me, the better.
While it's tragic that one of us must die (and I would probably
futilely attempt bribery or flight when the time came), it's
still better than the current and ongoing tragedy of a certain
volume of space not hosting me. (I just glanced over my shoulder
at an empty chair in this room, and I momentarily felt again the
sadness of noticing that I don't have a duplicate there.)
> The real question seems to boil down to whether anyone would value a
> duplicate copy. Many people seem to be assuming that after there is one
> Lee, another Lee is useless. I don't share that view. I would love to be
> able to duplicate myself and have an exact copy with my viewpoints and
> history to help me work on my projects. I would greatly value additional
> copies as useful persons. A loss of any of these after they were created
> would be a loss.
Totally agree.
> I keep insisting that I agree that after a copy operation, both copies are
> "me", and "I" am both copies. I still don't want any of "me" killed. I
> would no more want a copy destroyed just because it is a duplicate, than I
> would give up one of my arms on the theory that I already have another one.
> I can do more with more copies.
Absolutely agree.
Lee
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