From: matus (matus@snet.net)
Date: Tue Mar 25 2003 - 02:13:45 MST
"The Soviet and US Wars in Afghanistan: Why They Differed"
from - http://www.theestimate.com/public/113001.html
noteable excerpts -
"It is easy to romanticize the guerrilla. From T.E. Lawrence to Che Guevara,
guerrilla leaders have often become figures of legend; the late Ahmad Shah
Mas'oud, who was indeed a highly skillful fighter and tactician, emerged as
the legendary figure from the war against the Soviets. But Lawrence (who,
despite his legend, was only an advisor, not a commander of Arab forces) did
not defeat the Turks merely through the guerrilla tactics mentioned above.
The Arab irregulars with whom Lawrence fought used armored cars, artillery,
and aircraft, and even so it was ultimately British and Australian forces
(along with Arab regulars who are often forgotten) who beat the Turks. Mao
Zedong's guerrillas might swim like fish in the sea of the people, but it
was regular People's Liberation Army units which defeated Chiang Kai-shek.
No Afghan mujahedin leader ever took a city or even a major town from the
Soviets."
"Overall, the military technology of the Soviets was massively superior to
that of the resistance, but the Stingers provided a force multiplier that
negated some of the Soviet edge. Without the Stingers and the financial
support of the US, as well as military and other support from Pakistan, the
mujahedin might well have been crushed by the Soviets long before 1989"
And from http://hubcap.clemson.edu/~eemoise/limit6.html some more accurate
estimates on aide provided to Afghanistan
"This war began toward the end of Jimmy Carter's term as President of the
United States. Carter provided some US military aid to the guerrillas
fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan while he was president. He did not
provide a huge amount--about $30 million for 1980. Under Ronald Reagan this
went up $50 million for 1981, $50 million for 1982, $60 million for 1983,
and $140 million for 1984. These figures do not suggest a huge differenc in
policy between the Carter and Reagan administrations. One would not expect
deliveries in the first year after the Soviet invasion of December 1979 to
have been huge; it could legitimately take some time to get the pipeline
going. For the first-year deliveries to have been half of the fourth-year
level actually looks to me as if Carter got things off to a pretty fast
start. (Figures from Cordesman & Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 3,
The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts, p. 20).
The big break was between Reagan's first and second terms. US military aid
jumped to $250 million in 1985, and in succeeding years to $470 million,
$660 million, and $700 million. In 1986, the US began supplying Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles to the guerrillas. These imposed such heavy
casualties on low-flying helicopters and assault planes that the airmobile
tactics were largely abandoned in 1987, and the Soviet troops returned to a
strategy of defending strongpoints and supply routes."
In short, the guerrilla fighter often thought of as the hero of the Afghans
and the North Vietnamese was nothing short of a romanticized flight of
fancy. It was the millions to billions in aide that these fighters recieved
that kept them fighting.
Michael Dickey
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