From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rafal@smigrodzki.org)
Date: Mon Mar 24 2003 - 20:44:42 MST
Let me just make a few general remarks: I objected to your
classification of "economic force" as "violence" for very practical
reasons. I judge all actions by their long-term outcomes. To reliably
achieve desired outcomes in interactions involving large numbers of
participants, simple rules and clear-cut definitions are paramount
(although not sufficient). For practical purposes, conflating violence
(as I previously defined it) with non-violent exchanges, in the attempt
to include all of the world's complexity in the decision-making, leads
to discretion, arbitrariness and confusion, rather than improved
outcomes.
If everybody knows that killing his neighbor will be punished, even if
you claim temporary insanity due to the economic coercion by Twinkies
manufacturers, the outcome will be less murder. If you know that selling
goods will not be redefined as "violent exploitation of the poor", you
will invest in the future of your business, with you and your customers
getting richer.
Weakening such simple rules brings ruin to a society.
On Mon, 2003-03-24 at 18:20, Greg Jordan wrote:
>
> On 24 Mar 2003, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
> > violence), by definition includes an element of lack of consent. If the
> > mind does not consent to the use of direct manipulation of the computing
> > substrate to induce changes in volition, producing such changes and any
> > actions resulting from them are non-consensual. If I don't want to kill
> > somebody, but my ruler injects me with drugs to suppress my prefrontal
> > cortex, and I kill, then violence has been done by the ruler, not by
> > myself.
>
> Well, here's a more analytical definition, though it depends on the
> meaning of words like "direct", "manipulation". It's actually too narrow,
> though, because it would seemingly exclude things such as deception and
> physical threats of harm.
### These are "deception" and "physical threats" - concepts separate
from "violence", although related in being in most cases undesirable.
------------------------------
I would consider the latter "indirect" to some
> extent (your drug example I would consider fairly "direct").
> But - my point is not that you don't know what you would consider
> "violent" - obviously, you do. But my point is that it is better to pay
> attention to all the forces that are interacting, and evaluate the ethics
> overall. Economic forces can harm people, they can be consciously
> directed, etc., so there is no reason they cannot be understood as part of
> the problem (?) of violence.
### I disagree here explicitly. For the practical purposes of devising a
legal system, simplicity is of the utmost importance. The basic
concepts, like "violence", must be clearly defined, so that unequivocal
decisions can be made in most cases, with minimal discretion. Allowing
an infinite number of "interacting forces" to enter into the analysis is
highly counterproductive. Since "economic forces" are not violent, the
legal apparatus designed to deal with violence (criminal law) should not
be used in the areas best left to civil law, non-violent interactions
between people.
---------------------------------
>
> > > Does a suicide bomber consent to committing suicide?
> >
> > ### Yes, presently it is so, although in the future it might be possible
> > to produce suicide bombers by direct neural stimulation.
>
> Well, right here I would break it down - there are parts of the mind that
> may consent to suicide, but there are other parts that don't (my folk use
> of consent). Thus, the suicide bombers sweat and "seem nervous", which I
> take as evidence of their inner conflict. There is no homogeneous
> "self" and thus no unified "consent". To the extent that the bomber
> (*any* part of his mind) cannot control all the forces acting upon and
> shaping his mind, his "consent" is not arising from some transcendent
> operational base; it is embedded in the universe at large, its play of
> all forces. Some of those forces can be economic (desire for family to be
> paid a martyr's award, resentment over poverty, training by funded
> suicide-bomber-makers, funding of means of ubiquitous exposure to the
> auxiliary religiemes, purchase of bomb materials, etc.)
### Again, for the sake of practical workability, only the final
outcomes of cognitive acts can usefully be subject matter of
distinctions between consensual and non-consensual acts (aside from
direct neural control), since only this focus allows appropriate, simple
rules for behavior modification. The history of being exposed to some
nebulous forces, purportedly removing one's ability to make independent
decisions, cannot be used in a workable legal system as an extenuating
circumstance.
---------------------
.
>
> > ### Partially, by hanging out in the wrong places and listening to false
> > prophets. This is essentially irrelevant to the two initial
> > questions,since almost all humans are exposed to
> > suicide-bomber-philosophy, yet only a very small minority actually
> > consent to suicide bombing.
>
> No, we're not all exposed to the philosophy. I myself have never seen it
> explicitly stated at length by its devotees. The same applies to the
> "wrong places" (?); many people like myself have never been to a place
> where it was taught, or heard anyone preach it in person. Ditto for the
> auxiliary factors - my family and friends have not belonged to a religion
> variety in which it was taught at all, or done it.
### You made a decision not to seek more enlightenment. You are not a
suicide bomber by your own will.
--------------------------------
> > Does he consent to only two products of the
> > > sort he wants being available?
> >
> >
> > ### Yes.
>
>
> Explain. You mean I get to determine every company's product line?
### Yes, partially.
----------------------
>
>
> > Does he consent to only one product being
> > > sold practically near to him?
> >
> > ### Yes.
>
> Now I control the distribution of stores and their goods?
### Yes, partially.
------------------>
> > ### It is still not possible to program humans. As a result, marketing
> > does not make anybody to anything - it merely influences choices
> > non-violently, e.g. by informing about the existence of a product and
> > price comparisons, and allowing superior choices.
>
> If any marketing strategy has EVER been successful, then it has
> effectively programmed human behvior. The fact that such programming may
> be highly unreliable and distracted by other programming and environmental
> factors in most cases does not change that fact.
### Allowing the claim that "Twinkies made me do it" would lead to
undesirable social outcomes, so it must be rejected.
---------------------
>
> > Does he consent to receiving marketing
> > > influences?
>
> > ### Almost always yes, except in some unusual circumstances (children
> > exposed to marketing at school, etc.)
>
> I determine if and when/where I see billboards' ads and magazine ads and
> TV ads?
### With the exception of billboards, you do. Remember, you don't need
to see the ads or even watch TV.
---------------------
>
> > Does he consent to acquiring the characteristics that make the
> > > marketing effective?
> >
> >
> > ### Explain?
>
> Do people consent to having a hunger motive, or a taste for choclate, so
> that chocolate ice cream sellers can effectively sell chocolate sundaes to
> many people?
### Some people do not. Can you plausibly call a chocolate vendor
"violent" for catering to this taste?
-- > > Ethics is a branch of aesthetics. ### ? According to all the dictionaries I consulted, these are separate domains of inquiry. ------------------------ But - using violence to prevent > violence? is an oxymoron. ### Not an oxymoron - reciprocity. ------------------------- Not that I don't understand your drift (I > think). We can use one force to try to prevent another force. Some forces > can enable or disable certain other forces. One man's nonviolence > (embargo, imprisonment) is another man's violence - prompting > "self-defense" etc. ### Embargo and imprisonment involve a threat of violence, and by reciprocity allow the use of violent means to defend oneself against. -------------------------------- It would be better for ethics to at least first > analyze what all the operating forces are, before it decides to label this > or that pejoratively or amelioratively. In fact, gross-level category > labeling may be counterproductive altogether. ### On the contrary, defining simple categories is indispensable in real life decision-making. Rafal
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