From: Greg Jordan (jordan@chuma.cas.usf.edu)
Date: Mon Mar 24 2003 - 16:20:21 MST
On 24 Mar 2003, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
> violence), by definition includes an element of lack of consent. If the
> mind does not consent to the use of direct manipulation of the computing
> substrate to induce changes in volition, producing such changes and any
> actions resulting from them are non-consensual. If I don't want to kill
> somebody, but my ruler injects me with drugs to suppress my prefrontal
> cortex, and I kill, then violence has been done by the ruler, not by
> myself.
Well, here's a more analytical definition, though it depends on the
meaning of words like "direct", "manipulation". It's actually too narrow,
though, because it would seemingly exclude things such as deception and
physical threats of harm. I would consider the latter "indirect" to some
extent (your drug example I would consider fairly "direct").
But - my point is not that you don't know what you would consider
"violent" - obviously, you do. But my point is that it is better to pay
attention to all the forces that are interacting, and evaluate the ethics
overall. Economic forces can harm people, they can be consciously
directed, etc., so there is no reason they cannot be understood as part of
the problem (?) of violence.
> > Does a suicide bomber consent to committing suicide?
>
> ### Yes, presently it is so, although in the future it might be possible
> to produce suicide bombers by direct neural stimulation.
Well, right here I would break it down - there are parts of the mind that
may consent to suicide, but there are other parts that don't (my folk use
of consent). Thus, the suicide bombers sweat and "seem nervous", which I
take as evidence of their inner conflict. There is no homogeneous
"self" and thus no unified "consent". To the extent that the bomber
(*any* part of his mind) cannot control all the forces acting upon and
shaping his mind, his "consent" is not arising from some transcendent
operational base; it is embedded in the universe at large, its play of
all forces. Some of those forces can be economic (desire for family to be
paid a martyr's award, resentment over poverty, training by funded
suicide-bomber-makers, funding of means of ubiquitous exposure to the
auxiliary religiemes, purchase of bomb materials, etc.).
> ### Partially, by hanging out in the wrong places and listening to false
> prophets. This is essentially irrelevant to the two initial
> questions,since almost all humans are exposed to
> suicide-bomber-philosophy, yet only a very small minority actually
> consent to suicide bombing.
No, we're not all exposed to the philosophy. I myself have never seen it
explicitly stated at length by its devotees. The same applies to the
"wrong places" (?); many people like myself have never been to a place
where it was taught, or heard anyone preach it in person. Ditto for the
auxiliary factors - my family and friends have not belonged to a religion
variety in which it was taught at all, or done it.
> ### Since a very large number of choices other than suicide bombing
> exist for absolutely all humans, one's living circumstances are
> irrelevant as explanation for the consent to suicide-bomb.
I would say: a lot of outcomes are possible for most people since they are
acted upon by a bewildering, vast array of interacting forces at all
times, but those forces are the only plausible explanation for any human
behavior.
> Does he consent to only two products of the
> > sort he wants being available?
>
>
> ### Yes.
Explain. You mean I get to determine every company's product line?
> Does he consent to only one product being
> > sold practically near to him?
>
> ### Yes.
Now I control the distribution of stores and their goods?
> Does he consent to receiving marketing
> > influences?
> ### Almost always yes, except in some unusual circumstances (children
> exposed to marketing at school, etc.)
I determine if and when/where I see billboards' ads and magazine ads and
TV ads?
> Does he consent to acquiring the characteristics that make the
> > marketing effective?
>
>
> ### Explain?
Do people consent to having a hunger motive, or a taste for choclate, so
that chocolate ice cream sellers can effectively sell chocolate sundaes to
many people?
> ### The circuitry we use for determining the subjective feeling of "free
> will" and consent is a mental construct, just as all qualia and
> concepts. It is not crude, as most humans have the ability to detect
> harmful deceit under most circumstances. An individual's feeling of free
> will evolved to provide the best chances for reproduction in competition
> with similarly endowed individuals. As a result even the least
> intelligent persons can only with difficulty be led to self-destructive
> acts, and suicide-bombing is quite uncommon. Especially in cultures
> upholding the value of the individual freedom, and rigorous definitions
> of violence.
I would say that not all parts of the mind have a sense of free will,
so-called. I wouldn't argue that it was maladaptive, but I would tend to
think better/closer analysis of forces operating in the world would tend
to be more adaptive in most cases. It would have to be VERY refined before
it would start to erode the sense of "free will". But a simplistic analogy
might be people playing a sport or game - they are self-consciously aware
of the "objective" and they know the rules, and they know what the other
players are doing, etc., so that there may always be a discernible "best
move".
> ### Yes, but this doesn't have much relevance to the need of a rigorous
> definition of violence, and rejection of the concept of "economic
> force".
Well, for example, wealth can determine a person's desire to commit
violence (say, to make money, or to keep it, or to get it from others), or
their ability to commit violence (expensive weapons vs. shabby ones,
training in violence techniques vs. amateur hour). Thus economic factors
are crucial in analysis of social forces related to violence.
> Judgment as to whether an action is violent or not is not aesthetic, it
> is an ethical one, and important in deciding whether violent action may
> be used in its prevention.
Ethics is a branch of aesthetics. But - using violence to prevent
violence? is an oxymoron. Not that I don't understand your drift (I
think). We can use one force to try to prevent another force. Some forces
can enable or disable certain other forces. One man's nonviolence
(embargo, imprisonment) is another man's violence - prompting
"self-defense" etc. It would be better for ethics to at least first
analyze what all the operating forces are, before it decides to label this
or that pejoratively or amelioratively. In fact, gross-level category
labeling may be counterproductive altogether.
> ### It is still not possible to program humans. As a result, marketing
> does not make anybody to anything - it merely influences choices
> non-violently, e.g. by informing about the existence of a product and
> price comparisons, and allowing superior choices.
If any marketing strategy has EVER been successful, then it has
effectively programmed human behvior. The fact that such programming may
be highly unreliable and distracted by other programming and environmental
factors in most cases does not change that fact.
> It amazes me that the claim is so frequently made, that humans are mere
> marionettes at the tug of dark forces, marketers, and conspiracies.
I don't want to be reductionist - to oversimplify the complexity of human
minds and environmental forces. But the "mechanical" level of analysis is
real.
gej
resourcesoftheworld.org
jordan@chuma.cas.usf.edu
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