Re: The copy paradox

Brent Allsop (
Thu, 6 Nov 1997 14:07:46 -0700


> The attributes of our selves are not relevant, what I was trying to
> model is personal experience of self.

Oh ok. I guess I'm must trying to work through and figure out
the details and significances of your models.

> No. His self(me, myself) would evaluate to something. If this
> dualist then realized the error of his ways he would become a
> slightly different person, and his self(me', myself') could evaluate
> to something else (but likely he would think he had not become
> somebody different, just a bit more enlightened).

Hmmm, I guess I'm still struggling with what this erroneous
self(me, myself) would be, other than a fantasy, and why it would be
of any importance since it would have no relation to fundamental
reality. Sure we can have fantasies about what we are, but what I
want to know is what is it, fundamentally, that such phenomenal
fantasy is really made of or consciously represented by. To me, what
fantasies (and accurate precepts of reality) are really made of is the
stuff of consciousness, and this stuff is what we fundamentally are.
A computer that has similar behavior to you may have abstract models
that represent information like your phenomenal conscious models do
but an abstract binary number is nothing like a real phenomenal red
sensation is it? Regardless of whether this red is a dream of a
fantasy cherry or accurately representing a real sumptuous juicy one
you are about to eat, it is much more than an abstract number right?

Brent Allsop