Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2000 12:56:40 -0500
From: "John Clark" <jonkc@worldnet.att.net>
Subject: Re: Immortality
Steve Nichols <steve@multisell.com>
> A thermostat is set to switch on or off at a given (preset)
> temperature. It cannot decide to override this setting, so
> does not make this "decision" internally.
>A thermostats makes its decision
... excuse me, but thermostats are just switches that kick
in at a given threshold, the whole point is that it can't "make
its decision" ....
>based on its internal state and
A digital switch does not have an "internal state"
>the external state of the environment, people do the same thing, both
>" readjust their logic in response to the environment" as you say.
No, people are not preset " say to put on a hat if temperature drops below
zero degrees or whatever. We can readjust our logic, switches cannot.
> Turing machines are neither conscious,
>How do you know?
Well, they would fail the Turing test for starters.
The lack of some form of ultimate proof (my appeal is to
intuition and common sense ultimately) is not a problem
however. *NO* empirical theory can be ultimately proven.
The lack of absolute certainty should not blind us to the
obvious though ... we have to go with best evidence.
> Digital computers tends to be finite-state, whereas analog(ous
> to infinite-state) evolvable hardware is more like our brains.
>Welcome to the exciting world of analog computing. Thanks to the
>new Heath Kit Home Study Course, you can build your very own
>analog computer in the privacy of your own home. Make big bucks!
>Amaze your friends! Be a hit at parties! This is a true analog computer,
>no wimpy pseudo analog stuff here, this baby can handle infinity.
You have rather foolishly missed the whole point that ANALOG is the
abbreviation of "analogous to infinite-state" ... since true infinity
is a conjecture ......
> Turing machines are hard-wired and cannot evince PHASIC
>TRANSIENT behaviour ... correct me if I am wrong?
Ok, you are wrong. A Turing machine is not hard wired, its program
can put it into any internal configuration, and the only behavior
a Turing machine can't produce is pure randomness, that is, produce
an effect without a cause.
Are you actually claiming the Turing machines exhibit phasic
transients? Cite evidence please, you are utterly lost on this.
>Sense-data (experience) and the conscious sensor/ self
>seem to be different types
How so?
They *seem* so because we can make this distinction in speech,
and a difference is that sense-dat come from external objects,
whereas the phantom median eye is internally generated.
>MVT explains the virtual sensor(gan), the phantom median eye
>Seems to me all you've done is conjure up a black box, call it the
>phantom median eye and say consciousness comes from there.
>Not very helpful.
No, the conceptual "black box" which was a problem before MVT
now has a complete description, in actual terms and as an evolutionary
narrative, as the phantom media eye. I have done away with mere
"black box" conjecture!
>I don't want to get bogged down in individual cases because of the
>problem of solipsism.
You're going to have to get bogged down in it because if you have a complete
theory of consciousness you should be able to prove that solipsism is untrue
but you can't and I don't believe such a theory is even possible.
Solipsism is simply one (admissible) viewpoint. It isn't "refutable" since
I do not deny that people have this thought. Infinite-state capability
allows
*any possible thoughts* including the solipsistic ones. Likewise you cannot
prove it "correct."
>Please
>understand, I'm not a solipsist but when somebody claims to have solved the
>most profound problem in philosophy it's my duty to pretend that I am and
see
>if they can prove me wrong.
But the mind-body problem (solved by MVT) is a different "problem" to
solipsism. And I claim that MVT throws light on (purely linguistic) problems
such as the various paradoxes including solipsism (in practice you cannot
be a solipsist and meaningfully engage with others and operate in the
world).
>Do you accept that dreams happen?
>I accept that my dreams happen, I don't know about you.
Then (whether you believe that I exist independently, or am just another
facet of *your* consciousness - the solipsistic claim) by accepting that
at least your dreams exist, you allow a conscious phenomenon, and defeat
your
previous claim that consciousness doesn't occur.
Do you still deny "consciousness"? I argue the idealist stance that in
fact the world can be said to exist in consciousness, and not that
consciousness (phantom pineal eye) is located in space.
Level Up
www.steve-nichols.com
The Physician of Souls
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