Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 20:30:28 -0500 (EST)
From: Dan Fabulich <daniel.fabulich@yale.edu>
Subject: Re: Sentience
>I doubt that as well! But cite von Neumann, Turing and Church for
>pointing out that a Turing machine can do everything a massively
>parallel distributed system can do given enough time and tape. We
>use massively parallel systems today because they are faster than
>cheaper than doing these jobs serially, not because there are some
>things that massively parallel systems can do but Turing machines
>can't.
The reason that neural computers are relevant in discussion of
similarities to brains and that Turing machines are not is that
in fact neural (massively distributed parallel) designs *come from*
modelling and reverse engineering of brains! In no way are brains
like Turing or Von Neumann architecture.
> @ Any thought is possible, there are no boundaries to imagination.
>Yes, there are. Try to think of a REALLY BIG NUMBER. Now think of a
>number that long with all of its digits randomized. You can imagine
>it as an opaque term (just like most of us can only imagine a number
>as large as a trillion) but you can't actually hold it in your mind.
But in inventing and articulating the above example you provide evidence
to us that you HAVE thought of what you describe. Anyway, you pointed
out earlier that true randomness doesn't exist, so a machine would have
the same conceptual problem about that that we do.
>Alternately, try to imagine all of Shakespeare's Hamlet at once.
By "at once" do you mean "instantaneously" or do you mean "a very short
time, like 2 seconds." ? I can imagine both ... as a very blurry noise and
flash of actors moving on stage.
>Hey. That's sort of like the memory limitations on a computer. Hmm.
I doubt a computer could "imagine" anything at all .......
> @ Apparently there are more possible moves in a game of chess than
> @ there are atoms in the universe, and there are presumably an (infinite)
> @ different possible games of chess.
Actually, you're right if you count games where the players keep
moving their pieces back and forth in a circle. They can do that an
arbitrary number of times. But I don't think that's quite what you meant.
Absolutely, it doesn't matter that there is some repetition, I just used
this to
prove my point against your original claim about atoms.
> This is because we are talking of
> @ dynamic potentials. The thing with MVT is that we recognise a non-
> @ physical component ... this is true infinite-state!
>Non-physical components may well be infinite-state. But non-physical
>components can't interact with physical ones, so they can't be
>measured.
>Why do you bother in making claims about non-physical components? Why
>not settle for purely physical animal intelligence and be done with
>this stupid field of philosophy?
Do you have problems accepting the evidence for phantoms limbs?
These "non-physical components" have been widely accepted by science
for hundreds of years, and certainly aren't disputed by those afflicted
with phantom pain.
The key point of MVT, and how it DOES explain consciousness, is that
the phantom limb (or phantom sense-organ) is a *felt* phenomenon.
The difficulty in measuring such phenomena does not make them less
real .... but just points to a shortfall in our methods of measuring.
> >John and I actually DO think that the human brain is (analogous to) an
> >oversized Turing machine. We think that it's programmed, and that we
> >make "decisions" the same way that Deep Blue "decides" to move its
> >bishop.
(S)> How can any Turing machine, a glorified card-reader, have
(S)> experience?
>That's a Really Good Question. But how can atoms, a glorified billard
>game, have experiences? ;)
Only biological organisms can act independently from purely
chemical stimuli ...so we are talking about a very small subset of
"atomic structures" ... even more specifically, those animals with
E-1 brains.
My personal (plenumist) view is that atoms are themselves doubtful
as discrete entities, and I disagree with Heraclitus (?) claim that
"only atoms and the void are real." I think that a Popperian third world
of consciousness is independent of physical action, but is not "void."
A hole has a "shape" and "size" given in terms of its
substrate ... for instance a keyhole, or hole in the
road has measurable dimensions and we talk about holes
meaningfully .... even though they do not comprise of any matter.
Phantom limbs, and the phantom median eye, are functional gaps
as much as physical holes (although they do have physical correlates,
eg. the space where the physical arm was).
Another functional gap might be a missing piece of computer data.
(S) Anyway, big blue is a CPU machine, not even a neural computer, so is
(S) absolutely nothing like a brain. Are you saying the DNA is the
(S) "program" or what other medium are you identifying?
>The medium is your neurons. None of them can do anything
>non-physical. So your brain can't do anything non-physical. So your
>brain is entirely physical. Physical stuff happens in lock-step
>(because time happens in very small quanta) so the brain is emulatable
>with a sufficiently complex Turing machine.
Sure, neurons in isolation can't do much, but taken as a matrix
(maybe even including brain stem and both nervous systems)
they are able to generate a phantom pineal eye, which can deal
with "abstract" or phantom data .... a complete theory of mind
should explain how, for example, we can see objects although
our lateral eyes are closed, or "hear" an internal voice even though
our mouth is closed and we are not talking out loud.
There is even a question about non-physical quanta effects
(action at a distance &c.) so even atomsaren't as "solid" and physical
as you seem to claim ... let alone if we speculate on the physical or
non-physicalness at the very centre (the Singularity!) at the middle of
a black hole).
Let me now reject your Turing machine nonsense yet again .....
(1) Emulation is not the same as the thing being emulated, so even
if a Turing machine could emulate the functions of a brain, we are
no further forwards.
(2) The Turing emulation would not "feel" anything, and could not
dream (for example).
(3) Your account does not get rid of the homunculus (in your deep blue
case a whole team of homunculi ... human programmers tweaking
the software). MVT is a fully self-servicing and evolutionary account.
S > Hang about, Deep Blue is an extremely limited program that just plays
S > common chess. It is so dumb it can't even play other chess-like games,
let
S > alone "learn" ... it cannot even start to cope with natural language.
>We AI people have a problem. People say: "You can't make a computer
>'learn.'" Then we make them learn. They respond to things in their
>environment in an interesting and useful way. And people say: "THAT'S
>not really learning! THIS is learning!" So we make them do that, and
>they say "THAT'S not really learning! THIS is learning!"
>Do you KNOW how long people said that we couldn't make a computer that
>could improve its own playing style? And to then come back and have
>people say "Hah. Chess is easy!" It chills a man's heart, I tell you.
I think there is a difference between look-up table "learning" and neural
learning such as Reinforcement Learning (eg. in world champ. Backgammon
software "NeuroGammon.") or Learning I.A.C (interactive activation &
competition .. a distributed database alternative modelled on brains).
Changing play style is trifling stuff .... and I should
know, having designed or programmed three Chess-type games (Shogi,
Chaturanga .. ancestor of common chess, which is a mere human-era
Chaturanga variant!, and Enochian Chess, which includes an IAC neural
patch).
>Improving your game of chess is learning. It's simple learning, but
>it IS learning.
Maybe, on the most simple definition, but nothing like human-scale.
Deep Blue is an autistic moron!
>More to the point, we don't do anything more
>interesting, on a metaphysical level, than what Deep Blue does.
Speak for yourself mate!
(S) > What about extrapolation abilities
>Deep Blue extrapolates. "Not enough!" I don't care.
But it can't change its programming or deal with new situations,
its microcosmical "chess-rule world" is an artificial human-made
game-world to start with. It doesn't think like Kasparov, but uses
brute-force algorithms suited to von Neumann processing.
(S)> how can programs alter themselves to deal with entirely new
(S)> circumstances?
>Not all PEOPLE are good at that. But nonetheless, an adequately
>complex Turing program can "deal with" circumstances as new as we can.
Maybe not all are good at it, but even the stupidest human can do it.
Deep Blue can't. Which Turing machine are you talking about here ...
one of your (E-1 brain-powered) imaginary ones perhaps?
S > But precisely my point is it has not control over any "memory" of
S > the temperature setting, this is made EXTERNALLY and is not
S > within the thermostat's remit.
>The same thing happens to us. We don't have free will. Nothing is
>within our remit.
Plants, and simple E-2 (pineal eyed) animals have no free will.
There behaviour is governed by the sunlight and seasonal shifts,
plus chemical taxis &c. However, we E-1 animals have gained
indepence from external governance of behaviour rom sunlight
(via the old pineal eye) and *do* have self-volition or free will.
The term "free will" would not ever have been invented if things were
otherwise ..... the fact we can discuss it proves it almost.
s> So you are completely wrong in
S> anthromorphising that the thermostat "desires" a setting. A digital
S> switch is On or OFF, there is no intermediate or internal state, either
S> current goes through it or not. It cannot override its programming.
>Neither can you. Your programming is more complex, but that's all.
Yes I could ... like Captain Scott ... decide to override my body and
voluntarily freeze to death!
>You act according to your desires and beliefs. You cannot change your
>desires very much, and you can hardly change your desire to desire
>different things at all. You cannot change your beliefs either.
As an NLP and Hypnotherapy practitioner, of course I reject your
claim as completely groundless.
>You
>can decide what to say, but you cannot decide, for example, to drop
>your view about MVT and agree with me. You have to be convinced, and
>you're not in control of when you get convinced.
I could decide to drop MVT, and would if (1) you could refute it, or
(2) you outline a more convincing alternative theory that solves more
questions and I considered to be a better account. Go ahead,
convince me!
>You're not in control of when you're happy. You do things to make
>yourself happy because you desire happiness because that's part of the
>program. When you do things, you have only the slightest control over
>whether they make you happy or not, and considerably less control over
>your desire to feel happy. You're not in control of these things.
What are you babbling about here? I don't recognise any of these
statements in myself. Are you talking from your own, solipsistic viewpoint?
>A 128-bit thermostat knows the current setting on the heater, along
>with the desired temperature down to almost 40 decimal places. It has
>128 on-off switches stringed together. It knows 128 on-off facts.
>You know on the order of several hundred billion of them. But not
>more than that. Not infinite, by a long shot.
Indeed. I never claimed such a device to be infinite-state.
>And what suggests consciousness besides intelligence?
Intelligence PLUS felt experience.
> What test do
>YOU have for consciousness besides intelligence? Surely not phasic
>transients? I can make my Turing machine flick its eyes about.
I think the onus is on you to make a case why someone who claims
to have consciousness is in fact a robot. The subjective nature of
the phenomena does maybe rule out "objective" tests, so indeed
some new form of testing might be needed. Am more interested
in developments from MVT, what I can do and predict from it, than
in satisfying some sterile academic or philosophical debate.
S> The very fact that every aspect of Turing machines actions can be
S> predicted, I would say, might even preclude them from consciousness.
>No more than you are precluded from consciousness. Your atoms have no
>free will. You are composed entirely of atoms. You have no more free
>will than they do. An adequately informed and powerful computer could
>calculate your every move in a controlled environment.
Again (see above) you are looking at 'me' on the wrong level of
description ..... why say I am composed of atoms rather than I am
composed entirely of "cells" or "molecules" or "sub-atomic particles?"
None of these levels is macro enough to explain consciousness, which
requires the whole biomatrix, plus even phylogeny and embryonic history,
to be properly understood. The whole is greater than the parts ... and the
whole includes phantom body parts.
S> Yes, but as I try to point out, what MVT brings to table is *absent* or
S> non-physical, phantom components that complete the circuit!
>Right, I'd forgotten that. But non-physical components are no more
>explanatory than invoking the soul unless you have an empirical test
>for them. How can you show that you're measuring something
>non-physical, rather than just physical brain activity?
Ah, but you have accepted that at least you, even if nobody else)
has *dreams* .... which are non-physical ... they are temporal events
but cannot be detected by crummy human-era science. So just by
accepting dreams, as you have, then a distinction is made between the
conscious experience, and the PET or EEG activity of the brain, which
is detectable to scientists (but is unknown to the dreamer ... you don't
need
to know which of your neurons are firing in order to have thoughts).
S> A cathode ray tube is infinite-state in that it is fully variable,
scalar,
S> but because it operates within boundaries it is ANALOG. This stuff
S> is fairly rudimentary solid-state physics, you have no grounds to be
S> obfusticating here.
>Analog is NOT infinite-state. It is very-many-state. Really big
>number. So big that you can approximate that they're infinite in all
>the equations and get correct results. But they are NOT
>infinite-state. The analog to infinity is only *really big*. You
>seem to keep forgetting that.
Not even to "really big". A component can be scalar as
opposed to digital over a very narrow spectrum. It is just that it is
a continuum potential rather than just discrete digital switching
that leads it to be called analog. In terms of AI, the reconfigurable,
evolvable
hardware used by Thompson et al is solving fairly trivial AI problems
compared
to mammalian-type variety of intelligence. An analogy can be stretched, so
"bigness" is just another subjective term .... your big might be my small.
>That's the difference between infinite-state and awfully-many-state.
>It's the difference between transcendent and awe-inspiring.
Only an abstract, non-physical component can be properly infinite-state.
Can't you see this? Your transcendent is my mundane.
S> No, phasic transients occur simply because a circuit is undergoing
S> transformation from finite-state (lock step) to self-organising ....
S> and they happen after the removal of an external clock (whether
S> electronic or organic pineal eye). Aren't Turing machines always
S> lock-stepped?
>Why, yes. Along with ATOMS.
There aren't any atoms in a phantom pineal eye, or in a thought ....
your dreams cannot be observed precisely because they are NOT
atomic!
>I've not seen data that shows that phasic transients occur on account
>of a circuit going from finite state to very-many-state, but I'll take
>your word for it, because it hardly matters. Very-many-state is not
>infinite state, so a Very-large Turing machine can do the job nicely.
Size isn't important!
Absence, presence, and detection of presence are the real issues.
S> Absolutely. The main body of MVT concerns comparative brain
S> anatomy and behavioural difference between E-2 and E-1 animals.
>Ah. That's good news. But you just got through telling me that
>intelligence is not consciousness, around line 150 or so. So while I
>really do hope you have an excellent theory of intelligence on your
>hands, a perfect theory of intelligence is, unfortunately, a
>non-explanation of consciousness.
But MVT gives an account of why mammals dream, and furthermore
throws new light on the melatonin hypothesis, and Menaker's work
on REM and the evolutionary shift from pineal eye melatonin to
retinal production. DREAMS are not "intelligence" and do not involve
'rational' cognition of processing of sensory information from external
world ..... so MVT explains consciousness here rather than intelligence.
In fact, I think the computation/ intelligence mechanisms can largely be
explained in terms or local and general neuronal circuits (I qualified in
neural computation) WITHOUT having to invoke MVT ....
S> You obviously haven't read anything of MVT. All mammals and birds
S> are E-1, and have REM. No cold-blooded animals have REM. The
S> pineal eye atrophied across all species during the reptilian/mammalian
S> boundary, and during the emergence of endothermic (internal or warm-
S> blooded strategies). There is a clear experimental correlation between
S> absence of pineal input (after pinealectomy, or when pineal eye has
S> been covered by metal foil and subject reptiles compared with a control
S> group) and intelligent behaviour ... *awareness* ... I don't really like
to
S> use the "C" word!
>Actually, I knew that tidbit. But then you're observing intelligence,
>not consciousness.
>The problem of other minds asks: "I know I'm conscious and
>intelligent, and I know you act intelligently. But are you conscious,
>or do you just act that way?" This is a problem which your theory
>doesn't solve. Keep your pants on, a solid theory of animal
>intelligence will still win you the Nobel, but it won't help you solve
>the mind-body problem.
No, see above. The "atomic" brain is necessary, but not sufficient
for consciousness. The virtual sensor(gan) is need to complete the
gestalt experience of being intelligent. It is a substitute for sense
messages from the sun and environment that used, in early evolution,
to govern behaviour .... but also includes the "felt" aspects of the organ.
S> Yes, as I mention above, there are about 130 years of records of such
S> experiments. Other minds is an artificial lingoistic problem, it
S> doesn't stop consciousness (sentience) happening, just gives
philosophers
S> something to argue amongst themselves about.
>Yeeeeessss. But so is the mind-body problem. Why do you even CLAIM
>to have solved it? Why not sit pretty with a theory of animal
>intelligence and let the philosophers do their jobs on consciousness,
>for which you have no physical explanation?
Sorry, I am a reductionist on these matters, and believe that human-era
philosophers just perpetuate "problems" and do little to contribute to
solutions. They are not qualified to make judgements on physiological or
empirical issues ... academic philosophy seems to just be linguistic
analysis.
In fact, together with religion, they are an unnecessary Mystery Industry
that
actual obstructs new knowledge and solutions so as to safeguard their
incomes and paltry reputations. MVT is a more complete and basic theory
than any narrow linguistic (definititional) account of the mind-body
problem.
It solves dualism ... since Leibnitz objection to Descartes is overcome.
A non-physical part of the brain can interact with non-physico-spatial
thoughts ... like can only interact with like. The phantom median eye
is constructed out of the same neuronal type of information as the sensory
contents, so can reintegrate or focus all the diverse types of mentation and
give a pervasive locus of self. The phantom median eye is an illusion, or
trick of nature ... sure ... but then what mental experience isn't illusory?
(We do not have actual light and sound whizzing through our brains, just
action potential signals, which the phantom median eye allows simulation
of actual light &c to be experienced. There is a lot more to be said on
this.
S> Newborn infants seem to have empathic abilities, plus abilities
S> to monitor and judge emotions in others.
>So does a lie detector. Another input device to attach to a complex
>Turing machine.
But we have a difference of type here .... lie machines and Turing devices
do not occur in nature. They are designed and built, and are not evolved,
living beings. The type of consciousness we are discussing is mammalian.
And besides, I deny totally that lie detectors are empathising ... they do
not replicate the feelings of the subjects, just look for incidental tells
like
conductivity of sweat or whatever.
S> It is a fair bet that if someone
S> is screaming in pain, particularly if they have correlating signs such
S> as a red-hot poker sticking up their arse, that they are actually feeling
S> pain, in much the same way you would. I really fail to see the problem
here,
S> other than that you cannot be the other person so have to rely on
reports.
^^^^^^^^^^^
>That IS the problem! The problem is that I have no proof that brain
>activity implies actual feelings (in anyone but me), only with the
>behavior. This is a rather boring philosophical problem. I recommend
>that you ignore it, that you never think on it again, and sell the
>world your theory of animal intelligence. Most importantly, never
>again use the word consciousness. You have no proof of that. Nor any
>reason to care! So skip it.
Do you agree with McGinn that the mind-body problem is insoluble?
If so, then you can pack up and go away. If you think that it can be solved,
then you must also allow that an evolutionary account is needed. I accuse
academic philosophers of "THE ATHENA FALLACY (TM)" ... that they
deal with mind as if it sprung fully formed as "human" from the split head
of
Zeus ... and ignore the intermediate stages and natural processes that
led to the current state of things.
MVT puts forwards a set of predicates that can be challenged, and
conclusions
that follow from these, that can also be challenged. Yet no philosophers can
falsify MVT .. although I have been shoving it up their noses since 1980.
S> NO. Fodorian modules and central executive theories, supervenience
S> and all the other philosophical lingoistic drivel are not physiology
S> based, nor do they give a clear account of the *evolution* of
S> consciousness.
>But neither do you. Consciousness IS philosophical drivel. Let us
>keep it. We've reserved "intelligence" just for people like you, so
>you have something to prove and talk about scientifically and so you
>guys can never run us philosophers out of a job. Why bother attacking
>philosophy on this point?
As a qualified Philosopher (MA, Univ Leeds ... which I returned, & Bsc,
Surrey)
I despair at the waste of everyone's time and money spent on philosophy
departments. The arrogance is bearable .. they think they can dictate to
proper mathematicians on the "philosophy" or overview of maths, even though
in practice they perhaps can't even add up! And they presume to tell medical
doctors what to do regards medical ethics.
If there is some wonderful philosophical methods, some great secret
inaccessible
to the rest of us, why can't philosophers agree about anything? They just
cavil about words .. meanings &c. And sometimes they make them up, a new
jargon, just to sound pompous and to try to stop other academics seeing that
they are like the Emperor without any clothes.
S> Experimental evidence can only observe behaviour .... would that be
S> acceptable to you? If so, MVT has it in abundance. However, if as I
S> suspect you are not happy with circumstantial evidence (correlation
S> between REM and dream mentation, even in humans, cannot be
S> absolutely proven since it relies on reports of the dreamer) then
S> YOU have a problem, because you can never accept any account of
S> consciousness, MVT or not.
>Why YES. I think we're finally on the same page!
So YOU have the problem, not MVT, which comes to a high degree
of certainty as having solved the mind-body problem.
Let me put this to you. No scientific theorum can be proved 100%
(cite Heisenberg's principle). But we have to judge between the contending
theoretical models and make the best choice. As it happens, the only
competitor to MVT is Jerison's Recency Theory .. which can be fairly
easily dismissed. So if MVT is just 50.1% likely ... more likely than not,
then we are OBLIGED to accept MVT until a fuller account arrives.
Any competing theory can only be 49.9% probable, at best.
S> No-one has come up with a better idea than MVT, which explains both
S> walking and sleeping consciousness (24/7). Your Turing machine idea
S> doesn't even reach first base, it only models intelligence.
>But what do YOU get besides intelligence? Besides intelligent
>behaviour? Hell, what do you NEED more than than that, besides
>philosophical drivel?
MVT extends the Neuromatrix theories of self, and gateway theory of pain
(used by most clinicians) to give an account of felt experience and
self-referential states. It ties together an evolutionary story that
includes
mechanisms for transition to endothermy, the reasons for REM and
mechanics of dreaming, PLUS it overcomes Leibnitz Law (to be fully
identical the two things must be fully interchangeable) thus gets rid
of Cartesian dualism.
What philosophical drivel do you think is needed? Please make a case.
S> Perhaps I should develop new and irresistible hypnotic applications
S> from MVT and enforce belief in it ... would this satisfy you?
>It would certainly get you that Nobel!
If I wanted that, I could just hypnotise them to give it me anyway!
- -Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
Do your Turing machines fall in love then?
www.steve-nichols.com
Posthuman Organisation
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