RE: Doomsday vs Diaspora

From: Greg Jordan (jordan@chuma.cas.usf.edu)
Date: Fri Apr 25 2003 - 16:04:38 MDT

  • Next message: Robert J. Bradbury: "RE: Doomsday and Fermi"

    On Fri, 25 Apr 2003, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:

    > Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2003 12:23:27 -0700
    > From: Rafal Smigrodzki <rafal@smigrodzki.org>
    > Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
    > To: extropians@extropy.org
    > Subject: RE: Doomsday vs Diaspora
    >
    > Greg Jordan wrote:
    > > It seems improbable that a civilization spread out over various star
    > > systems would be using radio or any other light-speed communication
    > > system, which would be far too slow. So most likely, we are simply not
    > > able to monitor their communications medium, and perhaps it is also
    > > not "broadcast" but rather pointed with a little more privacy.
    >
    > ### This possibility is covered by the "common loss of interest in the above
    > activities" part of the Fermi paradox explanation.

    What I meant was that an interstellar civilization might communicate by
    means that do not easily permit eavesdropping, by curious primitives or
    anyone else.

    I don't think intelligence, as we know it, could "lose interest" in
    exploration.

    gej
    resourcesoftheworld.org
    jordan@chuma.cas.usf.edu

    >
    >
    > Rafal
    >
    >
    > >
    > > On Thu, 24 Apr 2003, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
    > >
    > >> Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2003 12:02:48 -0700
    > >> From: Rafal Smigrodzki <rafal@smigrodzki.org>
    > >> Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
    > >> To: extropians@extropy.org
    > >> Subject: RE: Doomsday vs Diaspora
    > >>
    > >> Civilizations which travel in space and loudly proclaiming their
    > >> existence by radio and other means we can detect, are apparently
    > >> uncommon. This fact can be the result of either uncommon genesis,
    > >> common loss of interest in the above activities, or common doom. No
    > >> a priori anthropic argument can decide between the alternatives. The
    > >> optimist, then, will hope to be the result of an uncommon event,
    > >> which allows a reasonable expectation of extreme longevity, perhaps
    > >> disinterested in talking to primitives and not contravened by
    > >> observation. The pessimist worries that we are the products of a
    > >> common event, and therefore consigned to the outcome most compatible
    > >> with what we see.
    > >>
    > >> Since our data on either the likelihood of spontaneous life
    > >> emergence, or the future of average sentient interest development,
    > >> or the actual cumulative extinction risk for a civilization of our
    > >> type, are woefully inadequate, the optimist and the pessimist will
    > >> reach their conclusions according to their predilections, while the
    > >> Bayesian will not conclude anything at all, aside from the need to
    > >> search for new knowledge and to carefully incorporate it in his
    > >> reasoning.
    > >>
    > >> Rafal
    >
    >
    >



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