Dickey, Michael F <michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
>Assertion: Sentience and subjective continuity is reliant on both the
> pattern of atoms and the atoms themselves.
There is something special about the pattern of atoms that make up your
body but there is absolutely nothing special about the atoms themselves.
Science can find no difference between one hydrogen atom and another,
you can swap them and no detectable change in the system, any system,
can be found.
>I lay on a table, a passive scanner determines the precise location of
>every atom in my body, its type, and what neighboring atoms it is bonded to,
>and proceeds to construct a atomic level duplicate of me. We are both
>awakened and escorted to separate rooms, the 'copy' is asked if he is able
>to see what the 'original' (me) sees, the 'copy' reports that he can not.
Well then the person you call "the copy" is no longer a copy of the person
you call "the original" because now they have different memories of being
escorted into different rooms.
>I lay on a table, a destructive scanning machine determines the precise
>location of every atom in my body while disrupting the information of the
>previous atom it scanned. Using the collected information, an atomic level
>duplicate is made of me. This duplicate is then asked if he is the
>original, as far as he can tell, he is. Did he experience subjectivity
>continuity of consciousness? Given the information provided in the previous
>two scenarios, it is reasonable and logical to assume he did not.
That doesn't make sense. You say the copy can't tell he is the copy
but he can detect a discontinuity of consciousness. Besides, if done
properly there is no reason you'd have any subjective interruption
in what you were thinking, even if a billion years had passed between
thoughts.
>Are you saying that nueral activity completes ceases under deep
>anesthesia? I am highly skeptical of that claim. You are still breathing?
I'm not breathing on the operating table without mechanical assistance. In brain
surgery surgeons often lower the body temperature down from the normal 98.6
to about 82 because then they can stop all blood flow to the brain for several
minutes while they work on it, the cold prevents the lack of oxygen fed to it during
that time from causing brain damage. During that time the brain is as active as
the brain of a corpse.
>>Me:
>>if you were murdered last night and replaced by a "copy" is there any
>>rational reason to be upset about it this morning? I can't think of any."
>In the sense that a sentient being was lost to the universe, yes there is a
>reason to be upset.
Nobody was lost because you can remember being that sentient being, that's
what you mean when you say "I" existed last year. What more could you want?
>as I have outlined multiple times, simple because you could have been
>murdered and couldnt tell that you were *doesnt* mean that you *were*
>murdered.
True, but it does mean it doesn't matter if you were murdered.
I'm reminded of a certain type of fantasy story that even as a child I could not
relate to; all sorts of strange and wonderful things happen to our hero and
then at the end he is horrified to discover he's dead. I don't get it. I'd be
absolutely delighted to discover I'm dead because that would mean I was
mistaken and death was not all it was cracked up to be.
Me:
>>Einstein tells us that there is no one true objective rate of change,
>> it depends on the observer."
>Perhaps you could elaborate on the relevance of that statement, A little
>confused as to how that relates to the question at hand.
You say there is some maximum rate of change that determines if you are still
you, but is one neuron a second being replaced, a thousand neurons a second
or a billion neurons a second, due to time dilation it depends on the speed of the
observer relative to you. Thus if you are correct then to some observers the copy
is truly you and to other observers the copy definitely is not you. That can't be right.
>if you change or alter the state of an individual nueron (or copy it)
>in a period of time shorter than its quickest firing time, your brain
>would never know the difference.
But before you said that to preserve your identity changes should be made
slowly, now you say it's better if changes are made quickly. For the life of me
I don't see why, fast or slow, speed should make the slightest difference.
John K Clark jonkc@att.net
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat May 11 2002 - 17:44:27 MDT