Wei Dai wrote:
> I would say the hypothesis that I am equally likely to be any of an
> infinite number of observers is logically inconsistent. This is simply
> because there is no uniform distribution on an infinite set of discrete
> events. The universe may contain an infinite number of observers, but if
> that is true I can't be equally likely to be any of them. This is really a
> very simple and obvious idea.
> > If you knew where you were, maybe you could define the preferred
> > position to be the place where you are. But in the case we are
> > considering, you don't know where you are, and any choice of a
> > preferred point seems equally arbitrary.
>
> I don't understand this. The preferred point is supposed to figure into
> your a priori distribution for where you are. If you already know for
> certain where you are, the preferred point is no longer relevant. The
> preferred point is like a physical constant, it is somewhat arbitrary but
> like other physical constants it has to be part of a complete theory of
> an infinite universe.
> > > I wasn't being very precise when I said the conventional model has a
> > > preferred position which is the Big Bang. What I meant is that the Big
> > > Bang is a natural choice for the preferred position. There are many ways
> > > to define "near" and thus to pick point number 2. The simplest would be to
> > > to pick the point that comes immediately after the Big Bang in the rest
> > > frame of the universe.
> >
> > I think there is an infinity of such points, and because of quantum
> > randomness, those points would (with prob 1) house an infinity of
> > consciousness-instances.
>
> I don't understand this either. How can there be a infinity of points at
> one Planck time after the Big Bang at the center of mass of the universe?
Nick Bostrom
http://www.hedweb.com/nickb n.bostrom@lse.ac.uk
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
London School of Economics