Joe E Dees wrote:
> Excerpted from Gurwitsch, Piaget and Recursive Equilibration, by
> Joe Dees
> The phenomenology of perception (wherein all perception is an
> intending of its perceptual object), was built upon the foundations
> laid by not only Franz Brentano (PSYCHOLOGY FROM AN
> EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT, SENSORY AND NOETIC
> CONSCIOUSNESS), but by his more famous student Edmund
> Husserl ... - (Dees: how we constitute perceptual objects)
You discuss this below -- my short answer, by anchoring a
reversible succession of percepts in the category "substance";
Kant answers Hume with respect to a "necessary" succession
by means of the a priori relation "causality".
> [Dees] Let me try to mediate between the two.
> Given that the visual field organizes phenomena, and precisely
> phenomena in focus, it is nevertheless necessary to learn to focus
> our lenses, to co-ordinate the two lines of sight, to correlate
> focusing with binocularity (which are not innately linked, for we can
> separate them), and to synthesize vision with our other perceptual
It's interesting, Joe, that it seems best simply to accept an equivoca-
tion in our term "intentionality" --  consciousness is always OF some-
thing, and  attention is vectored; that is, we "intend" to be aware
of what we are aware of.
> Husserl's contributions, of course, are many. The most
> seminal of these, however, did not originate with Husserl himself,
> but with his teacher, Franz Brentano. These include the
> characterization of perception as (1) intentional, and (2) pre-
> reflectively self-aware (1874: 153-189).
(2) is, for me, the sticking point. I think this is so, but I've never
been able to derive it. What do you think, Joe?
> We may distinguish
> between these two types of horizons by calling the first the world
> horizon and members of the second type field horizons. The world
> horizon contains all field horizons, and is reflectively approachable
> but not apprehensible in its totality.
The notion of a "cognitive horizon" is very, very subtle. Both Jaspers
and Heidigger struggled with it. There is the idea that between the
figure and the ground there is a discontinuity -- an emptiness, that
is a horizon that points toward the "transrational" meaning of the
immediate configuration. This is readily apparent in optical illusions
of the alternating figure-ground type. When the ordinary perceptual
background suddenly presents itself as, pari passu, a foreground, one
is tempted to compare this with an event horizon which cannot radiate
an image of its contents. In any event, a perceptual field always
seems contained, and not merely by the geometry of the lens and
retina, a metaperceptual context which, could we only perceive it,
would totally interpret what we are looking at.
I'd like to comment on your entire outstanding post, but the rules
Robert M. Owen
The Orion Institute
57 W. Morgan Street
Brevard, NC 28712-3659 USA
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