From: Brett Paatsch (bpaatsch@bigpond.net.au)
Date: Mon Aug 04 2003 - 12:50:31 MDT
Paul Grant writes:
> > > ..when acting on knowledge of probabilities in a
> > > premptive fashion), you can't really consider ur
> > > reaction moral or immoral....
>
> [brett]
> I was not meaning to say, as you seem to be
> here, that acting or anticipating the actions of others
> (especially when the actions of others are likely to be
> serious even lethal) that one is necessarily operating
> outside of a moral sphere. Quite to the contrary I was
> trying, perhaps, not very effectively, to make the point
> that as subjective indivduals *all* of our judgements
> must necessarily be finally self-centric, including our
> *moral* judgements.
>
> [brett]
> Therefore, it follows to me, almost as day must follow
> night, that whatever else one's moral system might
> incorporate, it *cannot*, (if it is to be consistent and to
> have utility in guiding our actions and serving as a basis
> from which we might seek to form compacts with each
> other) not incorporate the recognition that we must be
> honest with ourselves. I'm arguing that moral action is
> precluded, that one cannot be acting morally if one is
> not acting on one's own best comprehension of the
> situation.
>
> <me>
> .. in my opinion, anybody who says the statement that
> they are acting morally in a pre-emptive fashion that
> harms others, regardless of the effect, is immoral;
> insofar as no event has occurred to justify said "response".
I cannot agree with this statement as a generalisation, as
there are some classes of pre-emptive action made on
the basis of genuinely held, earnestly reasoned (note I
am not touching *belief* here) views that would require
action in my view. Indeed sometimes there would be
a moral impetus towards action (even pre-emptive
action). We cannot *know* for certain the actions of
others and we cannot always prudently wait for them
to do their worst before we respond. In the end it is
to our own judgement of the total risks that we must
hold true and then on that judgement we must act
(including in *some* cases pre-emptively).
> In relation to your secondary point (stated in this letter);
> I really don't think morality has anything necessarily to
> do with self-delusion, or the acknowledgement thereof.
> Or rather, there is no truth that states necessarily you
> have to be honest, ergo an act of dishonesty (as it relates
> to self-delusion) does not violate any particularly great
> truth.
First the status of morality and the rationality of ethics is
pretty widely regarded at least so far as I am aware in
philosophical circles as being almost a matter of opinion.
(eg. Bertrand Russell. History of Western Philosophy).
I find this conclusion powerful, dangerous and deeply
unsatisfying so I am keen to have at it. Let's be clear I may
fail but if I'm going down like Don Quixote, then I'm going
down "having at" one of the larger uglier philosophical
windmills.
Ok. Now here's my point. Unless a moral code can
arise form a set of universals such as a propensity to
reason and a predispositon to sociability then there is
not likely to be much genuine agreement between
subjective individuals on moral codes. Further those
who do not know endeavour to understand themselves,
what manner of creature they are, are not going to be
in a position to know what the most optimal compromises
for them are when compromises need to be made. A person
that deludes themselves that they are a different sort of
creature with different sets of drivers and needs than they
actually have is precluded from sitting down at table
to negotiate for their own best interests because they do
not know their own best interests. A person that deludes
themselves willingly can hardly be a person that others
would want to engage in a moral compacts with.
Within the context of the time available I think individuals
ought to use pan critical rationalism in their approach to
understanding their own nature and then pursuing the
optimal outcome for them in accordance with their nature.
This optimal outcome will necessarily involve compromise
because others whose cooperation is needed will not if they
are enlightened and empowered (and likely to be good
allies as a consequence) strike bad bargains.
>
> <me>
> Or to put it more bluntly, sometimes self-delusion
> is the ticket :) Ever wonder why (evolutionary-speaking)
> we have emotions?
>
I reckon to the extent one is self deluded one will be screwed
at the negotiating table because perceptive others will recognize
you as having a lower sentience quotient and the only one to
blame for this if you are self deluding will be yourself.
> [brett]
> Now against this point it might be argued that there
> are no circumstances where dishonesty with oneself is
> a moral matter. I conceed that this is the traditional view
> but my contention is that that traditional view is wrong,
> flawed, and lacking in utility.
>
> <me>
> Fair enough, I'll bite :)
>
> [brett]
> I am arguing that only those that can commit themselves
> to hold themselves to a rational moral code are in a
> position to have the sort of maturity that is required to
> forge the sort of compacts that will best serve the
> strongest forms of cooperatives and the most extropic
> societies.
>
> <me> substitute "ethics" in for "morality" and I'd agree;
>
So far I've been using morality and ethics without distinguishing
them particularly.
> morality to be is something generally provided for people
> by external sources (rather than derived by said people);
> it also deals heavily with intention. Now, I *really* don't
> care what people's intentions are, just their actions.
Of course you do. A person that you know was intending
to steal from you yesterday but did not for lack of an
opportunity is likely to be filed as such and regarded as
such. If not you'd be suckered far more often than the
norm.
> Intention are more of a heuristic to decide whether or
> not someone's future actions will be favorable.
They certainly are that. And a persons future actions, their
motives, their reputation are surely part of practical moral
deliberations on your part.
> This discussion could all
> be simplified by people adopting a non-intention based
> system, where people are judged by their actions, and
> statements made by said people are evaluated in that
> context (as actions).
I am trying to establish the validity of the statement to
thine ownself be true. You, I think, are trying to make me
make the case or to refute it. I am not interested in a simple
moral system I am interested in a rational, teachable and
extensible one. If I can teach a moral system that has high
utility to those I teach it too, like teaching the principle of tit
for tat, then I can be confident that the world will be that
much more pleasant and predictable for me as a result.
>
> [brett]
> I do not imagine that any of us ultimately succeeds in
> avoiding self delusion. But if the charge of hyper-rationality
> is ever a valid criticism I do not think it can be so on
> matters of morality where the individuals concerned
> acknowledge that their take on the universe is inherently
> subjective and inherently selfish.
>
> <me>
> I think there are degrees of self-delusion; I think
> more important than self-delusion is the end effect that
> self-delusion has on the person as a total system.
In almost all negotiations, and most moral matters between
persons involve a quid quo pro, the best possible outcome
for the individuals involved depends on them recognizing the
best possible outcome for them (without their being deluded
as to what they want or need) and then most closely
approximating it.
>
> [brett]
> It is my contention that if we cannot find a harmony of
> selfish interests we will not find anything but the illusion
> of harmony at all.
>
> <me> in other words, someplace where everyones needs
> are met...
Absolutely not. That is pure fantasy land. The best we can
hope to achieve is a reasonable compromise where all sit
down in good faith and recognizing that all are compromising
but all are gaining in the aggregate all act in accordance with
the agreement.
> [brett]
> And in order for their to be a harmony of selfish interests
> their must be real recognition of the nature of oneself
> and ones needs.
>
> <me>
> or a mapping of sensory input to available physical stimulus.
> thats another possibility, sans recognition of one's own selfish
> interests.
I wouldn't limit one's self understanding and ones understanding
of ones needs and desires to the mere physical. I think there
are social needs in most people that are very deep seeded
and go beyond the need for physical contact.
> Same goes for empaths (people with highly developed
> abilities to sense what others are feeling off of physical
> [body, speech] cues). They intuitively understand people
> and respond sans a specific rational understanding of those
> people. There's no reason (any empaths out there?) to
> think that emotion-intuition is not being applied to
> themselves (the equivalent of reflection).
I am not sure what your point is here. Sociopaths are also
good readers of patterns. They just don't empathise. But
I would argue that sociopathy is dysfunction. And real
sociopaths would possible grin at me and say who needs
that sentimental bullshit anyway. And I'd say you do here's
why ..etc.
>
> [Brett]
> This is where I think it becomes important
> to acknowledge to oneself that one can be rational and
> that one is by nature social. If one does not acknowledge
> that one is social one is not (by my reckoning) being true
> to oneself and one does not have the sort of maturity
> that will enable one to be on good terms with oneself
> and to form real compacts that have a chance of being
> honored with others.
>
> <me>
> Ooooh I don't know about that :) You seem to take
> that people are by nature, social creatures. I don't
> necessarily think thats the case. Or to qualify, people are
> social by a matter of degree.
Sure but there is a baseline. The human infant is born in a
state whereby it cannot support the weight of its own head.
Humans are designed (selected by evolution) from the outset
to be social. The big brain that is useful later would otherwise
by a lethal liability shortly after birth.
> Some are quite capable
> of going it alone while others would die if seperated
> from the herd.
Only after some initial basic social assistance has been rendered.
Many infants get suboptimal social assistance and the outcomes
are often dysfunctional people. But they are not dysfunctional
by choice.
> So i question ur assumption that everyone
> is social.... Its obviously a core belief in ur system, and certes,
> generally speaking, it is the case that most people are social.
Belief has nothing to do with it. I have learned and observed human
infants I know that physiologically they cannot survive without
assistance - that they wish to survive - that they suckle if they can
and cry if they can't is not a matter of mere belief.
> But not all.
Not all to the same degree. But there is no person alive at
present (to the best of my knowledge) with the power to stay
alive without cooperating with others. It is not necessary that
social be about niceness it is better, more funcitonal, if it is
about an enlightened understanding of frailty and the benefits
of cooperation. I would argue that tyrants that aim for the short
glorious life of Archilles in 2003 are short changing themselves.
They are sub-optimally selfish. With a tweak of their value
systems they may be able to satisfy more of their needs and
desires by cooperating. But many of them would have to
re-learn and I'd expect few of them to change what has worked
for them if they could not be presented with a compelling
argument. If there is no compelling argument that can be made
to their self interest then I would say that no real moral argument
is being put to them at all.
>
> [brett]
> If there was a creature that by nature was not social in
> any sense I would grant by my notion of morality that
> that creature would have no duties to others and that
> that creature would not be acting immorally in anything
> it did to others. If one is sure that one is being
> threatened by a genuine sociopath by my moral reckoning
> one would not only be permitted to act in ones defence
> one would be morally obliged.
>
> <me>
> see now I wouldn't go that far; just because ur being
> threatened by a sociopath does not necessarily mean they
> will carry out that act; there's a whole subset of sociopaths
> that lead "normal" lives without going through the murder
> sprees that characterize their (by our definitions)
> less-successful brethern. I think thats more of a policy issue
> (to be decided upon by each individual)....
That is exactly right. In the end the individual must decide moral
policy for themselves. The intelligent individual will take into
account existing social mores and laws but in the end they will not
shirk the responsibility of the moral decision. They cannot. To
shirk is the allow defaults to go into play.
>
> [brett]
>
> In practise I would have some residual doubts about
> the completeness of the sociopathy of even a creature
> such as Hitler so I would not feel completely free to
> exterminate him with extreme prejudice unless I had
> made a good faith reckoning as to the nature of him
> as a threat to what I value. Then having made a
> best a rational determination of the nature of the threat
> as I could given the time and context I would feel free
> to exterminate him with exteme prejudice and I
> would expect to feel no guilt but only some misgivings
> that had I more time I might have judged better. ie.
> My concept of morality is I think in that sense
> practical. And it is extensible. If others share it,
> if they act rationally and in accordance with their selfish
> best interests as they perceive it I can (in the context)
> of this moral system have not fault them morally.
>
> <me>
> now don't u see a contradiction therein? What if
> the sociopath, or even loony person (to broaden the set),
> is merely acting to fulfill his own utility (ergo munching
> on ur spleen or the like)? I mean, just because someone
> else is "selfishly" (is their any other way?!) pursuing
> there own interests, doesn't necessarily mean ur own
> moral code should approve their own...
No my moral code would tell me if this person is reasonable
I can point out that their aspiration to munch on my spleen
is well recognized by me and that that is not a circumstance
that I can permit to prevail. Either we reason out a conclusion
together or we fight to the death now. I then invite them to
do their calculations of cooperation vs competition and
consider how the agreement if it is to be cooperation will be
effectively honored. If at any stage I feel that my appeals to
their reasoning is hopeless then I fall back on trying to kill
them before they kill me.
>
> [Paul]
> > Pretty much the only time u can consider something
> > moral or immoral is after the event has occurred, and
> > then, only for urself. Morality has absolutely no import
> > in a pre-emptive doctrine.
>
> [brett]I don't agree. By my reckoning of morality, when
> individuals agree to cooperate with each other for their
> mutual advantage (perhaps at some cost to them on
> other dimensions were they reckoning their best
> interests separately) there is a moral bond between
> them.
>
> <me> according to ur definition of morality :)
Yes. According to a system I'm offering up for consideration
because I think there is some consistency and utility in it
and because if I am right and it is teachable I will benefit
by shifting the cooperate compete decision more towards
cooperation (just as if I had taught the principle of tit for tat).
>
> [Paul]
> > Anyone that believes to the contrary has not
> > rationally examined the situation.
Depends what you mean by belief. Belief is a problem word
for me because a lot of people who are doing more than
mere believing use the word belief to indicate a sort of less
than certain knowledge. The problem is that some people that
use the word belief may have done no personal processing
on the issue at hand at all but may have simply adopted
wholesale something that they were indoctrinated with.
If you are implying that my proposed moral system is flawed
or inconsistent or unclear then, yes, I am willing to accept that
that could be in fact a valid criticism but I'd ask you to point
out where because as I've said trying to find means of
increasing cooperation and putting morality and ethics on a
more rational footing is a worthwhile task.
> [brett]To be frank, I am doubtful that the word belief can
> be validly coupled (except as crude linguistic
> shorthand for "this is my operating hypothesis") with
> a rational examination of any situation. Belief is often
> used by fairly rational people in just this short hand
> manner.
>
> <me> belief => a statement a rational agent holds true.
Many use it like this. I don't like it because I spend a lot
of time considering the politics of language and communication.
I think that if an extrope is debating with a flat earther in front
of an open minded audience and the audience is only partly
paying attention and they hear the extrope talking of beliefs
on the one hand and the flat earther talking of beliefs on the
other the audience may be seduced into thinking one belief may
be just as good as the other. I think it is in our interests to
get some probability and quantifiability into the discussion. Belief
is language which serves the preservation of the status quo.
>
> [Brett] By the code of morality I have tried to
> describe, belief qua belief is immoral. This is because
> when one is believing one is not reasoning and when
> one is not reasoning to the route of ones selfish best
> interest one is groping with a less than optimal method.
>
> <me>
> depends on how u define it :)
>
> Yes. And I don't think extropes generally define it as
> I do, but my point is that people who hear belief being
> used may be people we are trying to persuade and it
> behooves us to use the most persuasive language.
> Belief is a poor word for conveying significant amounts
> of intellectual exercise.
>
> And certes, just because
> you believe something doesn't necessarily make it false
> (or ill-advised); classic example, I believe the sun will
> rise tomorrow morning... Of course the veracity of that
> statement will require observation tomorrow morning; but
> the belief is both advisable and statistically speaking,
> fairly certain... In other words, belief and logic
> are not necessarily at odds; it depends on how you define
> it.
My point is that when you speak in a political forum you do
your own thought process which is based on considerably
more than mere indoctrination by another (I hope) a disservice
when you use the word belief instead of another word. (This
is because not everyone who hears you use the word belief
knows that you will have done more processing. It seems to
me that many extropes fail to realise that the audience, the rest
of the world doesn't give away free credibility points for one
wacky belief over another.
>
> [brett]My contention is that as soon as one becomes
> a "believer" one has ceased to hold to the principle
> of to thine own self be true - unless one is incapable
> of reasoning - (or one must reach a tentative
> conclusion based on the imperative to live and
> act in real time).
>
> <me> hahahaha :) re - ur last qualification :)
> well since we're all stuck in this current universe... :)
Yes, but again I'd go back to pan critical rationalism.
Without ever getting absolute certainty there are techniques
which we can learn which give us a much higher probability
of getting a correct (a useful) answer.
>
> > Generally speaking, I have no use for morality;
> > just ethics [standard api, consistently adhered to,
> > logically derived, based on reality]....
>
> [brett]I'm reading api as 'application programming interface'.
>
> <me> yuppers.
>
> [brett]"Generally speaking" I suspect you are unlikely to
> enjoy discussing morality and/or ethics much further
> with me ;-)
>
> <me> it doesn't really bother me, if thats what u're asking :)
I was asking. I don't enjoy boring people, I just risk it ;-)
> but I've pretty much made up my ethical system, at least
> in terms of the larger ruleset (meta-rules)...
> some of the smaller "behaviors" are data-driven
> (tit-for-tat, etc) :)
As indeed in practice most of us have. If I am right and a
better more universal ethical system can be derived I would
expect that in most peoples cases there would be very little
observable differences in how they'd behave. But then on the
other hand when one starts to routinely reason as oppose
to believing one is in a position to converse mind to mind
with other reasoning beings. Beliefs can very easily become
entrenched positions. I think to reason when reason is
available is more social and because I think humans are
social (their interests are best served by cooperation) to
reason is moral to believe is not.
Regards,
Brett
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