From: Brett Paatsch (bpaatsch@bigpond.net.au)
Date: Mon Jul 28 2003 - 09:06:44 MDT
Paul Grant writes
> Brett Paatsch writes:
> Kevin Freels writes:
> > When carrying out a preemptive strike, we are
> > only weighing possibilities, not realities.
>
> [Brett] - True, but if we don't carry out a preemptive
> > strike <snip>
> > then we are also only weighting possibilities not
> > realities. We do not have certain knowledge of the
> > actions of others only probabilistic knowledge, only
> > our judgements. If it is immoral to act on a presumption
> > that is based on ones best judgements made in good
> > faith - then *everything* is immoral and the very
> > concept of morality itself becomes absurd as we
> > ultimately have no other recourse than to act on our own
> > judgement.
>
> [Paul]
> ..when acting on knowledge of probabilities in a
> premptive fashion), you can't really consider ur reaction
> moral or immoral....
I was not meaning to say, as you seem to be here, that
acting or anticipating the actions of others (especially
when the actions of others are likely to be serious even
lethal) that one is necessarily operating outside of a
moral sphere. Quite to the contrary I was trying, perhaps,
not very effectively, to make the point that as subjective
indivduals *all* of our judgements must necessarily be
finally self-centric, including our *moral* judgements.
Therefore, it follows to me, almost as day must follow
night, that whatever else one's moral system might
incorporate, it *cannot*, (if it is to be consistent and to
have utility in guiding our actions and serving as a basis
from which we might seek to form compacts with each
other) not incorporate the recognition that we must be
honest with ourselves. I'm arguing that moral action is
precluded, that one cannot be acting morally if one is
not acting on one's own best comprehension of the
situation.
Now against this point it might be argued that there
are no circumstances where dishonesty with oneself is
a moral matter. I conceed that this is the traditional view
but my contention is that that traditional view is wrong,
flawed, and lacking in utility.
I am arguing that only those that can commit themselves
to hold themselves to a rational moral code are in a
position to have the sort of maturity that is required to
forge the sort of compacts that will best serve the
strongest forms of cooperatives and the most extropic
societies.
I do not imagine that any of us ultimately succeeds in
avoiding self delusion. But if the charge of hyper-rationality
is ever a valid criticism I do not think it can be so on
matters of morality where the individuals concerned
acknowledge that their take on the universe is inherently
subjective and inherently selfish. It is my contention that
if we cannot find a harmony of selfish interests we will
not find anything but the illusion of harmony at all.
And in order for their to be a harmony of selfish interests
their must be real recognition of the nature of oneself
and ones needs. This is where I think it becomes important
to acknowledge to oneself that one can be rational and
that one is by nature social. If one does not acknowledge
that one is social one is not (by my reckoning) being true
to oneself and one does not have the sort of maturity
that will enable one to be on good terms with oneself
and to form real compacts that have a chance of being
honored with others.
If there was a creature that by nature was not social in
any sense I would grant by my notion of morality that
that creature would have no duties to others and that
that creature would not be acting immorally in anything
it did to others. If one is sure that one is being
threatened by a genuine sociopath by my moral reckoning
one would not only be permitted to act in ones defence
one would be morally obliged.
In practise I would have some residual doubts about
the completeness of the sociopathy of even a creature
such as Hitler so I would not feel completely free to
exterminate him with extreme prejudice unless I had
made a good faith reckoning as to the nature of him
as a threat to what I value. Then having made a
best a rational determination of the nature of the threat
as I could given the time and context I would feel free
to exterminate him with exteme prejudice and I
would expect to feel no guilt but only some misgivings
that had I more time I might have judged better. ie.
My concept of morality is I think in that sense
practical. And it is extensible. If others share it,
if they act rationally and in accordance with their selfish
best interests as they perceive it I can (in the context)
of this moral system have not fault them morally.
[Paul]
> Pretty much the only time u can consider something
> moral or immoral is after the event has occurred, and
> then, only for urself. Morality has absolutely no import
> in a pre-emptive doctrine.
I don't agree. By my reckoning of morality, when
individuals agree to cooperate with each other for their
mutual advantage (perhaps at some cost to them on
other dimensions were they reckoning their best
interests separately) there is a moral bond between
them.
I am interested in exploring the notion that all things
that are reckoned by a person to be in that persons
rational self-interest
[Paul]
> Anyone that believes to the contrary has not
> rationally examined the situation.
To be frank, I am doubtful that the word belief can
be validly coupled (except as crude linguistic
shorthand for "this is my operating hypothesis") with
a rational examination of any situation. Belief is often
used by fairly rational people in just this short hand
manner. By the code of morality I have tried to
describe, belief qua belief is immoral. This is because
when one is believing one is not reasoning and when
one is not reasoning to the route of ones selfish best
interest one is groping with a less than optimal method.
My contention is that as soon as one becomes
a "believer" one has ceased to hold to the principle
of to thine own self be true - unless one is incapable
of reasoning - (or one must reach a tenatative
conclusion based on the imperative to live and
act in real time).
> Generally speaking, I have no use for morality;
> just ethics [standard api, consistently adhered to,
> logically derived, based on reality]....
I'm reading api as 'application programming interface'.
"Generally speaking" I suspect you are unlikely to
enjoy discussing morality and/or ethics much further
with me ;-)
I may make a real balls up of communicating what
I am saying in an interesting way but I have given
the issue of morality some thought. I think it is an
important topic.
Brett
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