From: Terry W. Colvin (fortean1@mindspring.com)
Date: Sat Jul 26 2003 - 10:58:12 MDT
[Secret war in Laos...]
I'd like to share a story - a chapter from my memoir, actually. It concerns
the July 26, 1968 sapper attack on the Udorn[1] air base. I was down the road
at Ramasun Station at the time. The following is my statement of facts as I
know them from my time there and from talking to others who were there at the
same time. Admittedly, it includes some speculation on my part, as well as
documented fact. If any of you can shed further light on this particular
incident, I welcome your input. Many of you have probably seen this before, but
I'm recycling it for benefit of those who have not and for the sake of a new
thread. I call it...
[1] Thailand
Sitting Ducks, Sappers, and artificial boundaries….
One hot July evening in '68 some of my fellow airmen were killed and wounded in
an attack on the Udorn Air Base, just down the road from us. There was no
danger of their being completely overrun. A mere harassment raid", this was
officially called, though I'm sure it was just a little more than harassment to
those wounded and to the families of those who were killed. In that raid, two
Thai perimeter guards were killed, and at least two Americans were wounded, one
of them fatally, by an exploding satchel charge detonated by one of the sappers.
It was the Communists' mission to damage or destroy as many aircraft as
possible, no matter what type they might be, and to generally disrupt operations
of the air bases. The TC[2], Pathet Lao and NVA would steal into Thai bases
under cover of darkness. Sappers would charge onto the bases with satchel
charges and grenades, attempting to get near enough to a suitable target before
detonating the charge. Sometimes they sacrificed themselves in the process. I
remember hearing stories from flight line personnel at other Thai bases, who had
witnessed cleanup crews going about the grisly task of policing up pieces of
sapper bodies that had been strewn about the tarmac.
[2] Thai Cong
In the July, 29 raid on Udorn, their target was a C-141 Starlifter. In this
case, it was one being used as a medical evacuation plane. It was unmistakable
as such with the huge, conspicuous red crosses on its fuselage. I remember
having seen it sitting parked on the base for several days before the attack. I
took particular note of it, only because it was so unusual to see one there. It
was reported to the press that the raiders must have mistaken it for a B-52
bomber. That story may have satisfied the press corps, but I found it totally
absurd, as the two aircraft look nothing alike. Besides, there were no
B-52's[3] stationed at Udorn, and how many B-52 bombers would display huge red
crosses on their sides anyway? Did it just happen to be the biggest, easiest
target available at the time? Or did the raiders know exactly what it was and
specifically target it? After all, this was a war - one they were fighting to
win! For them, there were no "rules of engagement." Any target was fair game!
[3] B-52s in Thailand were based at U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base in
southern Thailand
The raid began at about 10:00 PM. The happenings at the scene that night were
related to me by a member of the flight line crew there. He had seen the whole
thing, watching from a ditch where he'd taken cover when the shooting started.
Unarmed, he had no choice but to hide and hope to survive it. The C-141 had been
sitting on the taxiway, awaiting arrival of a diplomatic flight from Vientiane,
which was rumored to be carrying two just recovered American POW's. I don't know
who they were, or where they had been, but it seems their return was shrouded in
secrecy. Upon landing at Udorn, they were to be immediately airlifted out to a
hospital in the Philippines by the Starlifter’s medevac crew. It may have been
coincidence, but the precise moment the Vientiane flight touched down on the
runway, the attack commenced.
It was a heavy assault, concentrated primarily on the C-141, though I also
learned from another source that at least one unexploded satchel charge was
later recovered from the intake on one of the parked F-4 Phantoms. When it
became apparent they were under attack, the commander of the C-141, Captain
Robert Shultz, and his flight engineer, Tech Sgt. Paul Yonkie dove for cover -
too late to escape injury. In a blinding flash that lit up the night, white-hot
shrapnel from an exploding satchel charge invaded Sgt. Yonkie's chest and
abdomen, and Captain Shultz's hands and wrists were slashed to the bone by the
cruel shards of flying metal.
I don't know how many were involved in the raid, but the battle went on for
thirty minutes or more on base before they could be driven back. And the
fighting continued throughout the night in the surrounding area. It was rumored
that the arming of the flight line personnel at the air base was initially
delayed, because the First Sergeant, who had possession of the key to the
weapons lockers was off base when the attack occurred. Fortunately, several
minutes into the assault, someone else was finally found to open the lockers and
distribute the weapons and ammo clips. Under the circumstances, it was fortunate
we didn't suffer more casualties than we did. When word of the ongoing attack on
the air base reached us at Ramasun Station, we were put on full alert. To put it
mildly, it was a somewhat disconcerting sight - two armed MP’s inside the
operations building, stationed facing the only door, with weapons at the ready,
locked and loaded. My blood ran cold.
To this day, it’s difficult for me to reconcile why the rest of us were not
immediately issued weapons with an attack under way just a few miles up the
road. Actually I can, but the conclusions are disturbing. I would have felt at
least a little better about the situation that night had I and my men been
allowed to carry our own M-16's and not have to entrust our security entirely to
a handful of armed guards, however well trained and dedicated they were! True
enough, we were technicians and linguists, not trained as combat troops. But in
other wars, even technicians and linguists had been provided means of self
defense! We each had been trained in the use of the M-16, and we had been
required to qualify with live ammo, before being shipped overseas. Furthermore,
we had all been officially assigned a weapon and were required to sign for it
upon arrival at our duty stations in country. Yet, while I was there at least,
we were never drilled on what to do, nor told where to retrieve those weapons in
case of attack. I never touched an M-16 while I was there. We were simply
informed, "They’re in the armory." They probably were, but I had serious doubts
we would be allowed to actually use them when the time came.
Today I have to ask myself, "Was it all just for show - something with which
powers that be could cover their asses in case of a major loss of life due to
hostile action in Thailand? Was it a measure of deniability for those who were
calling the shots in this war, and a means of hopefully silencing angry bereaved
families back home?" As a shift supervisor, I should have at least been made
aware where the weapons lockers were located and given the means to quickly open
them if we did indeed come under attack. But I was not. Unarmed as we were, if
the enemy were to breach our perimeter defenses and overrun the post, we would
have been "sitting ducks", much the same as the poor hapless men of LS-85[4] had
been. Some loss of life is inevitable and expected in war. We all knew and
accepted that. But some of it is unnecessary and is preventable. I kept thinking
it was another tragedy waiting to happen. And had it happened, it would have
been swept under the rug, just as the LS-85 incident had been.
[4] USAF radar site inside Laos
I quote from Alan Vick's book "Snakes in the Eagle's Nest" regarding air base
defenses in Thailand. "Throughout the war US air bases in Thailand lacked
sufficient perimeter fencing, lighting, observation towers and defensive
fighting positions. These shortfalls made it possible for NVA sappers to
penetrate base perimeters on at least five occasions." Looking back on it now,
we at Ramasun were ill prepared to deal with an enemy attack, in spite of the
perimeter fencing, observation towers and lighting we had there. The operations
compound at Ramasun Station was located very near the perimeter of the post.
Once inside the wire, it would take the enemy raiders only seconds to cover the
distance to the ops building. And if the guards in the towers had used their
spotlights to illuminate the grounds, they themselves would become sitting
ducks, easy targets for snipers.
If the building was stormed, the two guards at the entrance might take out a lot
of enemy troops, but in the face of a concerted rush by an enemy suicide unit,
they almost certainly would have been overwhelmed. Still, we inside the building
were supposed to remain unarmed at our radio receivers, carry on with the
mission, and pretend nothing unusual was going on outside - just as the men of
LS-85 had continued to man their RADAR and communications equipment to the
last. Indeed, in the event the post was overrun, in the last moments we would
likely have been preoccupied, feverishly destroying equipment and classified
documents and too busy to participate in our own defense! In our Security
Service training we’d had it drummed into our heads that we were to take care of
classified information FIRST at any cost! Our personal safety was a last
concern.
This very policy is in sync with another possible, much more sinister reason we
in the ops compound were not allowed to carry arms. I did not know it at the
time, but I have since learned some disturbing facts from one in a position to
know. An MP who had been stationed there at Ramasun, he states there were always
contingency plans - standing orders among the MP force that no one in the
compound was to be taken alive if the post were in danger of being overrun by
the enemy. In a letter to me he writes, "The M.P.s were told no one at Ops was
to be taken alive if we were overrun. Ops would be the final point of defense.
We were told before Ops would be overrun the Air Force would be sent in to
destroy it and the remaining personnel!" It’s a chilling thought to me, if it is
indeed true. Now I have to wonder, were the armed guards I saw at the door of
the ops building that night there to dispatch us, rather than to defend us from
the enemy? In the event things did not go well outside the building, would they
have turned their weapons on us? My mind recoils from such a prospect. It’s too
incredible, too distasteful to accept, yet I have to wonder. Certainly, if this
scenario was true, arming those of us in the operations building would have made
their task much more difficult, in fact impossible to carry out.
As for possible air strikes, I knew then, and it’s a well documented historical
fact, that Lima Site 85 had been destroyed just months earlier by Napalm strike
by our own fighter-bomber aircraft out of Udorn. Though the nape was dropped on
site-85 after the enemy had taken it, it doesn’t require too much of a stretch
of the imagination to believe they might have preemptively done the same at
Ramasun Station, if the situation had warranted. After all, there was at least
some evidence that three of the men at LS-85 had been taken alive and made
prisoners by the enemy. Like us, they were men who held Top Secret security
clearances, and were in possession of vital information of great potential value
to enemy intelligence. And we were fully aware the Communists had ways of making
even the strongest, most well indoctrinated man talk. Certainly, what had
happened earlier in the year at LS-85 was a "lesson learned" for those calling
the shots in this war. They would want to insure they did not make the same
mistake twice, would they not? They would surely take all steps necessary to see
to it Ramasun Station would not be occupied, and its personnel captured alive by
the enemy.
The post was but eighteen kilometers from Udorn, mere moments away by air.
Within minutes after orders were issued, aircraft could be scrambled, and the
post where we served would no longer exist. All that would remain is smoldering
rubble. Ramasun Station would be obliterated from the landscape, and we who
served there would be wiped out with it! Of course, on an intellectual level we
understood going in, that we were all expendable to protect the security of "the
mission." We had been told as much, many times over. It was an integral part of
our Security Service training and indoctrination. In fact, we had been told that
our operatives inside Laos had been issued cyanide capsules and ordered to
commit suicide, if they were in imminent danger of being captured. Still, at the
time, I don’t think any of us wanted to truly believe in our "heart of hearts"
that we might actually be purposely sacrificed in order to prevent our live
capture. That was the stuff of spy novels! After all, we were American boys!
Uncle Sam had invested literally millions of dollars and years in the training
of each of us. "Surely, we are of too much value to them alive for them to
actually do such a thing!" At least we all consoled ourselves with that
rationalization. It was a source of comfort and means of making the possible
consequences of what we were involved in less intimidating in our minds. But I
am a good deal older and wiser now, and I realize we were perhaps naive and
overly optimistic in allowing ourselves to believe that at the time. But the
young are by definition, naive and by nature, optimistic. Back then, not one of
us, I’m sure, truly believed in our hearts we were ever going to die. That sort
of thing only happens to others. But the undeniable hard reality remains,
preserving the secrecy of "the mission" was everything!
Admittedly, these ramblings represent only speculation on what might or could
have taken place that night at Ramasun, had the enemy chosen to hit us. In any
case, we spent a restless, uneasy night waiting there in the windowless radio
room, anticipating an attack that thankfully never came. I can only imagine
what the poor bastards manning the guard towers outside the building were going
through. They at least were armed, but I'm sure they would much rather have
been in a fox hole in the ground than exposed, thirty feet up in those towers!
After that incident, I never slept quite as soundly or as comfortably at night
on post. "Yes, there damned sure IS a war going on, and it is here!" Moreover,
I was left with little confidence that I and my men would be given the means
with which to defend ourselves if, and when the need arose. I felt closer than
ever to the men of LS-85.
Back at the air base, after the flight line was finally secured, both Yonkie and
Shultz were stabilized and immediately evacuated to the hospital at Clark Air
Base in Manila. There, Captain Shultz would recover from his wounds. But after
putting up a valiant struggle to live, Sgt. Yonkie finally succumbed to his
injuries weeks later. He was but 34 years old, and I understand he left behind
a grieving wife and three young daughters. The morning after the attack, I
heard that Yonkie and Schultz had been seriously wounded and were air evac'ed
out, but I didn't learn the particulars of their eventual fates until many years
later, after I'd returned Stateside. I didn't know Sgt. Yonkie personally, and
I don't know if he had ever killed anyone in his life. I doubt it. He'd been
on TDY there (Temporary Duty) from his unit's home base in South Carolina, and
he was the unit's first casualty of the Vietnam War. A so called "REMF", his
only mission was to help airlift out our wounded, and he surely didn't expect,
nor deserve to die in such a way. But then, neither did any of the more than
58,200 American casualties of that war whose names cover that massive wall in
Washington DC.
The "Domino Theory", which proposed that other nations of the region would fall
under Communist control if South Vietnam were to fall, was not just some
unfounded fear, despite arguments to the contrary. The Communist sympathizers
and revisionists of history, who would characterize North Vietnam's part in the
war as simply a struggle to unite the two halves of their own country, are dead
wrong! For North Vietnam was actively promoting and directly aiding the
Communist insurgents in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as the Viet Cong
in South Vietnam. And beyond that, the North Vietnamese were receiving massive
aid from the Chinese and Soviet Communists, who would have loved nothing better
than to see their brand of oppressive government spread around the world.
These are things to which I can attest from first-hand knowledge. Aside from
what I learned personally, listening in on Communist communications, I found
from reliable intelligence sources, at least one of the raiders killed in that
fatal July attack on Udorn was a Captain in the North Vietnamese Army. At least
one other raider, who had been captured alive, was also NVA. His live capture
was a stroke of good luck for our side, and a very unlucky one for him. For
days, he was exhaustively interrogated by our agents, before finally being
handed over to the Thai authorities for further questioning. I don’t know, but
the talk in the intelligence community was, his would be a fate far worse than
death. He would pray to die before the Thais were through with him. This had
been a rare opportunity to glean intelligence from one of the sappers. In the
raids on Thai bases, aside from the ones who sacrificed themselves as human
bombs with satchel charges strapped to their bodies, most of the raiders would
get away. After a brief firefight, they'd disengage, melt back into the rain
forest and retreat beyond the borders to find refuge in Laos or Cambodia, where
our troops and planes were not supposed to follow.
The Communist forces which were invading South Vietnam were using the sanctuary
of Cambodia and Laos in the same way. The no man’s lands of Laos and Cambodia
were KEY FACTORS in perpetuating the Vietnam War, thereby determining its final
outcome. This point cannot be overly emphasized! By their own admission, to the
North Vietnamese, Laos and Cambodia were absolutely crucial to their success in
South Vietnam. The restriction of not being able to send our ground troops into
those areas in meaningful numbers was the main factor which enabled the North to
keep the ground war in the South alive, year after bloody year. Because we were
never allowed to eliminate the Communists’ places of refuge, the war persisted,
like some throbbing abscessed tooth. The American people gradually grew
increasingly opposed to an ongoing conflict which seemed to have no end in
sight. As time went on, more of the mainstream began to add their own voices to
the voices of the radicals, who for their own reasons, had opposed the war from
the beginning. That public fatigue with the war is what would eventually allow
the American people to look the other way, as our political leaders finally
pulled the rug out from under the South, ending ALL U.S. support for them. It’s
what would allow America to look the other way and ignore the mass murder that
would take place in Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime and the many atrocities
that would be carried out in Laos by the Pathet Lao.
I quote here an excerpt from a telegram from the Vientiane embassy to the
Department of State in Washington, dated March 16, 1968. It points up a growing
sense by our Lao allies that America lacked the will to do what was necessary to
help them protect themselves in the face of determined Communist aggression.
"As we enter last few weeks of dry season without visible reduction North
Vietnamese presence or activities, Lao are bracing themselves for another series
of enemy attacks. This time there is somewhat less sense of panic than in
February and a more careful measuring of circumstances. However, there is also
an underlying worry and fatalism, which reflects a broad scale of uncertainties.
Chief among these are apparent inability of friendly forces in South Vietnam to
reassert initiative, specially in countryside and marks of diminishing support
for war in United States."
Yes, we did send missions into Laos, trying our best to fight and win a "Secret
War." But they were much less extensive and less effective than they might
otherwise have been, because of their necessarily clandestine nature. That
secrecy was a necessity imposed upon us by a recalcitrant American public and
the politicians. For our involvement in an officially "neutral" Laos would
have been an escalation unacceptable to the anti-war protesters back home! And
any news of Americans involved in a shooting war in Thailand certainly would not
have been well received by them either. But then, those who were protesting in
the streets at home were not the ones sitting in a jungle, halfway around the
world, risking life and limb for their country, were they? Better we should let
the Communists escape to regroup, re-supply and return in a few days or weeks
and do it all again!
Far from helping us, the protesters back home were virtually cutting our legs
from under us! Because of political expediency, we on the ground outside the
borders of South Vietnam were to be kept unarmed and defenseless. And theater
wide, we were to be bound by ridiculous "rules of engagement" and expected to
observe artificial boundaries that our enemies were not obliged to observe. It
was absolute insanity, a completely, indefensibly asinine way to fight a war -
one that just would not allow us to win!
Bob Wheatley, a.k.a., "Air Force Lingy" Sergeant,
USAF Security Service Detachment 4,
6922 Security Wing Ramasun Station,
7th Radio Research Field Station -
"Cobra 7" Udorn Thailand, 1967 - 1968
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-- Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean1@mindspring.com > Alternate: < fortean1@msn.com > Home Page: < http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Stargate/8958/index.html > Sites: * Fortean Times * Mystic's Haven * TLCB * U.S. Message Text Formatting (USMTF) Program ------------ Member: Thailand-Laos-Cambodia Brotherhood (TLCB) Mailing List TLCB Web Site: < http://www.tlc-brotherhood.org >[Vietnam veterans, Allies, CIA/NSA, and "steenkeen" contractors are welcome.]
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