From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rafal@smigrodzki.org)
Date: Wed Jul 02 2003 - 23:30:57 MDT
Emlyn wrote:
>
> Well, wait up there. An infinite space can't really be partitioned
> like that. You either take up none of it, or a finite subset of it,
> or an infinite subset of some order equal to or less than its order.
> Is it clear that making the effort to exist, or to make sure that
> there are 10 copies of yourself rather than 1 actually impacts in any
> way on the space of possibilities in any meaningful way?
### Maybe it does. Say, if there is an infinite number of distinct
trajectories that a mind can follow in its development - not the number of
distinct states that the mind can have, at present, which might be finite,
but the possibilities for growth in various ways, which should be infinite,
then increasing the measure of your instantiations in the multiverse (having
a trillion copies per hubble volume, if you make it to the interstellar
diaspora by cryonics, rather than one - if you decide not to bother), could
increase the number of the trajectories you can follow at any point in the
history of the universe. You can still achieve an infinite number of futures
if you are re-formed again at a later stage of the universe's history (e.g.
in a simulation, billions of years later) but you are missing a lot of
trajectories possible at the same time (sorry for the fuzzy use of the
concept of time and simultaneity). An infinity does not equal infinity.
Imagine an ever-growing disc, built by a cellular automaton from a point
origin. It's border is present, and it is also the only place where
consciousness of any kind is possible in this system. At some time point r
in the calculation you exist in a few locations (2pi*r)on the border.
Assuming that the frequency of you per unit of circle length remains the
same, at time point r + y there will be 2pi(r+y) of you. There will be also
trajectories derived from you and your interactions with the local
environments, different at every location. If you decided to die at r in
most locations, then you would miss most of the trajectories. You could
experience them if you wait long enough (r + x) and the local environments
from r are again recreated (the automaton has a partially recursive
structure), but by then there are even more trajectories than there were at
r + y, and you will never catch up with the guy who wanted to live right
from the start.
---------------------
>
> As to unpleasant consequences, that seems like a rather sad
> punishment-avoidance motivation, unworthy of a rational being. Exist
> because you are scared to not. Yuck.
### I wouldn't say I am scared of non-existence, but rather eager to exist.
The unpleasant consequence is not death, but loss of life.
----------------------------------
>
> Arguments about striving to survive because we evolved to (as brought
> up by Brett), are explanatory, but not sufficient for justification
> in the light of a philosophy (transhumanism) which rejects the
> constraints of naturally selected mental structures. Wanting life
> because we evolved to want it isn't really good enough. Is there a
> better reason?
>
### I think there is no good (i.e. transcendentally valid, universally
right, one and only proper) reason to live. But, since there is no power in
me that would counteract my desire to live, I choose to live. I don't see
the fact that all my desires are just computations on a protein computer
which evolved to survive, as an external imposition. I wouldn't say that
transhumanism rejects naturally evolved mental structures merely because
they are natural - to reject something, it has to be no longer fitting in
with the rest of accepted mental structures. If it still works, feels
coherent, then I can keep it. I am, I identify, I accept this evolutionary
process as a part of self. My self wants to live. This is all the
justification for living that I need.
Rafal
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