From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rafal@smigrodzki.org)
Date: Fri Jun 06 2003 - 15:01:42 MDT
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
>> ### I wonder how I should call myself - as a modal realist I do
>> believe in the actual existence of everything, including God
>> (Jehovah, Allah, and absolutely every deity ever invented or not
>> invented), but I think they are all pretty far away from here, ever
>> farther away than my nearest atom-perfect copy in this level I
>> Tegmark universe. So for all practical purposes I am an atheist,
>> because gods, AFAIK, are too far away to matter. But in theory I am
>> a theist, a polytheist, or even a maxitheist.
>>
>> So maybe I am an alltheist.
>
> You are a theist about this world, as well as all the others. Alvin
> Plantinga is famous for this somewhat surprising enhancement to
> Anselm's ontological argument. The argument is as follows: presume
> that you are a "modal realist:" a believer in the idea that there are
> entities called possible worlds, within at least one of which all
> possibilities are actual(ized).
>
> Well, we can define "God" to be an entity with maximal "greatness",
> which is plausibly defined as a being which is morally perfect and
> "necessary": existing in all possible worlds. Or none at all.
> (Other candidates for "necessary" entities might be the empty set,
> the number 1, and the geometric point.) Well, in that case, "God"
> exists in all possible worlds, or none at all. [Do not omit the
> scare quotes in this argument; its unusual definition is the whole
> key to getting it off the ground.]
>
> Since you say that "God" exists in some possible world, you are
> therefore forced to conclude that "God" exists in all possible words,
> including, of course, this one!
>
> Of course, if you think that there is ANY possible world in which
> "God" doesn't exist, you are similarly forced to accept that "God"
> exists in no possible worlds at all!
>
> While not even Plantinga thinks that the argument is a good proof, or
> even very convincing, it does serve to galvanize the debate: either
> "God" exists necessarily, in all possible words, or "God" necessarily
> *doesn't* exist in ANY possible worlds.
### I think that the use of words such as "necessary", together with
"greatness" and "moral perfection", allows me a lot of wiggle room to avoid
the charge of being a this-world theist. If we were to say that all that is
necessary for the "God" to claim actual existence in this Hubble volume is
to have persons defining him/her/it, then indeed there would be God on
Earth. Even more - if we were to ascribe moral perfection and maximal
greatness to the empty set, such "God" would be present in all possible
worlds.
Yet, I would have little interest in such semantic sleight of hand, using a
word with some connotations as a pointer to entities devoid of most of such
connotations. For practical purposes, I am not aware of any evidence that a
god of any matter-moving kind meddled anywhere within 13.7 billion
lightyears from here. I expect that the measure of my continuations actually
encountering gods, compared to the measure of me's who never meet a god,
will be quite low. Therefore, I do not feel obliged to worship or otherwise
adapt my behavior or expectations for the future, the main issues of
interest for me. Should the likes of Mr Plantinga wish to worship the empty
set, good luck to him. I presume he will be granted an infinite existence
within his "God" after leaving our present location.
>
> I encourage you to read more about this here:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#7
>
### Thanks. It is quite amusing. Old Anselm' argument is so easy to shoot
down.
Rafal
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