From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Wed Jun 04 2003 - 23:34:48 MDT
Dan Fabulich wrote,
> The use of indexicals here such as "this world" and "our levels" is
> misleading. If this world is a simulation, then this world may be
> considerably more exciting than its previous version. I don't feel like I
> have a good measure of how "exciting" our world is. You seem to take it
> that the answer is "not very exciting", but I don't see it that way at
> all.
I am equating technological advances and virtual reality toys. We can't simulate entire universes in our current existence. But
the Simulators obviously can. Their level of virtual reality, computing power, and technological advancement must be immeasurably
superior to ours. Whatever you find exciting about our escalating level of technology, they've been there, done that, and moved on.
That's what I call exciting! On any continuum between pre-singularity and post-singularity, I would assume that the previous world
is more boring than the later world!
> As for the argument about suffering, I think this is argument is utterly
> misplaced. I don't need a posthuman theodicy to think that there's a
> reasonable chance that an interested posthuman with arbitrarily large
> resources might rehearse the brief history of life on Earth in ver mind,
> perhaps in great detail, and that's all it takes to get the sim argument
> off the ground.
But to give us the ability to feel pain, to make us conscious of our pain, and then to submit us all into the world of suffering
needlessly.... That's hard to imagine. I don't think any of us would do that. If we are simulations of the Creators' ancestors,
then they are our descendants in the future. Can we extrapolate a scenario where we will become transhuman, immortal, and
ultimately powerful, ...and then recreate a world of suffering that we have ourselves escaped? This does not seem very likely to
me.
> This
> argument amounts to saying that in most sim universes, movies like The
> Matrix would be prevented by physics itself. A cool superhero movie would
> be possible, but considering the brain-in-a-vat case wouldn't...? This
> seems absurd. Why wouldn't they just let us consider the possibility
> without giving us a practical use for this information?
But this would break the simulation. Because in the real world, people might ponder such things uselessly. They aren't in a
simulation, so none of their attempts to detect the simulation, prove it, and break it would work. But in a simulation, these very
same actions could cause problems. We might discover proof and redirect the history of the simulation as we demonstrate this to
everybody. We might find a way to hack the simulation and start reprogramming it or try to communicate to the real world. If we
couldn't get that far, we could all just commit suicide to end the simulation, or all act inappropriately to ruin the historical
recreation, or overload the system with a denial of service attack by doing a lot of things that are much harder to calculate and
simulate. These actions must be possible, or, they must be prevented by security features in the simulation. If these security
features are there, we should be able to detect them as our attempts fail. But it seems much simpler and more direct in design if
we were merely prevented from having the idea of hacking our way out of the simulation in the first place.
> Of course, this flies in the face of Hanson's "How to Live in a
> Simulation" paper, (which advocates that, in a simulation, you should try
> to be interesting, entertaining, praiseworthy, and all around impressive,)
> especially in light of your argument that they'd NEVER simulate a world
> like ours because it would be too boring.
I find that argument to be unconvincing. If we can't effect how the simulation is being run by getting the interest or attention of
our Simulators, then it would be futile to alter our behavior. On the other hand, if they did tweak the simulation based on our
actions, we would have examples of miracles or non-sequiturs all the time. Maybe they could carefully modify the game without it
being noticed. But this would change the argument from a simulation to a directly-controlled scenario or game. I think such
control would make our universe appear less arbitrary or more directed or would be detectable in some way.
> With that said, I think that *because* your excitement and suffering
> arguments fail, so does the argument from pragmatism gain force.
> On the other hand, I said:
>
> > > Here, I think, you have missed the point of this argument. Many
> > > transhumanists still seem to believe that *we* will create simulated
> > > environments, in which it will be impossible for our simulated subjects to
> > > falsify the claim that they are in a simulation. This is a solid
> > > prediction that makes claims about what kinds of worlds there will be:
> > > namely, that there will be some simulated worlds that we'll make.
This leads into my further extrapolation: If we intend to create such worlds, and we postulate that if we are in a simulation that
it would probably be a simulation of the Simulators' ancestors, then they are probably our descendants derived from our own future
history. This gives us a lot better predictive power concerning the simulation than if they were totally alien. Of course, they
may be so advanced to be unrelated to us in any significant way, but it still is much closer than a randomly different and alien
culture out there.
> But it is precisely the point that we'll have no practical tests for
> whether we're in a simulation for quite a long time, if ever. Therefore
> there is no prediction being made here: only a prediction in combination
> with a metaphysical view.
You need a professional hacker! They are great for figuring out how to detect, probe, evaluate, and ultimately manipulate remote
unseen computing forces by using ordinary communications and interactions in such a way as to get unexpected results. If we are in
a simulation, a hacker should be able to figure it out.
(Hmmm... unless the hackers capable of doing this are programmed to disbelieve that we are in a simulation so they never try!
Nah...!)
> There's something wrong with this, but it's not the verification
> principle: the problem is that the information in question is useless.
> We should act the same regardless of whether we're in a *detailed
> posthuman* simulation. Hanson can't give you any advice for such a case,
> and neither can anyone else.
This is what makes this argument so fun. I don't think it should have any influence on how we behave, what we choose to do, our
goals, or our methods. In short, life goes on as if we aren't in a simulation even if we are.
> > Name me one transhumanist who wants to build a world as mundane as this
> > one with our levels of tragedy and suffering.
>
> At times, Tipler seems to argue that we would be simulated (or, as he
> calls it, "resurrected") precisely as we were, and/or in certain kinds of
> indistinguishable "educational worlds" that would teach us to be better;
> hence any Tiplerian transhumanists of that vein would meet my criteria.
OK, that's one! I keep forgetting that creationism and reincarnation are coming at me from two different fronts! How odd...
> Certainly many of us have entertained the idea of ancestor-simulations in
> what we took to be a realistic fashion, though I don't think anyone has
> gone to the mat arguing that we WILL do ancestor-simulations. If you
> doubt me, I suppose I can go archive-diving, but I won't slog through that
> pointless task merely for your amusement. ;)
Our current archives don't seem as realistic as the simulated history we are talking about. :-)
-- Harvey Newstrom, CISM, CISSP, IAM, IBMCP, GSEC Certified Security Manager, Professional, Assessor, Consultant, Technician <HarveyNewstrom.com> <Newstaff.com>
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