From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@optusnet.com.au)
Date: Mon Jun 30 2003 - 14:28:29 MDT
Giu1i0 Pri5c0 writes:
> Of course it is correct that we do not yet know as much as
> we should on brain and consciousness. At the same time
> the point that I am trying to make is independent of a
> particular mechanism of consciousness:
>
> Question A: does the uploaded copy of person X wake up
> thinking and feeling that (s)he is X? Does (s)he feel continuity
> with X (going to sleep - waking up)?
Yes and yes. Assuming, as we have been, that the upload works.
Indeed the test of whether the upload has worked is likely to be
does Xprime think (s)he is X and does everyone else relate to
Xprime as X.
> This is a scientific question that can be answered with a simple
> experiment: just ask the uploaded copy of X. I assume the
> answer depends on the details of a uploading technology, like
> how much and what kind of information it is able to copy and
> restore. I think this technology is a few decades away at least,
> but it seems reasonable to think that it will be developed sooner
> or later.
Well, the uploading technology is unlikely to be *built* until it can
be designed. Seems we are unlikely to be satisfied with the design
until we have a better understanding of what we take for
"consciousness" and the "self".
> Question B: assuming that the answer to Question A is yes (the
> uploaded copy feels that (s)he is X), is (s)he REALLY X?
>
> This does not look like a scientific question, since its formulation
> is such that it cannot be verified or falsified.
Agreed.
Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem: There are certain propositions
that are true that cannot be proven.
Do you think the consciousness of any other person you know
is a scientifically veriable hypothesis? I think it can only be inferred.
Do you think your own is even to you? I think it can only be
assumed.
Without assuming it you have *no base* from which to formulate
scientific questions or any other types of questions.
> Of course we still tend to feel uneasy: when it comes to survival,
> everyone is the Most Selfish Individual. We cannot help thinking
> that Question B matters very much. The answer that I choose is:
> it does not matter.
A leap of faith?
> I can accept as a continuation of my current
> identity any conscious being who thinks that he is a continuation
> of my current identity. I could not go to sleep if I could not
> accept this.
A leap of faith for peace of mind?
> Brett:
> > Because I don't *know* enough about how my consciousness
> > and the experience of self-hood manifests to assume that it can
> > persist completely decoupled from a matter substrate for any
> > length of time. My current thinking is no substrate means no
> > conscious processing (or unconscious processing either). No
> > consciousness process means no self concept process. In short
> > I assume that no brain means a discontinuation of me because it
> > seems prudent to do so.
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