From: Giu1i0 Pri5c0 (gpmap@runbox.com)
Date: Sun Jun 29 2003 - 03:31:26 MDT
So, operationally from the outside and from the inside the uploaded copy is
the original. I wonder then what the meaning of "but the uploaded copy is
not REALLY the original" can be.
Perhaps we should use "feels like" instead than the difficult "is". I feel
like me because I remember the things that I remember (including what I
donīt consciously remember at this moment) or, in other words, because of
the specific information coded in my brain. This is I believe the simplest
explanation. So if the information coded in my brain is transferred
somewhere else, someone will wake up feeling that he is me. I consider this
enough, because I do not care too much about "is".
I think when one dies consciousness goes on, even if that particular
individual stream of consciousness stops. There are still thinkers thinking
thoughts. Of course you can accepts this as a partial "answer" only is you
believe that each consciousness is fundamentally the same, in other words
that there is no physical or spiritual "signature" other than information
that defines the difference between you and I.
So when I die "I" will continue as another thinker thinking other thoughts
and remembering other things: this "I" (weak I) is already preserved. If
what I am interested in is preserving a "strong I" (the thinker who is
thinking these specific thoughts and remembering these specific things),
then I do not see anything wrong with uploading when it is technically
feasible.
Sorry this was not very clear, perhaps language is not really equipped for
this. It would be interesting to put it in better words.
--- G. P. WEB: http://prisco.info/giulio/ WAP: http://prisco.info/wap/giulio/index.wml Email, phone, fax, PGP: see WEB/WAP Yahoo, MSN: gpmap ----- Original Message ----- From: "Damien Broderick" <damienb@unimelb.edu.au> To: <extropians@extropy.org> Sent: Sunday, June 29, 2003 8:34 AM Subject: RE: Cryonics and uploading as leaps of faith? (was Re: Uploaded Omnisciience) > I agree that this delusion will become common, because operationally, from > the outside, you *will* be dealing with the same person (or an improved > version), and the duplicates, from the inside, will recall the same > memories as the original. That's built in to the premise.
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