From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Wed Jun 18 2003 - 17:41:51 MDT
At 07:00 PM 6/18/2003 -0700, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
> > I face a tradeoff. The more confident I become I like her the worse
> > my future decisions will be (due to the difference y-x), but the more
> > she will be reassured of my loyalty (due to a high y). The higher my
> > x, the higher a y I'm willing to choose in making this tradeoff. So
> > the higher a y she sees, the higher an x she can infer. So this is
> > all really costly signaling.
>
>### At this point, the terms signaling and self-deception are perhaps no
>longer quite appropriate. The signal you send and the referent of value to
>your girlfriend are one and the same. Word and deed is one, which is
>different from the usual context of signaling. ...
>It might be useful to restrict the term self-deception to situations where
>an unfulfilled need stemming from one part of a goal system leads to the
>formulation of a belief and a secondary goal, which is in conflict with the
>initial goal. ...
I meant how much I like her to be a belief about a fact, say how pretty
or smart she is, and not just a preference statement, which you are right
is not really self-deception per se. There is of course a huge literature
on self-deception and what it can mean; I don't mean here to be innovate
with respect to that, and defer to that literature on definitions.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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