Kayakian Sentence

From: Damien Broderick (damienb@unimelb.edu.au)
Date: Sat May 31 2003 - 21:55:56 MDT

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    At 02:39 PM 5/31/03 -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:

    >I was television baby, and so many of the
    >19th century type sentences uttered by writers of the latter
    >century don't stick will enough in my short term memory to
    >enable me to follow them very well.

    Ha! Try Hegel or Kant! Here's an interesting attempt to justify Hegel's
    porridge (from Judith P. Butler, *Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections
    in Twentieth-Century France*, Columbia University Press, 1987):

    ============

    Hegel's sentence structure seems to defy the laws of grammar and to test
    the ontological imagination beyond its usual bounds. His sentences begin
    with subjects that turn out to be interchangeable with their objects or to
    pivot on verbs that are swiftly negated or inverted in supporting clauses.
    When 'is' is the verb at the core of any claim, it rarely carries a
    familiar burden of predication, but becomes transitive in an unfamiliar and
    foreboding sense, affirming the inherent movement in `being', disrupting
    the ontological assumptions that ordinary language usage lulls us into making.
            The rhetorical inversion of Hegelian sentences as well as the narrative
    structure of the text as a whole convey the elusive nature of both the
    grammatical and human subject. Against the Understanding's compulsion to
    fix the grammatical subject into a univocal and static signifier, Hegel's
    sentences indicate that the subject can only be understood in its movement.
     When Hegel states, `Substance is Subject', the `is' carries the burden of
    `becomes', where becoming is not a unilinear but a cyclical process.
    Hence, we read the sentence wrong if we rely on the ontological assumptions
    of linear reading, for the `is' is a nodal point of the interpenetration of
    both `Substance' and `Subject'; each is itself only to the extent that it
    is the other because, for Hegel, self-identity is only rendered actual to
    the extent that it is mediated through that which is different. To read
    the sentence right would mean to read it cyclically, or to bring to bear
    the variety of partial meanings it permits on any given reading. [...T]he
    very meaning of the copula itself is being expressed as a locus of movement
    and plurivocality.
    [...]
            Hegelian sentences are read with difficulty, for their meaning is not
    immediately given or known; they call to be reread, read with different
    intonations and grammatical emphases. Like a line of poetry that stops us
    and forces us to consider that the way in which it is said is essential to
    what it is saying, Hegel's sentences rhetorically call attention to
    themselves. The discrete and static words on the page deceive us only
    momentarily into thinking that discrete and static meanings will be
    released by our reading.
    [...]
            In reading for multiple meanings, for plurivocity, ambiguity, and metaphor
    in the general sense, we experience concretely the inherent movement of
    dialectical thinking, the essential alteration of reality. And we also
    comes to understand the role of our own consciousness in constituting this
    reality inasmuch as the text must be read to have its meaning enacted. [pp.
    17-19]

    ================

    Damien Broderick



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