From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Wed May 28 2003 - 09:12:02 MDT
Lee writes:
> Jef writes:
>> From this we might infer that superrationality is what you get
>> when you extrapolate any more limited concept of rational behavior
>> to a timeless setting. This seems particularly apropos to extropians
>> who hope and plan to live forever.
>
> Yes, I think I know what you are saying. Certainly if in the
> non-iterated Prisoners Dilemma I begin to suspect that the other
> player is myself, either a freshly minted duplicate or a self from
> another time, then my incentive to Defect vanishes. (Because I see
> Lee Corbin getting benefit no matter "who" wins.)
>
> Now then, timelessness also invites one to confuse a present setting
> with members of the set of all equivalent settings. I shall refer to
> the atavistic axioms of Kolmogorov, (which are all that I believed
> until indoctrinated by the present ilk of Bayesians who infest these
> lists). My interpretation of Kolmogorov axioms were just this: say
> one has tossed a die high into the air, and then just as it hit the
> table, slapped a hat on top of it so that one cannot see the value
> that the die has assumed. Then on the one hand we accept that the
> die has assumed a definite value (and is not really in any sort of
> superposition of all six possibilities). My interpretation of the K
> axioms was that we are invited to deliberately confuse the present
> circumstances with all those other historical cases in which a die
> has been tossed (Kolmogorov's "class G"). Then from this vast
> sample, the theoretical fraction of instances in which the "six" is
> showing is one-sixth! And thus we have probability.
>
> It is possible that you meant something like this by your
> "timelessness".
No, that's not really what I meant. See below.
>
> As for superrationality itself---as originally defined by Hofstadter
> and others---it's merely the mistaken doctrine that one should
> Cooperate in the non-iterated Prisoners Dilemma under the normal
> conditions that the adversary is not a version of oneself (and
> therefore has behavior completely uncorrelated with one), and that
> one is not an altruist. The values in the Table say "Defect", and I
> think that that is all there is to it (given the Totally correct
> assessment of the non-Repeatability of the PD).
Prisoners Dilemma is considered a paradox because at the level within which
is it discussed by game theorists, it shows two fully aware and rational
players choosing to defect (they both lose) when they could have easily
chosen to cooperate (they both win.)
As with all paradox, the problem is seeing things at too low a level,
isolated from other relevant factors. In the real world, our actions *are*
correlated, and we can expect (more or less) that others will choose as we
choose. As we interact over time, correlation only increases, so the
success of superrational decision-making becomes increasingly probable as we
approach "timelessness".
It seems that superrationality is very similar to the "altruism" humans
speak of. The key to understanding it is the proper context level.
Hmmm, weren't we here about a year ago?
- Jef
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