From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue May 27 2003 - 18:24:35 MDT
Rafal writes
> Hal Finney wrote:
>
> > Without analyzing it in detail, I think this level of honesty,
> > in conjunction with the usual game theory assumption of rationality,
> > would be enough to imply the result that the two parties can't
> > disagree. Basically the argument is the same, that since you both
> > have the same goals and (arguably) the same priors, the fact that the
> > other party judges an outcome differently than you must make you no
> > more likely to believe your own estimation than his. Since the game
> > theory matrix makes the estimated utilities for each outcome common
> > knowledge, the two estimates must be equal, for each outcome.
>
> ### But isn't the main problem an irreconcilable difference in the goals
> between players, the difference in weighing outcomes? The simplified
> depiction of the averagist vs. the totalist is just the beginning: you could
> imagine all kinds of global payoff matrices, describing attitudes towards
> outcomes affecting all objects of value, and even differences in what may be
> considered an object of value. There are those who favor asymmetric
> relationships between wishes and their fulfillment (meaning that while the
> total rather than average utility is to be maximized, at the same time a
> limited list of outcomes must be minimized). There are fundamental
> differences the lists of subjects whose preferences are to be entered into
> the ethical equation, and the methods for relative weighing of such
> preferences.
At this stage, I'm not going to claim that I understand what you
have written. But would you care to comment upon
http://hanson.gmu.edu/deceive.pdf
It mentions the annoying result that "if two or more Bayesians
would believe the same thing given the same information (i.e.,
have "common priors"), then those individuals cannot knowingly
disagree. Merely knowing someone else's opinion provides a
powerful summary of everything that person knows, powerful
enough to eliminate any differences of opinion due to differing
information."
I could certainly use a hand in getting to the bottom of this.
Lee
> I would contend that even perfectly rational altruists could differ
> significantly about their recipes for the perfect world.
>
> Rafal
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